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Law firms maintain and store voluminous amounts of highly confidential and
proprietary data, such as attorney-client privileged information, intellectual properties,
financials, trade secrets, personal, and other sensitive information. There is an ethical
obligation to protect law firm client data from unauthorized access. Security breaches
jeopardize the reputation of the law firm and could have a substantial financial impact if
these confidential data are compromised. Information security policies describe the
security goals of a law firm and the acceptable actions and uses of law firm information
resources.
In this dissertation investigation, the author examined the problem of whether
information security policies assist with preventing unauthorized parties from accessing
law firm confidential and sensitive information. In 2005, Doherty and Fulford performed
an exploratory analysis of security policies and security breach incidents that highlighted
the need for research with different target populations. This investigation advanced
Doherty and Fulford’s research by targeting information security policies and security
breach incidents in law firms. The purpose of this dissertation investigation was to
determine whether there is a correlation between the timing of security policy
development (proactive versus reactive policy development) and the frequency and
severity of security breach incidents in law firms of varying sizes.
Outcomes of this investigation correlated with Doherty and Fulford’s general findings
of no evidence of statistically significant relationships between the existence of a written
information security policy and the frequency and severity of security breach incidents
within law firms. There was also a weak relationship between infrequency of
information security policy updates and increase of theft resources. Results demonstrated
that, generally, written information security policies in law firms were not created in
response to a security breach incident. These findings suggest that information security
policies generally are proactively developed by law firms.
Important contributions to the body of knowledge from this analysis included the
effectiveness of information security policies in reducing the number of computer
security breach incidents of law firms, an under represented population, in the
information assurance field. Also, the analysis showed the necessity for law firms to
become more immersed in state security breach notification law requirements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Introduction
Law firms are entrusted with highly confidential and privileged client documents
containing personal data that may include financial, shareholder, personally identifiable
information (PII), trade secrets, and/or attorney-client privileged information. Reinstein
and Seward (2008) define attorney-client privileged information as confidential
communications between clients and their attorneys to allow truthful disclosure when
seeking legal advice that cannot be discovered by other parties, including adverse parties
in lawsuits. Law firms have an obligation to maintain, store, and secure this sensitive
information and to ensure their clients’ privacy (Comerford, 2006; Nelson, Isom, &
Simek, 2006). Security breaches are incidents consisting of unauthorized access to
sensitive or confidential data of the law firm (Kraemer & Carayan, 2007; Schwartz &
Janger, 2007; Silverman, 2007). Information security policies describe the security goals
and procedures of a law firm (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Metzler, 2007; Robinson, 2005).
Information security policies are specifically designed to safeguard network resources
from security breaches (Doherty & Fulford, 2005). Information security policies outline
the responsibilities and acceptable use actions of law firm employees (Baker & Wallace,
2007; Ries, 2007) when using law firm computers and networks. Security controls
include management controls, operational controls, and technical controls. Information
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security policies are considered management controls and define appropriate security of
the network infrastructure (Post & Kagan, 2007). Incorporated in the security policy is a
clear explanation of the rules with regard to how the network can be accessed, with a
concentration on maintaining confidentiality and identifying the ramifications of a
security breach (Greene, 2006; Whitman & Mattord, 2008). Other management controls
include vulnerability assessments and security plans implemented to manage the security
(Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2006; Salmela, 2008) of the law firm. Operational controls
include physical security, personnel security, business continuity planning, incident
response, hardware and software maintenance, confidential data protection, and security
awareness training (Bowen, et al.; Hagen, Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 2008) that are
implemented by law firm personnel rather than automatically by computer software.
Technical controls include firewalls, anti-virus, intrusion detection systems (IDSs),
intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), and access controls. Farn, Lin, and Lo (2008) define
defense-in-depth as a way to overlap security policies, technical controls, management
controls, operational controls, and procedures in order to provide layers of protection to
the network infrastructure (Kamal, 2008; Hagen et al., 2008). Whitman and Mattord
(2008) further explain that defense-in-depth provides redundancy throughout the network
architecture by using technical controls. Firewalls are software and hardware that
prevent unauthorized users from accessing the law firm network (Weaver, 2007). Antivirus software scans files for potentially harmful viruses and sequesters these files to
prevent their propagation (Lin, 2006) to other computers on the network. IDSs are
software programs that identify possible unauthorized access to files (Basta & Halton,
2008). IPSs are software programs like IDSs that identify possible access to files but flag
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the activity in real-time (Whitman & Mattord). Authorized users are those users who
have permission to access the computer files and network of the law firm (Comerford,
2006). Access controls provide permissions to allow users access to network assets, such
as database files or law firm networks based on their carefully delineated access
privileges, making sure that only authorized users are allowed to access certain data on
the law firm’s network (Comerford).
Kamal (2008) further includes the use of information security policies, security
awareness, and employee training to deflect social engineering schemes as other security
layers to be included in the defense-in-depth process. Social engineering is the act of
people attempting to coerce or trick someone into divulging secrets, such as their
username and password to circumvent security protocols (Kamal; Basta & Halton, 2008;
Medlin, Cazier, & Foulk, 2008). This can be accomplished by pretending to be an
employee or someone knowledgeable (Kamal) about the law firm to gain the trust of the
law firm employee in an attempt to retrieve sensitive information or bribing an employee
to be unfaithful to the law firm (Basta & Halton).
Individuals who access law firm data without security measures in place may
unknowingly put confidential information at risk (Salmela, 2008). Im and Baskerville
(2005) found in their longitudinal study, as did Post and Kagan (2007) in their survey
study, that human errors can be based on an individual’s computer skill level. Errors can
result in mistakes involving rules, or malfunctions of knowledge-based systems and can
be intentional, accidental, malicious, direct attacks, or indirect attacks (D’Arcy & Hovav,
2009; Im & Baskerville; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Post & Kagan). LaRose, Rifon, and
Enbody (2008) define self-efficacy as “the belief in one’s own ability to carry out an
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action in pursuit of a valued goal” (p. 72). In order to safeguard law firm data, an
individual law firm employee has to believe that he/she is capable of making the proper
security decisions (Chan, Woon, & Kankanhalli, 2005; LaRose et al.; West, 2008).
Despite technical controls (i.e., firewalls, IDSs/IPSs, anti-virus, and access controls) that
automatically assist in providing security measures, the provision of optimal security is
challenging because humans are involved (Kraemer & Carayon; Post & Kagan; West).
For example, a firewall can be misconfigured by a law firm employee resulting in a
possible security breach or an e-mail attachment containing a virus can be opened
without first scanning it causing a security breach incident (Comerford, 2006; Keller,
Powell, Horstmann, Predmore, & Crawford, 2005). Security policies aid in defining how
law firm employees should set up the firewall or when it is necessary to scan an attached
file with anti-virus software prior to opening the file (Keller et al.; Verdon, 2006).
The design, implementation, and enforcement of security policies can be
accomplished through a risk assessment such as an external or internal vulnerability
assessment (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006). An information
security assessment typically consists of a risk assessment that identifies potential
cyberthreats to a law firm’s mission critical resources and a vulnerability scan of
applications, ports, and systems (Batista, 2006; Bowen et al., 2006). An information
security risk assessment examines how law firm employees are actually following the
information security policies and procedures (Bowen, et al.). A risk assessment can aid
in determining the strength of the defense-in-depth of the multiple technologies installed
to protect confidential and sensitive information residing on law firm networks (Batista).
Typically, law firms perform an information security risk assessment to identify potential
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threats, determine the likelihood (ranked high, medium, or low) that these threats will
occur, and evaluate the impact (ranked high, medium, or low) on the law firm’s functions
should these threats transpire (Bowen et al.).
A vulnerability assessment consists of scanning the network and systems to identify
exploitable vulnerabilities of the installed applications and to identify what patches and
controls are needed to mitigate exposure of the confidential data to unauthorized users
(Batista, 2006; Myler & Broadbent, 2006). Vulnerability assessments also scan the ports
to identify whether there are exposed ports open that should be closed (Batista; Bowen et
al., 2006) to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to the law firm network
infrastructure (Comerford, 2006). This vulnerability assessment can also aid in
determining the effectiveness of law firm security policies and procedures (Batista;
Bowen et al.; Ross, 2007).
Problem Statement and Goal
Problem Statement
With the proliferation of electronic documents in the legal world, the volume of
documents held by law firms has increased significantly (Gorga & Halberstam, 2007).
Document-intensive cases also contribute to the need to share data and other content of a
client’s case with roaming law firm users, the client, and/or with co-counsel for
collaborative purposes (Gorga & Halberstam). A security breach can result in the risk of
an intrusion into the law firm’s sensitive information (Comerford, 2006; Kraemer &
Carayan, 2007; Ries, 2007; Schwartz & Janger, 2007). For instance, the intruder could
potentially gain access to attorney-client privileged documents that may contain
proprietary information, trade secrets, shareholder information, PII, and/or other private
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data that may be damaging to a law firm if it were to become public (Comerford;
Johnson, 2008; Ries). Lawyers have an ethical obligation to protect confidential
information from inadvertent disclosure, including data stored on law firm networks, as
well as data accessed remotely (Comerford; Johnson). Such disclosure can contribute to
a loss of confidence in a law firm (Schwartz & Janger) and/or liability from malpractice
claims against lawyers and the firm. Therefore, the problem examined in this
investigation was determining whether information security policies assist with
preventing unauthorized parties from accessing this sensitive information.
The author further investigated the exploratory analysis study of Doherty and Fulford
(2005) in this dissertation investigation to determine whether security policies aid in
abating security breach incidents against law firm data and networks. The author
advanced the 2005 study by identifying whether information security policies were
developed in response to security breach incidents or whether concern for security
breaches prompted the development and implementation of security policies. Thus, in
this dissertation investigation, the author posited questions relative to whether security
policies are proactively or reactively developed.
Goal
The goal of this dissertation investigation was to develop an analysis of the survey
data to determine whether law firms are proactive in their security policy development or
reactive to security breach incidents. In this dissertation investigation, the author also
investigated whether law firms utilize risk assessments, network vulnerability scans,
and/or penetration tests to validate the intended information security policies and ensure
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the existence of adequate safeguards from attackers and/or prevention of unauthorized
access to law firm confidential information (Myler & Broadbent, 2006).
Effective security practices by law firm personnel may be realized through the
development, implementation, and enforcement of security policies. Information security
policies outline the acceptable actions and uses of law firm computers and networks, and
articulate procedures for secure access to the law firm’s information resources (Da Veiga
& Eloff, 2007; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Kamal, 2008). Information security policies are
identified as an integral part of information security best practices (Baker & Wallace,
2007; Da Veiga & Eloff; Doherty & Fulford; Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2006; Keller et
al., 2005; Metzler, 2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006).
The likelihood that law firm employees will implement security measures is inversely
proportional to the security measures’ difficulty and/or complexity. For example, if law
firm employees must download and install a software patch before opening a file, they
may find it too time consuming and as a result find a way to by-pass performing this
action in the future (LaRose, et al., 2008; Post & Kagan, 2007). Consequently, the
complexity of computer safety measures may weaken security (Furnell, Jusoh, &
Katsabas, 2006; LaRose et al.; West, 2008).
A practical example of this phenomenon can be seen in the use of computer
passwords. A weak password is a password that can be easily guessed and typically
consists of common words found in the dictionary (Basta & Halton, 2008; Beaver, 2007;
Fordham, 2008; Garrison, 2008; Richardson, 2006). A password cracking software tool
can quickly and easily discover a weak password (Garrison; Richardson). In contrast, a
strong password consists of a combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers
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and/or alphanumeric special characters (not at the end of the password). Additionally, the
length of the password should be longer than eight characters and should not form a word
in the dictionary (Basta & Halton; Harrison, 2006; Keller et al., 2005; Richardson). An
example of a strong password that uses a combination of special characters, lower and
upper case letters, and numbers is Nov@South3@$t3rnUniv3r$ity. However, if strong
passwords become too difficult to remember, the law firm employees will write them
down and carry them about or place it near the computer, thus resulting in weakened
security (Comerford, 2006; Fordham; Keller et al.). Therefore, to be effective, security
solutions must be perceived as practical and not unduly burdensome (Cannoy, Palvia, &
Schilhavy, 2006; Fordham; LaRose et al.; Metzler, 2007; Post & Kagan, 2007). As a
consequence, the perception of self-efficacy of security technologies was examined as
well.
Relevance, Significance, and Need for the Study
Doherty and Fulford (2005) examined the role of information security policies in
relation to the number and severity of security breaches. This survey was mailed to 2,838
information technology (IT) directors from large United Kingdom (U.K.) based
organizations (employing more than 250 people) with 219 valid responses (7.7%
response rate) returned. The majority of responses were received from those
organizations employing fewer than 1,000 employees (44%) and between 1,000 and
5,000 employees (33%) with 23% of the respondents employing more than 5,000
employees (Doherty & Fulford). The survey instrument was validated by Doherty and
Fulford through two pre-tests and a pilot study exercise distributed to experienced
information security researchers and senior IT professionals with information security
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duties (Doherty & Fulford). Doherty and Fulford found there was “no statistically
significant relationship between the existence and application of information security
policies and the incidence or severity of security breaches” (p.36). According to Doherty
and Fulford, further research with different targeted samples was urgently needed.
The author included the original Doherty and Fulford (2005) survey instrument (N.
Doherty, personal communication, January 13, 2007) in this dissertation investigation.
Permission to use the Doherty and Fulford instrument in this dissertation investigation
was received from Neil Doherty on January 13, 2007 with a confirmation of permission
received again on December 8, 2008 (see Appendix A). Additionally, questions to
determine the timing of security policy development in conjunction with security breach
incidents have been developed by the author and reviewed by subject matter experts,
Mark Thorogood, M.S., Ruth S. Stevens, M.L.S, J.D, and Anne K. Abatte, Ph.D.
Surveying members of the legal community (Wiant, 2005) in this dissertation
investigation facilitated the discovery of how this community, which is a different
population from the Doherty and Fulford study, compared to the results from their 2005
study (Doherty & Fulford, 2005).
Wiant (2005) also recommended further research regarding the effect information
security policies have on reducing the number of security breaches. Kraemer and
Carayon (2007) urged additional research with regard to how security policies influence
computer security and information security in organizations. Siponen and OinasKukkonen (2007) recommended additional qualitative studies regarding high level
information security policies from an organizational perspective.
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With security breach incidents announced on a regular basis in the media (Conger,
2009), research regarding the impact of information security policies on reducing the
number of security breaches is highly relevant. Security breach notification laws in 45
United States (U.S.) states (excluding Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, and
South Dakota), and the District of Columbia, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico (Greenberg,
2009) mandate in the event of the compromise of personal data that clients be notified of
the security breach incident (Heitzenrater, 2008; Johnson, 2008; Kugele & Placer, 2007;
Schwartz & Janger, 2007; Silverman, 2007). Many of these laws define compromised
PII as unencrypted customer information (Schwartz & Janger). PII is a combination of a
person’s first name or initial with last name, Social Security Number (SSN), driver’s
license number or state issued identification card, debit/credit card number with or
without the security code, and/or medical information (Heitzenrater; Kugele & Placer;
Silverman). Law firms collect some PII from their clients and also retain employee PII.
In the event of a security breach wherein this information is exposed to or compromised
by unauthorized parties, including insiders, the requisite notification procedures go into
effect (Johnson; Kugele & Placer; Schwartz & Janger; Silverman).
On September 19, 2008, the Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business
Regulation issued a set of Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR), referred to as “201
CMR 17.00: Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the
Commonwealth” which describes the expectations and requirements on how to safeguard
residents’ personal information in both paper and electronic formats (Massachusetts
OCAB, 2008). These regulations were initially set to be effective on January 1, 2009.
However, due to the overwhelming requirements contained therein, this date was delayed
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initially to May 1, 2009, and most recently on November 4, 2009 delayed to March 1,
2010 (Lefferts, 2009). Law firms with clients who are residents of Massachusetts must
comply with these regulations.
These security breach notification laws are similar to the California Senate Bill 1386
(SB 1386) (2002), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (1999), the Health Insurance
and Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (CMS, 2003), and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) (2002). On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 which included a section
entitled Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act. Pursuant to the HITECH Act, there is now a federal security breach notification
requirement for the healthcare industry requiring notification of a breach involving any
type of personal information retained by a healthcare entity (Congress, 2009; Holloway
& Fensholt, 2009). Law firms have clients who must comply with these regulations.
When protected data are transferred to the law firm by the client, the law firm must also
comply with the regulations and provide adequate safeguards (Comerford, 2006;
Johnson, 2008; Ries, 2007). For example, if the law firm receives PII, such as electronic
protected health information (ePHI) from a healthcare client, the law firm would become
a business associate under HIPAA and must share in providing protections to the ePHI
while it is in the law firm’s possession (Li & Shaw, 2008; Swire & Bermann, 2007).
Law firms also must abide by applicable state security breach notification laws with
regard to their employee records in the event employees’ SSNs or bank accounts, or other
financial information is breached (Johnson; Kugele & Placer, 2007; Schwartz & Janger,
2007).
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Barriers and Issues
Law firms consist of lawyers and members of their support staff, such as paralegals
and legal secretaries (Hadfield, 2008) whose primary concern is the practice of law. In
the legal profession, paralegals and lawyers generally have little, if any, formal training in
the use of security applications, such as encryption or IDSs (Hadfield; Nelson et al.,
2006; Ries, 2007). They may have little desire to engage in this type of training since
their focus is on the practice of law. This lack of interest and training may result in
reluctance to budget funds for IT staff, computer security risk and vulnerability
assessments, and/or security products to ensure data security (Baker & Wallace, 2007).
The lack of funds and management buy-in may result in a law firm having minimal IT
personnel and, therefore, may not support security measures for its documents and/or
databases and information resources (Nelson et al.).
According to Cannoy et al. (2006), typically organizations are unwilling to share
security information with researchers. As a result, law firms may be reluctant to disclose
their security breach incidents and security issues as well.
Roster, Rogers, Hozier, Baker, and Albaum (2007) state that having the survey e-mail
link perceived as spam is a major potential barrier of online surveys. In an effort to
combat this weakness, ILTA agreed to send out e-mail invitations with an introduction to
the author and a link to the ILTA Website where ILTA members could preview a copy of
the Zoomerang online survey in Portable Document Format (PDF) format prior to
agreeing to participate in the survey. ILTA also included in the e-mail message, a link
directing potential ILTA participants to the anonymous Web-based survey on
Zoomerang.com. By providing a link to the survey on Zoomerang.com rather than
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obtaining an e-mail list from ILTA to import into Zoomerang, the results of the survey
were anonymous. Since ILTA members receive numerous survey requests from ILTA
each year, they should have ILTA on their whitelist to prevent the e-mail from going into
their spam e-mail.
Research Questions Investigated
The Web-based survey used in this dissertation investigation consisted of 10 primary
research questions. The first five questions were derived from Doherty and Fulford’s
(2005) research on the relationship between written information security policies and
security breaches in an exploratory analysis of U.K. organizations employing more than
250 people. The author converted their hypotheses into research questions for this Webbased survey in order to discover how law firms compare to the subjects in the Doherty
and Fulford study. The additional five research questions were designed to investigate
how information security policies impact law firms. The 10 primary questions
investigated included:
1. Do law firms that have written information security policies have fewer security
breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those that do not have
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?
2. Are law firms that have had information security policies in place for numerous
years likely to have fewer computer security breach incidents in terms of both
frequency and severity than those that do not have information security policies in
place (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?
3. Do law firms that have updated their information security policies on a regular
basis have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than
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those that have not updated their information security policies (Doherty &
Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
4. Are law firms that have an information security policy with a broad scope likely
to have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those
organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of best practices likely to have
fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those
organizations that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
6. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, are law firm employees more
likely to by-pass security measures in order to complete the task (Post & Kagan,
2007)?
7. Are law firm security policies created in response to an information security
breach incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)?
8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests a part
of law firms’ validation of the intended security policies (Myler & Broadbent,
2006; Verdon, 2006)?
9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and smaller law firms (less than 250
users) differ in whether they have written information security policies (Gibney &
Corham, 2008)?
10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees) and larger law firms (more than
251 users) differ in whether written information security policies were due to
information security breach incidents (Gibney & Corham, 2008)?
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Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
This investigation is limited to a select population of law firm IT professionals who
are members of the International Legal Technology Association (ILTA). The author
determined that ILTA would provide the most purposeful sampling available (Creswell &
Clark, 2007; Patton, 2002). This study was limited by law firms who were ILTA
members and by those who chose to answer the survey questions presented to them
(Cannoy et al., 2006; Post & Kagan, 2007).
ILTA’s 2008 Technology Survey defines the size of law firms by total number of users
of the law firm’s computers (Gibney & Corham, 2008).

These law firm sizes are

quantified as small (less than 151 users), medium (between 151-250 users), large (251500 users) and very large (greater than 500 users) law firms (Gibney & Corham). Other
measures of size of law firm may be number of lawyers rather than total number of users.
Thus, this investigation was limited by the ILTA definition of law firm size as total
number of users (Cannoy et al., 2006; Post & Kagan, 2007).
Small law firms with less than 150 employees may not dedicate resources to security
or have information security policies as compared to large law firms of over 500
employees, who may invest more fully in security and security personnel (Doherty &
Fulford, 2005). Thus, personnel in small law firms may not be aware of security breach
incidents. External factors such as budgeting for security or security personnel may
adversely impact the ability of smaller law firms to purchase and implement security
technologies (Doherty & Fulford).
A vast body of international data privacy laws exists (Swire & Bermann, 2007).
International law firms and law firms with global clients need to be cognizant of these
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laws (Wugmeister, Retzer, & Rich, 2007). The delimitation of this research is that an
exhaustive survey of global privacy laws was beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However, an overview of some key international privacy laws was discussed in this
dissertation.
Definition of Terms
The key terms utilized in this investigation are defined in this section. A list of
acronyms is included in Appendix B.
Access control – Permission granted to authorize users to read and/or write to files on
a computer or network through programs and information security policies (Whitman &
Mattord, 2008).
Anti-spyware – Software detection program that alerts the computer user of software
programs attempting to secretly collect confidential information from the computer user’s
files (Lin, 2006).
Anti-virus – Software that scans files to identify and quarantine harmful files that
could compromise data (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).
Authorized user – A person who has been granted read and/or write access to a
computer or network (Comerford, 2006).
Confidential information – Personal data that may include PII, trade secrets, and
financial, shareholder, or attorney-client privileged information (Comerford, 2006;
Nelson et al., 2006; Ries, 2007).
Electronic Networks – Use of computer-based technology, such as a personal digital
assistant (PDA), listserv, social networking Websites, blogs, and/or e-mail, to
communicate with others (Taylor & Murthy, 2009).
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Encryption – Software that uses mathematical algorithms to hide the content of a
computer file or hard drive through the use of ciphertext (Stream & Fletcher, 2008).
Firewalls – Software or hardware that filters the traffic of the network to prevent
unauthorized access (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).
Human error – Mistakes or incorrect security decisions made by law firm personnel
that expose the law firm computers and/or network to security breaches (Kraemer &
Carayon, 2007).
Identity theft – Stealing the identifying credentials such as PII of another person to
obtain credit cards for the monetary gain of the thieve (FTC, 2007; Rey, 2008).
Information security policies – Written documentation outlining the structure of the
law firm’s security posture. Security policies outline the acceptable actions and uses of
law firm computers and networks by their employees (Baker & Wallace, 2007; Da Veiga
& Eloff, 2007; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Metzler, 2007; Ries, 2007; Verdon, 2006).
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) – Software programs that scan the perimeter of the
network as well as the network to identify possible intruders to the computer systems and
alert the user of this unauthorized access (Basta & Halton, 2008).
Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) – Software programs similar to IDSs that include
an additional feature of alerting the user in real-time of a possible unauthorized access
attempt against the network or computer files (Whitman & Mattord, 2008).
Law firm size – Law firm size is measured by the number of employees using
computers in a law firm (Gibney & Corham, 2008).
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Management controls – Vulnerability assessments, security policies, and security
plans, implemented to manage the security (Bowen et al., 2006) of the law firm’s
computer systems and network.
Network vulnerability scans – Use of a variety of software tools to scan law firm
computers and networks to identify whether software vulnerability patches are and if so,
which ones, that may allow unauthorized persons to breach the security of law firm
computers and networks (Batista, 2006).
Operational controls – Physical security, personnel security, business continuity
planning, incident response, hardware and software maintenance, confidential data
protection, and security awareness training (Bowen, et al., 2006) that are implemented
by law firm personnel rather than automatically by computer software.
Penetration tests – Use of software tools to exploit vulnerabilities found in software
applications (Bowen, et al., 2006) to gain access to law firm networks.
Personally identifiable information (PII) – Information that is unique to an individual
and used to specifically identify a person (Kugele & Placer, 2007; Ries, 2007; Silverman,
2007). This information includes the combination of a person’s first name or initial with
that person’s last name, and with any of the following: SSN, account number, driver’s
license number, debit/credit card number, and/or medical information (Heitzenrater,
2008; Kugele & Placer; Silverman; Swire & Bermann, 2007).
Risk assessments –Examination of security policies and identification of potential
security threats to a law firm’s mission critical resources through interviews of law firm
personnel, as well as the use of a vulnerability scan of applications, ports, and systems
(Batista, 2006; Bowen, et al., 2006; Ries, 2007).
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Security breach incidents – Exposure of sensitive or confidential data, such as PII,
trade secrets, intellectual properties, business processes, or other proprietary information
to unauthorized persons (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Heitzenrater, 2008; Schwartz &
Janger, 2007; Wiant, 2005). These incidents can be accidental, intentional, malicious, or
human error (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007).
Security controls – Software products for access control, anti-virus, anti-spyware,
encryption, firewalls, IDSs and IPSs (Kamal, 2008; Whitman & Mattord, 2008) installed
on law firm computers and networks.
Security measures – Incorporation of management controls, operational controls, and
technical controls in an effort to safeguard data on law firm computers and networks
(Bowen et al., 2006; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).
Self-efficacy – An individual’s belief that he/she is capable of making the proper
security decisions to safeguard data (Chan et al., 2005; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009; LaRose
et al., 2008).
Social engineering – Coercing, tricking, or manipulating behavioral changes of
another person (Kamal, 2008; Medlin et al., 2008).
Technical controls – Security controls, such as access controls, audit logs, biometrics,
and user authentication that assist with the detection of security violations by automated
software programs (Bowen et al., 2006). Technical controls, such as anti-virus software,
anti-spyware software, IDSs/IPSs, and data leakage content filtering, assist with
enforcement of law firm security policies (Batista, 2006; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).
Threats – Anything with the potential to cause harm to the data residing on the law
firm network or on any other computer device of the law firm (Comerford, 2006). There
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are natural, human, and environmental threats (Bowen et al., 2006). Threats can include
deliberate acts, physical attacks, remote penetration attacks, human errors, acts of God,
technical control failures, operational issues, or social engineering wherein someone is
tricked into divulging his/her username and password (Furnell et al., 2006; Kraemer &
Carayon, 2007; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).
Vulnerability Assessments – Security assessments based on the use of software tools
to determine whether the controls that a law firm has implemented have any security
holes potentially enabling a user to gain access to data without authorization (Batista,
2006).
Summary
A large volume of highly confidential and sensitive information is stored on law firm
computer hard drives and servers (Comerford, 2006). In the event that an unauthorized
individual gains on-site or remote access to this equipment, the information could be
compromised and the firm’s reputation destroyed (Bisel, 2007; Comerford; Johnson,
2008). The financial losses associated with the disclosure of sensitive information can be
staggering (Bisel). Ever increasing use of laptops and other portable media devices by
the attorney workforce (Comerford; Gibney & Corham, 2008) raises the risk of
inadvertent disclosure.
Doherty and Fulford (2005) performed an exploratory analysis of security policies and
security breach incidents that highlighted the need for follow-up research with different
target populations. This dissertation investigation advanced the research of Doherty and
Fulford by targeting information security policies in law firms. Included in this
dissertation investigation were Doherty and Fulford’s original survey questions along
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with additional questions posited to determine the timing of security policy development
in conjunction with security breach incidents in a survey distributed by the author to
ILTA members.
As clients continue to entrust their intellectual property, trade secrets, PII, and other
proprietary material to their attorneys, law firms have a corresponding ethical obligation
to safeguard this information from any type of security breach (Comerford, 2006;
Johnson, 2008; Ries, 2007). Security policies and procedures specify what is expected of
authorized users in protecting law firm database content and documents (Comerford).
This dissertation investigation determined the effectiveness of law firm information
security policies, implemented either proactively or reactively (Cannoy et al., 2006), in
reducing the number of security breach incidents. The perception of self-efficacy of the
use of security technologies by law firm employees as security measures was also
discovered (Post & Kagan, 2007). Capabilities of risk assessments, network vulnerability
scans, and/or penetration tests to validate the intended security policies and controls
(Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006) to assist with safeguarding law firm data were
noted.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Introduction
In this literature review, the author provides an analysis of the impact of information
security policies on computer security breaches in law firms. Next, the author examines
information security policies and computer security breach incidents in relation to
safeguarding client data. Then, the author reviews topics relevant to security breach
notification laws, U.S. and international privacy laws, data breach incidents, data leakage
threats, and information security assessment procedures. The chapter concludes with
what is known and unknown regarding this topic along with the contribution this study
makes to the field.
The Theory and Research Literature Specific to the Topic
Security Policies
According to Baker and Wallace (2007), a security policy defines actions that can and
cannot be taken with company computers. Security policies outline the acceptable
actions and use of law firm computers and networks by law firm employees (Doherty &
Fulford, 2005; Metzler, 2007; Verdon, 2006). Information security policies consist of
written documentation outlining the structure of the organization’s security posture.
Typically, security policies provide guidance with regard to the physical and remote
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access to data of the law firm. According to Doherty and Fulford (2006), information
security policies should be in line with the law firm objectives.
Verdon (2006) found that “threats continually evolve, and the countermeasures must
evolve too” (p. 47). After reviewing the potential threats to the law firm network, the law
firm CSO (Chief Security Officer) and/or CIO (Chief Information Officer) should
develop, implement, and distribute a security policy or policies to all employees.
According to Whitman and Mattord (2008) and Greene (2006) an effective security
policy must establish key goals for ensuring that authorized users can access the network
and information resources. Additionally, the security policy must ensure employees
know the penalties of inappropriate behavior when using the law firm information
resources and/or assets. Within the policy, each law firm employee’s information
security responsibilities to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the law
firm PII and confidential data (Whitman and Mattord; Greene) must be communicated.
Security policies are generally a snapshot in time (Belsis & Kokolakis, 2005). Thus,
Metzler (2007) suggested using standards or security processes rather than just security
policies to address the continual need to update the requirements as part of security policy
maintenance. According to Metzler, organization stakeholders’ involvement is critical in
order to produce longevity and effective security policies. In order to achieve these
security goals, law firm managing partners and IT staff must be actively involved in
developing these policies. If the security failure can be equated to a monetary figure,
then the seriousness of developing an applicable security policy is more readily accepted
by the managing partners (Greene, 2006; Nelson et al., 2006; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).
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Security policies cover topics such as: acceptable use, access control, business
continuity and disaster recovery, change control management, confidentiality, data
classification, data backup and recovery, disposal practices, e-mail practices, encryption,
information protection, information systems security, Internet use, network security,
privacy, physical security, remote access, system administration security, incident
response, and termination (Greene, 2006; Metzler, 2007; Rotvold, 2008; Verdon, 2006).
All of these information security policies provide a legal defense in lawsuits and
regulatory compliance (Nelson et al., 2006). Metzler suggests developing a separate
security policy for each topic in order to quickly update and approve procedures.
Therefore, smaller separate documents rather than one large document would expedite
revisions and approval of necessary revisions to the individual topic policies since they
would be shorter and therefore easier to review.
Incorporated in the security policy is a clear explanation of the rules with regard to
how the network can be accessed, with a concentration on maintaining confidentiality
and identifying the ramifications of a security breach (Greene, 2006; Whitman &
Mattord, 2008). Distribution of the security policy to all law firm employees (Chen,
Shaw, & Yang, 2006; Metzler, 2007) is of paramount importance. Security awareness is
a topic all law firm employees must understand so their actions will not jeopardize
confidential data in their possession (Nelson et al., 2006). Therefore, law firm employees
must be informed as to the applicable security policy pertinent to their job and understand
why it is important to protect the information located on their computers from
unauthorized access (Baker & Wallace, 2007; Chen et al.; Metzler).
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Insider threats consisting of the disgruntled or curious employee must be addressed in
the security policies to outline the ramifications of accessing data not relevant to the law
firm employee’s job description (Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Lin, 2006). Insider threats
are one of the most common causes of security breaches (Bowen et al., 2006; Chan, et al.,
2005; Chen et al., 2006; Ramim & Levy, 2006). Incident response procedures and the
method for reporting information security incidents relative to insider breaches should be
included in law firm security policies (Chen et al.; Goldberg, 2008; Nelson et al., 2006).
Attendance at security policy awareness training sessions on information security
incident reporting should be required of all law firm employees (Chen et al., 2006; Gupta
& Hammond, 2005; Kim, 2005; Rotvold, 2008) on an annual basis. Rotvold suggests
training attendance be a mandatory requirement incorporated into employee evaluations
in order to assure enforcement of the security policy. Rotvold further found with regard
to security policies that, “the top three personal motivators reported for compliance were
individual motivation, followed by employee responsibility for information security, and
importance placed on information security” (p. 37). Thus, communication of the
seriousness of information security responsibilities by law firm management to law firm
employees is critical in building a culture wherein it is second nature for employees to
apply security measures (Rotvold).
Verdon (2006) underscores the importance of monitoring practices and the
implementation of standards such as, ISO 27001:2005 (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical
Committee, 2005), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Control
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (CoBIT) and Build Security In (a
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Department of Homeland Security initiative). While other practices and standards are
relevant to information security, the most recognized standard and controls are ISO/IEC
27001:2005 (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee)and ISO/IEC 27002:2005
(ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005). The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) 27001:2005 Information Technology – Security Techniques –
Information Security Management Systems - Requirements is an international security
standard (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee) that specifies a framework of
developing, establishing, utilizing, and maintaining an information security management
system (ISMS). The relevant controls for ISO 27001:2005 that specify a framework of
controls for structuring development of security policies (Humphreys, 2007; Myler &
Broadbent, 2006) are described in detail in the ISO 27002:2005 Information Technology
– Security Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Management
(ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee). These 12 controls include (1) risk
assessment and treatment, (2) security policy, (3) organization of information security,
(4) asset management, (5) human resources security, (6) physical and environmental
security, (7) communications and operations management, (8) access control, (9)
information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, (10) information security
incident management, (11) business continuity management, and (12) compliance
(ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee). These specifications describe a framework
for developing an ISMS and the controls required to implement administrative,
operational, and management safeguards necessary to provide data protection and
regulatory compliance (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint
Technical Committee). This international framework delineates a comprehensive outline
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of what controls law firms should use to validate the effectiveness of their ISMS
(Humphreys, 2007) protecting the client and law firm employee PII.
Siponen and Iivari (2006) examined six design theories focusing on when it would be
acceptable for individuals to violate security policies for the good of the organization.
While security policies are written for organizations as a whole, individuals are the ones
who must abide by them. Exceptions are rare incidents of acceptable security policy
violations (Siponen & Iivari; Verdon, 2006; Wugmeister et al., 2007). Wugmeister et al.
point out that these exceptions outlined in the European Union (EU) Data Directive are
only met:
. . . when one of the following exceptions is met: consent from the individual;
contract necessity (that is, data may be used if necessary for the performance of
the contract with the individual); compliance with (local) legal obligations; or the
legitimate interests of the entity collecting the personal information outweigh the
privacy interests of the individual (p. 456).
According to Siponen and Iivari, the EU has established data privacy directives
predicated on an opt-in clause requiring an individual’s permission prior to disclosing
sensitive data. Each EU Member State is a country belonging to the EU (Swire &
Bermann, 2007). Each of the Member States are encouraged to adopt their own privacy
laws based on the European Commission Data Directive. Finland is an EU Member
State with this opt-in requirement for permission from an individual prior to using his/her
sensitive data (Wugmeister et al.). However, an acceptable exception to this clause was a
Finnish tsunami victims’/survivors’ Website which placed Finnish residents’ names on it
without consent since this action provided a higher level of service for the greater good of
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the public (Siponen & Iivari). According to Verdon, exceptions should be included as an
integral part of security policy development since they are valuable in demonstrating how
employees should handle exceptions to achieve the greater good of the law firm.
U.S. Data Privacy Laws
In the U.S., state privacy laws require the review of security policies on an ongoing
basis to ensure compliance with security breach notification requirements (Lin, 2006;
Metzler, 2007; Verdon, 2006).There are security data breach notification laws in
numerous states, as well as children protection laws and sections of federal laws
protecting consumer’s PII in finance and healthcare. Currently, no comprehensive
federal data privacy laws in the U.S. directed specifically at law firms or private
industries exist (Cassini, Medlin, & Romaniello, 2008; Jones, 2008; Otto, Antón, &
Baumer, 2007). However, if law firms are entrusted with client information that contains
PII from the client’s customers, the law firm must protect this PII (Li & Shaw, 2008).
Several states recently passed specific data privacy laws (Worthen, 2008). Nevada
passed Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 597.970, a data privacy law that went into effect
on October 1, 2008 (Greenberg, 2008). This law mandates encryption for the
transmission of Nevada customer PII through electronic means other than via a fax or on
an internal secured system (Worthen).

Massachusetts General Law (M.G.L.) 93H

regarding security breach notifications became effective October 31, 2007. In
conjunction with this law, on September 19, 2008, the Massachusetts Office of Consumer
Affairs and Business Regulation issued a set of Regulations, referred to as “201 CMR
17.00: Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the
Commonwealth” originally slated to go into effect on January 1, 2009, but now due to the
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economic climate will go into effect on March 1, 2010 (Lefferts, 2009), regulating PII of
Massachusetts residents, whether or not that business maintains a presence within
Massachusetts (Worthen). The development of a written comprehensive information
security plan that includes security policies and security breach notifications is outlined in
this Massachusetts regulation (Massachusetts OCAB, 2009). Like all businesses, law
firms must comply with this Massachusetts law by encrypting laptops and removable
media devices containing PII, as well as encrypting e-mail messages containing PII.
Thus, if the law firm collects credit card payments or SSNs from their Nevada or
Massachusetts clients, they must comply with these laws.
Law firms must be cognizant of many laws that relate to their clients. A nonexhaustive sampling of some of the most significant laws and regulations that must be
complied with in the U.S. are as follows:
Security Data Breach Notification Laws
A landmark security breach event occurred in 2005 when ChoicePoint, a data
aggregator of PII headquartered in Georgia, announced it had unknowingly sold close to
145,000 people’s PII to a criminal (Greenberg, 2008; Jones, 2008; Miller, 2007; Otto et
al., 2007). The penalties for disclosing this PII were severe for ChoicePoint with
penalties totaling $15 million and an additional $9 million in legal fees (Foley, 2008).
With the ever increasing number of computerized PII records along with other data
collected and subsequently retained by various organizations, including law firms, the
odds of this data being compromised is high. As a result, in 2005, many states began to
create data security breach notification laws similar to California Senate Bill (1386) of
2003 (Greenberg).
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In the U.S. as of October 2009, 45 states as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands have data security breach notification laws (Greenberg,
2009). Many of these laws define compromised PII as unencrypted customer information
(Greenberg). PII is a combination of a person’s first name or initial with last name, SSN,
driver’s license number, debit/credit card number, account number, and/or medical
information (Kugele & Placer, 2007; Silverman, 2007). As depicted in Figure 1, the six
states that did not have these types of laws as of December 2008 were Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and South Dakota (Greenberg). Missouri
added a data breach notification law in late July 2009 (Greenberg).

Figure 1. States with security breach laws map. Adapted with permission from
©National Conference of State Legislature (see Appendix A), “Right to Know,”
by P. Greenberg, December 2008, p. 28, State Legislatures.
Overall, these laws mandate notification to state residents of lost, stolen, or compromised
PII through unauthorized access to computerized data, including access by an
unauthorized employee (Heitzenrater, 2008; Romanosky, Telang, & Acquisti, 2008).
There is an overall exemption in every state data security breach notification law except
for the state of Wyoming where reporting a security breach is not necessary if the
compromised PII was encrypted (Greenberg, 2008). However, if the encryption key is
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also compromised, this would then trigger the notification process. Many of the states
also have a provision wherein if it can be determined that no reasonable harm will come
of the compromised PII, then notification is not required (Romanosky et al.). A few
states require that this determination be retained for three to five years.
Greenberg (2008) summarizes the 23 differences between the various state security
breach notification laws. The variations outlined in Table 1 created by the author of this
dissertation investigation includes eight states requiring specific details of the breach be
included in the notice based on Greenberg’s findings. Three states included paper in the
definition of what constitutes a breach, along with five other states adding biometrics to
their definitions of a data security breach incident (Greenberg). Health and medical
information has been added to the PII definition of these states and Puerto Rico
(Greenberg). Eight states and Puerto Rico require that the security breach incident also
be reported to the Attorney General (Greenberg).
Table 1. Differences Within the State Security Breach Notification Laws

States

Every state
except
Wyoming
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Hawaii
Iowa
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Nebraska

Exempt
from
Reporting
if PII
Encrypted

Includes
Paper
Breaches in
Addition to
Computerized
Breaches

Broader PII
Definition
Including
Medical or
Health
Insurance
Information

Biometric
Data if
Released
with
Other PII

Specific
Information
about the
Breach

Report
to the
Attorney
General

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
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States

New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North
Carolina
Oregon
Puerto Rico
South
Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virginia

Exempt
from
Reporting
if PII
Encrypted

Includes
Paper
Breaches in
Addition to
Computerized
Breaches

Broader PII
Definition
Including
Medical or
Health
Insurance
Information

Biometric
Data if
Released
with
Other PII

X

Specific
Information
about the
Breach

Report
to the
Attorney
General

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

Created from the data in the ©National Conference of State Legislature article, “Right to
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These laws are pertinent to any business, including law firms, or an individual who
collects PII, with an exemption for those entities who must comply with HIPAA or
GLBA in some states (Hildebrand & Savare, 2008; Romanosky et al., 2008). Failure to
notify those individuals whose PII are compromised carries a severe monetary penalty
ranging from $250 - $500 per person to a maximum of $750,000 per incident in some
states (Schwartz & Janger, 2007). The critical distinction of these security breach
notification laws is that notice is dependent upon where the consumer resides rather than
where the business is located (Romanosky et al.). Notices to over 1,000 residents are
permissible through mass media in most instances or if the cost of notification is over a
specific monetary amount, such as $5,000 in some states, up to more than $250,000 in
others (Silverman, 2007). Whenever the number of afflicted residents is more than 1,000
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people, the majority of the state security breach notification laws require the company to
notify the credit reporting agencies of the breach incident (Schwartz & Janger, 2007).
Romanosky et al. (2008) question whether the security breach notification laws
actually affect the number of identity thefts. In Romanosky et al.’s study, they found “no
statistically significant effect the laws reduce identity theft” (p. 1). However, Romanosky
et al. also indicated that the data collected may be unreliable data gathered from Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the FTC. Moreover, data bias may exist as a
consequence of inactivity by those individuals who personally knew the alleged identity
thief (Romanosky et al.).
U.S. Identity Theft Regulations
Numerous risks are associated with unprotected PII. An identity theft risk involves
how a law firm collects, uses, disseminates, and disposes of PII (Rey, 2008). News
reports claim the exposure of numerous SSNs, credit card and debit card numbers, or
medical information due to lost laptops, universal serial bus (USB) drives, or other
portable media devices containing unencrypted PII (Bartlett & Smith, 2008; Berg,
Freeman, & Schneider, 2008; Greenberg, 2008; Radcliff, 2008; Schreft, 2007). The use
of e-mail to transmit PII without the use of encryption also provides an avenue for
identity theft if this information is intercepted or sent to the incorrect e-mail address.
Hacking into an unprotected computer is a method identity thieves use to procure
unauthorized access to PII (Comerford, 2006; Johnson, 2008). Additionally, the physical
thefts of credit card applications delivered through the mail or found in garbage by
persons attempting to capture or steal someone’s identity also place information integrity
at risk. Improperly disposing of credit card applications, documents containing one’s
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SSN, medical records or pharmacy receipts in the garbage without first cross-strip
shredding them also result in identity theft (FTC Business Alert, 2005).
The prevention of identity theft as a result of compromised PII and sensitive
information in an organization’s possession has been the focus of numerous laws in the
U.S. as well as international laws. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) describes the
risk of identity theft as the loss of one’s good credit that occurs when someone else steals
an individual’s identity and through the use of PII procures credit cards typically for cash
advances as well as to make purchases of jewelry, electronics, or other items that can
easily be converted into cash (FTC, 2007; Rey, 2008). Once the new credit card invoice
is due, either one payment is made or no payments are made by identity thieves (FTC).
As a consequence, the person whose identity has been stolen experiences deterioration in
credit ratings and difficulties in procuring future credit (Rey).
FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act) of 2003 was signed into law in
2003 to combat identity theft (Rey, 2008). In 2005, a disposal rule was created by the
FTC, National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and federal banking regulatory
agencies requiring appropriate disposal of credit reporting information or information
derived from credit reports (Federal Trade Commission, 2005; FTC Business Alert,
2005). The FACTA disposal rule requires that PII be burned, pulverized, or shredded
(FTC Business Alert). This rule also describes the proper destruction of electronic media
containing sensitive data to ensure that the information contained therein cannot be read,
reconstructed, or used. The FTC Business Alert specifically indicated that attorneys must
comply with the FACTA disposal rule.
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The American Bar Association (ABA) challenged whether the FTC could assert that
lawyers were considered financial institutions under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act if they
provided financial services (Comerford, 2006; McMillion, 2006; Podgers, 2008). Title V
of the GLBA (1999) focuses specifically on privacy and the protections of financial
customer data (Cassini et al., 2008). Any non-public information in the possession of a
financial institution must be protected from a security breach. Typically, GLBA
supersedes other laws regarding data breach notifications (Greenberg, 2008). However,
in the case of lawyers, they cannot be regulated by this financial institution law due to the
2005 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruling in favor of the ABA that
GLBA was not intended to regulate lawyers (Comerford, 2006; McMillion; Podgers).
Thus, it is debatable whether the FTC can enforce the FACTA disposal rule with regard
to law firms. Nonetheless, Comerford stated that FTC rules should still be used in a
guidance role by law firms as a basis for ensuring good security practices when handling
confidential client information.
Identity Theft Red Flags Rule
In 2005, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued
guidelines for safeguarding high risk transactions, such as online money transfers
(FFIEC, 2005; Foley, 2008; Greene, 2006). According to the FFIEC, the confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and non-repudiation of credit card information must be protected.
FFIEC guidelines mandate development by financial institutions of a security program
based on findings from a risk assessment (Foley; Greene; Nickell & Denyer, 2007); then
implement the use of authentication appropriate for the level of risk (Cocheo, 2006;
Hiltgen, Kramp, & Weigold, 2006). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
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issued guidelines to mitigate account-hijacking identity theft (FDIC, 2004) and defined
additional multi-factor authentication procedures. These procedures include “something
a person knows” such as shared secrets, out-of-band authentication (authenticated
through a second medium, such as a cell phone, telephone, fax, or e-mail message), and
challenge questions verification techniques (FDIC). Other options include the use of
“something a person has” such as tokens and non-hardware based one-time password
scratch cards (FDIC). Moreover, additional items under this category include Internet
Protocol (IP) address location (match a previously used IP address), device authentication
(authenticates the computer), geo-location (calculates location), and mutual
authentication (digital certificate) (FDIC). Biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and
retinal scans that verify “something a person is” are also increasingly employed (Cocheo;
FDIC, 2005; FFIEC; Greene). According to Comerford (2006) these techniques would
also be useful for attorneys safeguarding client data.
Stringent laws dealing with preparation of red flags to warn of identity theft were
promulgated by the FTC in cooperation with five other U.S. regulatory agencies in 2008
(Rey, 2008). As an example, on January 1, 2008, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve System (Board), FTC, FFIEC, FDIC, and National
Credit Union Association (NCUA) endorsed the Identity Theft Red Flags and Address
Discrepancies under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 Final Rule
which became effective (FTC, 2007; Wernick, 2009). Federal Register Subpart J of the
Red Flags Rule requires a risk assessment of identity theft protection plans and programs.
Subpart J further outlines 26 practices and patterns that should raise red flags that identity
theft may occur (FTC; Rey). The Red Flags include identifying suspicious PII, such as
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address discrepancies, forged documents, improper use of SSNs from deceased persons,
or unusual activity (FTC; Rey).
A mandatory Red Flags Rule compliance date of November 1, 2008 for all financial
institutions was endorsed as well (FTC, 2007). However, many non-banking creditors,
such as car dealerships and others who defer payment for goods or services did not
realize that they too needed to comply with the Red Flags Rule. As a result, the FTC
granted an extension to June 1, 2009 to these non-financial institution creditors and statechartered credit unions to develop and implement their written identity theft prevention
programs (Moscaritolo, 2009; Podgers, 2009). Despite the reprieve on the mandatory
compliance date, the liabilities for failure to comply with the Red Flags Rule were
activated. The penalty for non-compliance includes civil monetary penalties and
remediation costs, and may result in loss of customers (Rey, 2008). The ABA filed a
lawsuit opposing the FTC’s claim that attorneys have to comply with these rules. The
ABA’s stance was that since attorneys ethically cannot bill for services until they have
been rendered, this does not constitute a deferment of payment (Podgers). The case was
decided by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia judge in favor of the ABA
(Honorable R.B. Walton, 2009). However, the FTC has 30 days to appeal this ruling.
Currently, guidelines that specifically address law firm security like those for the
financial industry are not yet available (M. Thorogood, personal communication,
December 18, 2008). Nonetheless, law firms with financial institution clients are
required by these clients to produce evidence of security safeguards for banking
information entrusted to the law firm during litigation (Comerford, 2006).
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PCI DSS (PCI Data Security Standards)
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS) outline the security
measures that must be implemented with regard to credit card information. These
standards are required for safeguarding all credit card purchases (PCI Security Standards
Council, 2008). Pursuant to PCI DSS, it is required that law firms not store any more
cardholder data than is necessary, not store sensitive authentication data subsequent to
authorization (even if encrypted), and mask the PAN (primary account number) when
displayed (Berg et al, 2008). The first six and last four digits are the maximum number of
digits to be displayed (Berg et al.). Law firms generally accept credit card payments for
their services and must comply with the PCI DSS.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996
The enactment of the HIPAA of 1996 imposes restrictions on healthcare providers to
ensure that patient medical records remain confidential, private, and secure (Greene,
2006; Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008; Li & Shaw, 2008; Wiant, 2005). HIPAA requires that
remote access to any medical records have proper security safeguards in place (Baker &
Wallace, 2007; Kahn & Sheshadri; Wiant). The HIPAA Security Rule dated February
20, 2003 requires that all ePHI whether at rest or transferred electronically, be encrypted
and protected from interception by unauthorized parties (CMS, 2003; Li & Shaw).
Covered entities include health care providers, healthcare plans, and clearinghouses
(Holloway & Fensholt, 2009).
HIPAA imposes restrictions on healthcare providers to ensure that patient medical
records remain confidential, private, and secure through the use of administrative,
physical, and technical safeguards (CMS, 2003; Johnston & Warkentin, 2008). Protected
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health information (PHI) can include paper documents, verbal communications, and
electronic communications, such as electronic health records (EHRs), with only the
electronic format of ePHI requiring administrative, physical, and technical safeguards
(Cassini et al., 2008; Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008; Medlin et al., 2008). Patient name with
medical diagnosis, laboratory results, medical history, SSNs, credit card numbers, names
of doctors, and contact information are considered ePHI (Li & Shaw, 2008; Medlin et
al.).
While the HIPAA Final Ruling does not require specific security measures
(technology neutral), it provides guidelines with regard to what is reasonable and
appropriate. The HIPAA Security Rule consists of 18 standards, which include 42
implementation specifications (CMS, 2003). Of the 42 implementation specifications, 20
are required specifications and 22 are addressable specifications. While a number of these
requirements are listed as addressable, it does not mean they are optional. Rather,
addressable means that if the risk assessment indicates they are necessary then these
specifications should be addressed (CMS, 2003).
Covered entities must comply with the HIPAA Security Standards with respect to
ePHI (Nahra, 2008). Covered entities are required to review, modify, and/or develop
security measures that will provide reasonable and appropriate protection of ePHI by
ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the ePHI that is captured,
maintained, and/or transmitted (Li & Shaw, 2008). Additionally, ePHI must be protected
against reasonably anticipated threats, hazards, and unauthorized disclosures and security
policies must be updated on an annual basis (Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008; Nahra). Anyone
associated with the primary healthcare provider as a third party provider of services is
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considered a Business Associate and also must comply with the HIPAA security
provisions (CMS, 2003; Li & Shaw). For example, if the law firm receives patient
identifiable information, such as ePHI from a healthcare client, the law firm would
become a business associate under HIPAA and must share in providing protections to the
ePHI while it is in their possession (Li & Shaw). The penalties for disclosure to
unauthorized parties are substantial and can ruin the reputation of the law firm (Bisel,
2007).
The HITECH Act portion of the ARRA (Congress, 2009) requires that any
unauthorized access to PHI must be reported to the affected individual within 60 days of
the security breach discovery (Holloway & Fensholt, 2009). The 60 day time period
begins upon the discovery of the unauthorized access by anyone in the organization
(Congress). The notice requirements include an explanation of what happened, date of
breach, what PHI was accessed, and the security countermeasures taken to mitigate the
breach (Holloway & Fensholt). The HITECH Act also outlines new penalties depending
on the circumstances of the breach as $100 per violation up to $1.5 million associated
with HIPAA privacy and security breaches (Holloway & Fensholt).
International Data Privacy Laws
Historically, privacy laws started with the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974. The OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Privacy Principles were
created in 1980 (Gunasekara, 2007). The content was developed by 23 countries,
including the U.S., and provided guidelines for protecting, limiting, and securing the
collected PII of individuals (Swire & Bermann, 2007). ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 are based on the OECD Privacy Principles (Humphreys, 2007). The
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Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Principals are explicit data privacy
laws (Swire & Bermann). According to Wugmeister et al. (2007), the APEC Privacy
Principals incorporate OECD privacy principles of “notice, choice, collection limitation,
use of personal information, data integrity, security safeguards, access and correction,
and accountability” (p. 483). Wugmeister et al. further state that the APEC Privacy
Principal expectations go above and beyond the OECD Privacy Principles by requiring
the ethical handling of any and all PII when PII is being transferred even those items that
are not necessarily required to be protected.
While the U.S. is an opt-out society, meaning personal data can be used until the
person requests his/her data not be used, many other countries, including those in the EU
are opt-in societies wherein the person’s consent is required prior to use of PII for any
purpose (Swire & Bermann, 2007). In the EU countries, Canada, Australia, and Japan,
data privacy is taken quite seriously. By way of example, the following is an overview of
some key international privacy laws.
European Union (EU) Privacy Laws
The EU has explicit data privacy laws that are all encompassing with regard to
vigorously protecting sensitive personal data (Swire & Bermann, 2007). Pursuant to the
European Commission’s Directive, the EU definition regarding personal data refers to
anything that can identify an individual and harm their dignity (Cassini et al., 2008). No
sensitive data regarding any EU resident can be disseminated without written consent
from the individual (Swire & Bermann). Employee data are classified as the most
sensitive data that must be protected pursuant to the EU Data Directive. Data include
business address, business phone number, title, sexual orientation, date of birth, trade
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union membership, political opinions, national identification or social security number,
credit/debit/charge card number, PIN, and photograph (Swire & Bermann). Employment
applications, performance evaluations, drug tests, and terminations are also considered
sensitive data. No PII or other sensitive data about an EU resident can be transferred to
the U.S. without express written consent (Wugmeister et al., 2007). Law firms with
global offices must be aware of the individual laws for each state belonging to the EU
and how each EU state’s laws relate to a data security breach of the law firm satellite
office or offices located in that EU state (Goldberg, 2008). Raether (2008) further
indicated if a breach of information from the European Economic Area of Iceland,
Norway, and Liechtenstein occurs, that these laws would also pertain to law firms in
these areas as well (Wugmeister et al.).
Canadian Privacy Laws
Canada also takes the privacy of their citizens very seriously. The Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) of 1998 covers all
industries and protects the collection, usage, and disclosure of personal information
(Wugmeister et al., 2007). Similar to the European Directive, this law mandates a
person’s consent to allow his/her personal information to be used in any fashion, barring
criminal investigations (Swire & Bermann, 2007). PIPEDA is based on the OECD
Privacy Principles of accountability, purpose, consent, collection limitations, usage,
disclosure and retention limitations, accuracy, safeguards, openness, individual access,
and challenging compliance (Wugmeister et al.). The burden is on the collector to protect
the PII collected and retained to ensure that the data is used only for the purpose it was
collected (Gunasekara, 2007).
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Safe Harbor
The EU and Canada have strict laws controlling third party transfers of data
(Wugmeister et al., 2007). Thus, data cannot be removed from European countries or
Canada without complying with many stringent standards. A law firm with satellite
offices in European countries must obtain Safe Harbor certification prior to transferring
any private data to their offices in any other country, including the U.S. (Wugmeister et
al.). Safe Harbor certification is a laborious and expensive process (U. S. Department of
Commerce, 2000). However, it aids with being able to send law firm paycheck
information as well as transmittal of other sensitive information back to the U.S.
Supplier contact databases, contract information and third party access to sensitive data,
as well as customer databases and contract information, are all forms of personal
information in Europe and must be protected (Swire & Bermann, 2007). Consequently, if
the law firm’s EU satellite office wants to exchange this type of information with their
U.S. office, they must become Safe Harbor certified (Wugmeister et al.).
Data Leakage Threats
Whitman and Mattord (2008) classify threats as accidental, deliberate acts, physical
attacks, remote penetration attacks, human errors, acts of God, technical control failures,
operational issues, or social engineering wherein someone is tricked into divulging
his/her username and password. Environmental, natural, and human threats (Bowen et
al., 2006) to law firm data adversely impact a law firm’s operations. Environmental
threats include inadequate temperatures in law firm server closets, fires, and power
outages (Bowen et al.; Nelson et al., 2006). Natural threats to law firms include
hurricanes, floods, high winds, blizzards, tornadoes, earthquakes, volcanic explosions,
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and wild fires (Myler & Broadbent, 2006). Environmental and natural threats also
adversely impact the availability of law firm data. By contrast, a security breach results
from lost, stolen, or compromised PII or confidential data through unauthorized access to
computerized data (Cassini et al., 2008). Human threats, however, whether accidental or
intentional (Whitman & Mattord, 2008) can directly compromise PII by facilitating
unauthorized access to computerized data (Cassini, et al.).
Insider Threats
According to Comerford (2006) data at rest are even more at risk than e-mail
messages in transit. Unencrypted data on servers and hard drives are at risk to
unauthorized retrieval by employees and/or hackers (Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Wiant,
2005). The weakest factor in protecting PII and sensitive data from unauthorized
disclosure is the insider (Bowen et al., 2006; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009) who works for the
law firm as an employee, attorney, or contractor. The consequences of losing a laptop or
PDA containing sensitive law firm data or PII could lead to financial ruin in the form of a
malpractice case resulting in bankruptcy and/or damage to a law firm’s reputation
(Comerford; Desouza, 2008). Additionally, removable media devices used by law firm
employees may introduce a virus and/or malicious code into the network or individual
computer while by-passing the IDSs and/or virus protection safeguards (Heikkila, 2007;
Radcliff, 2008). These removable media devices also provide the capability to download
gigabits of attorney-client privileged documents, work product information, and/or client
data. Exposing law firm sensitive information and/or PII to unauthorized people poses a
serious liability to the law firm (Goldberg, 2008).
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Downloading and/or uploading pictures and software programs onto law firm
networks without regard to the acceptable use security policy requiring an anti-virus scan
of pictures and software prior to installation could result in a security breach or incident
(Greene, 2006). In the absence of distributed written security policies outlining what can
or cannot be downloaded, in conjunction with a lack of appropriate controls in place to
prohibit unauthorized downloads from the Internet, there is a higher probability of law
firm employees unknowingly compromising law firm computers (Metzler, 2007; Verdon,
2006). West (2008) states that users are unmotivated to download security software
while in the middle of a project or they feel incapable of making an appropriate decision
with regard to whether or not they should install security software. LaRose et al. (2008)
found that fear inhibits user’s self-efficacy regarding using security measures such as
anti-spyware and the downloading of security patches. LaRose et al. further found that
those who believed they were personally responsible for their computer’s security were
more inclined to take appropriate security actions as necessary.
Many of the security techniques for law firm users rely upon passwords to
authenticate the user prior to gaining access to protected sensitive data on the law firm
computers/networks (Basta & Halton, 2008). Employee usernames and passwords are
utilized to access the network and files (Fordham, 2008) on the law firm servers.
Although password files are often encrypted in ciphertext when stored on the server, the
individual is the weakest link with regard to protecting the identity of the password
(Bowen et al., 2006; Goldberg, 2008; Stream & Fletcher, 2008). According to Garrison
(2008), passwords are quickly divulged to others within the corporation and sometimes to
complete strangers outside of the organization, or they are taped to computer screens for
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anyone with physical access to the computer to discover (Basta & Halton; Fordham;
Goldberg; Metzler, 2007; Stream & Fletcher). Medlin et al. (2008) found that hospital
employees who changed their passwords more often or had longer passwords were more
willing to share those passwords through social engineering techniques such as entering a
drawing to win a prize for giving up their password. Medlin et al. further stated that
those hospital employees who had training were more likely to have strong passwords
than their peers but still were willing to share them with internal hospital employees.
Passwords that are common words found in the dictionary make them susceptible to a
dictionary attack or easily guessed because they relate to the immediate life of the
password holder (Basta & Halton, 2008; Beaver, 2007; Fordham, 2008; Garrison, 2008).
Fordham suggests using the first or second letters of the words in sentences that are easy
to remember. For example, the sentence “Nova Southeastern University is a great
institution to get your PhD” would translate to the strong password NSUi@gi2gyP.
Password mismanagement is another insider threat. The use of a default password is a
high level threat since default password schemes are widely know by law firm employees
and therefore trivial to guess (Beaver, 2007). Software default passwords may also
readily be available on the Internet or through the software company Website (Beaver).
Furthermore, if law firm employees are unaware of approaches for password protection,
the likelihood of using default passwords increases (Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Metzler,
2007). In the event the default password naming scheme is widely known, curious and/or
malicious individuals can readily access documents and e-mail accounts.
Additionally, the threat of compromised passwords increases with the hiring of
contract attorneys (Gorga & Halberstam, 2007). With contract attorneys working on a
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temporary basis, a large turnover of employees coupled with the ability to download large
amounts of sensitive information onto USB flash drives (Heikkila, 2007) would provide
the motive and resources to carry out a threat action (Radcliff, 2008). Temporary
employees, who may not be invested in the law firm, may be able to access highly
confidential information (Gorga & Halberstam), thereby placing the law firm PII and
confidential information at risk. By surreptitiously logging in as an authorized user or
contract attorney, these actions may disrupt network operations and his/her actions may
not be traced (Heikkila, 2006). This is a high risk threat that must be addressed and
controls put into place to protect against it. In the event that an intruder physically broke
into the building, having data available without any type of password protection or
encryption is an additional liability the law firm must also protect against (Comerford,
2006).
Another insider threat can originate within the IT Department. The sharing of one
administrator username and password by the entire IT Department for accessing every
network server is categorized as a high threat level practice (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint
Technical Committee, 2005). An audit trail using automated monitoring software should
be enforced (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee). However, when everyone
shares the same administrative username and password, there is no audit trail to discover
who made specific changes (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee; Kent &
Souppaya, 2006). Aside from the login username and password for logging into the
network, each member of a law firm IT Department should be assigned a unique
username and password for the domain controller accounts (Kent & Souppaya). Use of
the null default passwords poses a high threat level practice that can result in the
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compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the network should a
disgruntled employee or other unauthorized users initiate changes to the network servers
(Wiant, 2005). Thus, individual administrator passwords for each IT Department
employee should be changed on a regular basis, as should law firm employee passwords
(Fordham, 2008).
Data Breach Incidents
How the law firm collects, uses, distributes, and disposes of both client and employee
PII is impacted by identity theft risks associated with unsecured PII on law firm computer
equipment or networks. There are a number of Websites that report data breaches with
different sets of data security breach incidents reported to each. These Websites include
government, medical, education and business in their sector categories with a few
segregating banking/financial from the business category. The following are a composite
of the 2008 breaches.
Pursuant to data compiled by Attrition.org, Etiolated.org, and the Open Security
Foundation, as of December 31, 2008, there were 386 data breach incidents (Open
Security Foundation, 2008).

Figure 2 depicts these 386 data breach incidents by sector.

Figure 2. Incidents by sector. Adapted with permission courtesy
DataLossDB.org, ©2008, Open Security Foundation (see Appendix A).
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As depicted in Figure 2, Biz (business) lead all sectors in 2008 with 148 reported data
security breaches. Edu (education) had 103 incidents, while Gov (government) reported
79 and Med (medical) 56 incidents. These reported security breaches comprised a
number of different data types. Figure 3 shows the December 31, 2008 breakdown of
these incidents by data type.

Figure 3. Incidents by data type. Adapted with permission courtesy
DataLossDB.org, ©2008, Open Security Foundation (see Appendix A).
As depicted in Figure 3, NAA (names and addresses) were the data type most
compromised with 289 incidents reported followed by 273 incidents of SSN breaches.
The rest of the data types were substantially less in total numbers of incidents with 60
DOB (date of birth), 45 CCN (credit card numbers), 41 MED, 40 FIN (financial), 29
ACC (account information – financial), 27 MISC (miscellaneous), and 7 EMA (e-mail
address) for 2008 (Open Security Foundation). Each data breach incident included a
combination of data types that were compromised. SSNs are typically more valuable PII
to identity thieves than names and addresses (Greene, 2006). However, in order to
commit identity theft, the SSN in combination of the person’s name is necessary
(Greene).
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Open Security Foundation (2008) has been collecting security breach information
since 2000. There were only a handful of security breaches reported during the early
2000’s (Open Security Foundation). Once the ChoicePoint data breach occurred in 2005,
there were 22 states that enacted security breach notification laws (Greenberg, 2008) and
consequently there were significantly more security breach incidents reported (Otto et al.,
2007). In 2005, 128 data breaches were reported (Open Security Foundation). Figure 4
shows the breakdown of types of breaches from 2000 through 2008 with laptops (21%)
and hacking (20%) leading the types of all time breaches reported.

Figure 4: Incidents by Breach Type – All Time. Adapted with permission
courtesy DataLossDB.org, ©2008, Open Security Foundation (see Appendix A).
On a yearly basis, the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) also compiles a list of
security breaches. ITRC has been collecting information for the past four years (Curtin &
Ayres, 2009). Bartlett and Smith (2008) report exposure of PII as a risk management
threat has been growing exponentially since 2006, up 140% from 2006 to 2007 with 448
data breaches. However, by August 2008, a record number of data breaches (449
compared to a total of 448 for all of 2007) had already been reported on the ITRC (ITRC,
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2008a) breach list. As of December 31, 2008 for the year 2008, 656 data breaches and
35.6 million record exposures were reported to ITRC (2008b). This large increase of
47% over 2007 is attributed to underreporting in previous years and more than one
organization reporting the same breach (ITRC, 2009).
For the year 2008, businesses lead the way on the ITRC list with 36.6% of the
breaches followed by education, government/military, medical/healthcare, and banking
(ITRC, 2008b). The banking industry, however, has more than half of the records that
were compromised at 52.5% (ITRC, 2008b). A summary of the breakdown of the 2008
breaches outlined in the ITRC (2008b) data breach stats as of December 31, 2008 created
by the author of this dissertation investigation depicted in Table 2 shows business as the
leader in number of breaches with 240 breaches. However, banking exposed three times
as many records than business in 2008 with 18.7 million records compromised.
Table 2. Summary of 656 Data Breaches
CATEGORY

Banking
Business
Educational
Government/Military
Medical/Healthcare

# OF
BREACHES

% OF
BREACHES

# OF
RECORDS

PERCENTAGE
OF RECORDS

78
240
131
110
97

11.9%
36.6%
20.0%
16.8%
14.8%

18.7 M
5.8 M
.80 M
2.9 M
7.3 M

52.5%
16.5%
2.3%
8.3%
20.5%

Created from the data in the ITRC 2008 Data Breach Stats (ITRC, 2008b).
The ITRC (2009) points out that government previously had the highest number of
breaches in 2006 with 30% of the breaches but had substantially reduced that number to
only 16.8% in 2008. According to ITRC (2009), “only 2.4% of all breaches had
encryption or other strong protection methods in use. Only 8.5% of reported breaches
had password protection” (p. 1). The ITRC 2008 data breach list shows only two Texas
law firms and one Florida law firm as having reported a data breach (ITRC, 2008b).
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One of the Texas law firms reporting a breach listed 672 records as being compromised.
The other two law firms did not disclose the number of records breached (ITRC, 2008b).
According to Curtin and Ayres (2009) in their analysis of the ITRC 2005, 2006, 2007,
and 2008 reported data breaches, lost or stolen computing hardware were the largest
contributors to breaches (29.14%), while insiders of an organization were responsible for
35% of the ITRC reported data breaches.
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse collects security breach incident information from a
number of sources, but their primary source is the Open Security Foundation Data Loss
Database (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2008). Their chronology of data breaches
indicates there have been over 246 million breaches since 2005 (Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse). Greenberg (2008) depicts in Figure 5 a 2008 breakdown of the 880
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reported data breach notifications.

Figure 5. How data are breached. Adapted with permission from ©National
Conference of State Legislature (see Appendix A), “Right to Know,” by P.
Greenberg, December 2008, p. 27, State Legislatures.
The majority of the breaches (45%) were attributed to lost or stolen equipment, while
hacking only contributed to 18% of these incidents. Inadvertent Web exposure (14%),
lost mail (12%), improper disposal (6%), and insider fraud (5%) were the other reasons
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provided for the incidents reported to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (Greenberg).
Schwartz and Janger (2007) believe insider fraud reporting has historically been
extremely low due to the fact that companies do not typically report insider abuse.
Romanosky et al. (2008) state there may be reporting biases with regard to who
reports a data breach. According to Sveen, Sarriegi, Rich, and Gonzalez (2007) data
breaches are typically under reported by employees due to disincentives such as
embarrassment, lack of positive gains, fear of punitive measures or reprimands, and time
allotment being too high for completion of reporting forms. In law firms, the lack of
commitment and/or incentives to report a security breach incident can have serious
consequences, such as malpractice and regulatory compliance penalties (Goldberg, 2008).
In 2007, TJX Companies, Inc., the parent company of a number of discount retailers,
reported a large security breach involving 94 million Visa and Master Card records due to
the inappropriate use of WEP (wired equivalent privacy) wireless security, inadequate
storage of these records, and a failure to encrypt data at rest (Bartlett & Smith, 2008;
Berg et al., 2008; Chandler, 2007; Heitzenrater, 2008). Due to the inadequate security
solutions in place, hackers were able to break into the TJX Companies network and
compromise these 94 million records for 18 months before being discovered. This data
security breach crossed many jurisdictions (Chandler) and cost approximately $4.5
billion (Berg et al.).
Another security breach incident reported in 2008 involved the Hannaford Brothers
Supermarket chain (Bartlett & Smith, 2008). Approximately 4.2 million records were
compromised by hackers (Bartlett & Smith). As noted by Swartz (2008) the numbers of
records compromised typically are grossly understated. According to Bartlett and Smith
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only a small percentage of compromised records are used in an illegal way. Despite the
lack of criminal activity involved with compromised data, the trust of the client in the law
firm that has reported a security breach incident may be damaged (Bartlett & Smith).
However, Chandler (2007) stated that as large numbers of security breach notices are
distributed, affected individuals become increasingly desensitized to these notifications.
Information Security Assessment
An information security assessment is a critical exercise for protecting the confidential
and sensitive data (Humphreys, 2007; Salmela, 2008) that resides on a law firm’s
network and portable media devices (Batista, 2006; Heikkila, 2006). A security
assessment based on a combination of a risk assessment that identifies the potential
threats to mission critical assets of a law firm, along with vulnerability scans of
applications, ports, and operating systems, including mission critical databases, assist in
the mitigation and remediation of potential threats (Batista). Based on the identification
of the mission critical assets that need the utmost protection and the level of risk accepted
by law firm management, the scope of the vulnerability assessment is defined
(Humphreys; Salmela). Natural, human, and environmental threats that are identified
can aid in determining the management, operational, and technical controls implemented
to remediate these threats (Bowen et al., 2006; Heikkila).
IT risk assessments are performed to protect vital business processes and key assets of
a law firm (Batista, 2006; Salmela, 2008). According to Humphreys (2007), the goal of a
risk assessment is to evaluate the impact of a threat based upon the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA) approach in law firm environments (Batista). If a
database becomes unavailable, the lawyers sit idle unable to bill time and as a
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consequence thousands of dollars in revenue can be lost (Bisel, 2007). In the event that a
database becomes corrupt or sensitive information is inadvertently disclosed, the cost can
range from losing the case to losing the confidence of the client (Comerford, 2006;
Desouza, 2008). The firm’s reputation is at stake should the trust the client places in the
law firm suddenly be destroyed due to the inadvertent or deliberate disclosure of the
client’s information to unauthorized parties due to a security breach incident (Alagna et
al., 2005; Desouza; Salmela, 2008). The exposure of the firm to lawsuits can range in the
millions of dollars.
Accordingly, an initial risk assessment should be performed by the law firm’s IT
Department in order to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities to unauthorized
access to PII and confidential data (Ross, 2007; Batista, 2006). An independent third
party security firm may also be contracted to perform vulnerability assessments and,
thereby, discover the potential risks (Foley, 2008; Heikkila, 2006). If the decision is to
hire an IT consulting firm to conduct a security assessment, this typically includes the
scheduling of interviews with lead department personnel and/or individual users in all
satellite offices as well as the primary location. These interviews provide verification as
to whether employees are abiding by the law firm’s written security policies and
procedures (Humphreys, 2007; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005). The
employees respond to specific questions taken directly from the security policies to assist
with ascertaining whether or not these policies are understood and applied correctly
(Humphreys) by law firm employees.
Risk assessment results can be categorized by likelihood of occurrence, impact on the
firm’s tangible and intangible assets, acceptance of risk with remediation, and acceptance
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of risk without corrective actions (Humphreys, 2007). Whether the law firm or an
independent third party security firm performs the security assessment, the results of this
assessment are usually presented to the law firm’s managing partners and the IT
Department supervisor (Batista, 2006). Managing partners are not typically trained in
information security and, therefore, the final risk assessment results must also be
presented in a format that is easily understood by the lay-person (Batista; Heikkila,
2006). As noted by Bowen et al. (2006), this report should not consist of accusations
about the risks, but rather documentation on actual and projected threats and risks for
enabling informed business decisions regarding appropriate corrective controls necessary.
The risk assessment should include the review and analysis of compliance with
information security policies and procedures by law firm employees.
Participants in the risk assessment process can include those users that remotely
access law firm content and information. The various assets of a law firm must be
evaluated to determine what the critical assets are and whether or not they are adequately
protected (Humphreys, 2007). NIST outlines the various levels of management controls,
operational controls, and technical controls that an organization should strive for with its
security plan (Bowen et al., 2006). It is important to begin with the mission critical
components and develop policies to mitigate any gaps between security risks and
corrective actions (Humphreys).
Threat identification includes reviewing the physical or hardware and software
components that support access to the law firm’s computer systems and network and any
vulnerable applications which may perpetuate a security breach incident. Each threat is
ranked by the probability of occurrence and whether or not a law firm is willing to accept
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the risk, avoid the risk by prohibiting a certain action from being taken, or transfer the
risk to an insurance carrier or other third party (Hadfield, 2008; Humphreys, 2007;
ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee, 2005). Threat probability levels assist with
the control analysis, likelihood of occurrences, and impact analysis determination that
must be made for each asset (Bowen et al, 2006; Humphreys).
Vulnerability assessments can be conducted with scanning tools that identify the
potential risks to the applications, servers, and routers (Batista, 2006; Hadfield, 2008). A
penetration test can also assist in identifying how unauthorized users could potentially
compromise a law firm’s business assets (Bowen et al., 2006). Based on the risks that are
identified, the law firm should consider implementing controls to mitigate the threats and
vulnerabilities (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).
Due care must be exercised when performing vulnerability scans of law firm
networks. The potential for exposing a firm’s assets during the vulnerability assessment
should be determined and guarded against unintended intrusions (Bowen et al., 2006).
The tools selected for vulnerability scans may target Microsoft products as well as
Cisco and Citrix products that are commonly used in law firm networks (Gibney &
Corham, 2008). For example, common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) are found
in the Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) and Apache Web servers (Whitman
& Mattord, 2008). The United States Computer Emergency Response Team (U.S. –
CERT) numbers are typically included in vulnerability scan reports. CERT publicly
announces vulnerabilities found, as well as the mitigation in the form of patches to
remediate these vulnerabilities (Arora, Nandkumar, & Telang, 2006). The published
vulnerabilities are assigned numbers for reference purposes. These numbers are divided
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into candidate numbers (CAN) and CVE numbers (Carnegie Mellon University, 2008;
Pfleeger & Rue, 2008). A CAN is a potential vulnerability, while a CVE is a confirmed
vulnerability (Pfleeger & Rue). Thus, the vulnerabilities identified by the vulnerability
scan need to be remediated with the appropriate patch to safeguard the law firm network
from data leakage and unauthorized access to PII.
Management controls, operational controls, and technical controls safeguard tangible
and intangible assets (Bowen et al, 2006). A law firm’s reputation and client perceptions
are intangible assets (Desouza, 2008). Tangible assets include the law firm’s hardware,
software, electronic documents, paper documents, and employees (Humphreys, 2007).
Management Controls
Management controls include vulnerability assessments, security policies, and security
plans, implemented to manage the security of the law firm’s computer systems and
network (Bowen et al., 2006). Law firm networks contain financial data, trade secrets,
personnel information, client records, including PII and other sensitive data (Comerford,
2006). Protecting this data from disclosure to unauthorized individuals is critical to law
firm operations (Ries, 2007). Typically, physical security is the first line of defense that is
commonly addressed by law firms (Keller et al., 2005). Critically important is the
implementation of security policies and procedures enforced by management to safeguard
the integrity of law firm computer information systems (Metzler, 2007).

Once a

vulnerability assessment is performed and security policies are drafted, a yearly review of
the enforcement of security controls is recommended to ensure the adequacy of security
controls in mitigating emerging security threats (Humphreys, 2007). Any time a data
security breach of a law firm’s network has occurred, an assessment should be performed
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and the security incident documented and mitigated (Alagna et al., 2005; Humphreys;
ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005). According to Humphreys, whenever
a new technology is employed by the law firm, an assessment should be conducted to
ensure that threats and/or risks associated with the new technology are reduced.
The designation of an individual responsible for security is recommended by ISO/IEC
27002:2005 (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005). Thus, law firms should
consider hiring a Chief Security Officer (CSO) or Information Systems Security Officer
(ISSO) to oversee the overall information security of the law firm (Alagna et al., 2005;
Bowen et al., 2006). According to Alagna et al., this person should have information
security qualifications relative to network access controls, IDSs, as well as information
security policies and procedures and be able to communicate IS issues with the lead IT
person such as the IT Director or Chief Information Officer (CIO). If a law firm has not
developed a security plan or drafted security policies, this may be the first order of
business (Keller et al., 2005; Metzler, 2007). A CSO/ISSO oversees the development of
security policies and the enforcement of security policies and procedures (Alagna et al.;
Bowen et al.; Whitman & Mattord, 2008). At a minimum, one of the current IT
Department employees may be designated to assist with vulnerability assessments.
Attendance at security training sessions on a regular basis to gain insight on the security
risk assessment process and maintain an understanding of the current threats and
technical controls available is recommended for the CSO/ISSO (Bowen et al.; ISO/IEC
27001 Joint Technical Committee, 2005; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee;
Humphreys, 2007).
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Operational Controls
Operational controls include physical security, personnel security, business continuity
planning, incident response, hardware and software maintenance, confidential
information protection, and security awareness training (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical
Committee, 2005) that are implemented by law firm personnel rather than automatically
by computer software (Bowen, et al., 2006). The law firm may consider including an
audit log requirement in the written security policies with an established protocol for
setting up user accounts, including administrative user accounts and passwords (ISO/IEC
27002 Joint Technical Committee; Lin, 2006; Metzler, 2007). Also, written procedures
for disabling a user account could be included in the security policies so that a standard
process is in place for terminated employee accounts (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical
Committee).
With regard to physical security, data centers consisting of network devices and
servers should be in a secured area to protect confidential information and PII (ISO/IEC
27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2008). For example,
highly confidential compact discs (CDs) stored in hallways in plain view pose a threat for
theft. Additionally, retired servers must be properly wiped of their contents prior to
disposal (FTC Business Alert, 2005; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee). The
proper disposal of retired equipment and the locking of server rooms, as well as the safe
storage of CDs should be included in the security policies to provide appropriate
procedures for protecting law firm PII and confidential information (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint
Technical Committee).
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Enforcing an encryption policy to ensure the encryption of data at rest and on laptops,
as well as USB devices (Radcliff, 2008; Myler & Broadbent, 2006) is another operational
control for law firms. Access to confidential information residing on the law firm
network and removable media devices can be mitigated by installing encryption software
on hard drives as well as USB devices (Radcliff; Heikkila, 2007). The benefit of
encrypting PII and sensitive data is that the state security breach notification laws, with
the exception of Wyoming, specifically exempt notices to clients if the compromised PII
is encrypted and the encryption key is not attached (Greenberg, 2008).
In the absence of training or educational sessions regarding security issues, law firm
employees may lack procedures or policies covering the basic functions, such as
changing the default passwords issued to each user (Gupta & Hammond, 2005). This
absence results in a large numbers of users who never change default passwords (Gupta
& Hammond; Metzler, 2007). One corrective action could be implementing the
requirement that the login password be changed upon the first login session (ISO/IEC
27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005). The operational control of changing passwords
has met with some resistance (Keller et al., 2005) from law firm users (M. Thorogood,
personal communication, December 18, 2008). However, law firm IT departments must
develop, implement, and enforce password policies that will assist with mitigating this
risk (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).
Further consideration as to the number of times a password must be changed should
coincide with the sensitivity of the data being protected and the feasibility of users
changing, as well as protecting, their passwords (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical
Committee, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2008). From time to time, a law firm may
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employ many contract attorneys to work on litigation support databases (Gorga &
Halberstam, 2007) who have access to sensitive data. In these types of situations it is
important that the passwords change more often. It is difficult for people to remember
their passwords due to the number of passwords required on various Websites
(Richardson, 2006), as well as at the law firm. According to Harrison (2006) a 2006
Sophos survey found that “41 percent of the respondents said they always use the same
password, 45 percent said they have a few different passwords, and 14 percent said they
never use the same password on multiple Web sites” (p. 5). Strong passwords require a
combination of lower case letters, upper case letters, as well as a mix of numbers and/or
other characters found on a keyboard (Basta & Halton, 2008; Harrison; Keller et al.,
2005; Richardson). Training on how to choose and maintain a strong password is
advisable for all law firm employees and mandatory particularly for all temporary
contract attorneys (Gorga & Halberstam; Heikkila, 2006), especially those with access to
PII and sensitive data.
Technical Controls
Technical controls are those security controls, such as access controls, audit logs, and
user authentication that assist with the detection of security violations by automated
software programs (Bowen et al., 2006; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee,
2005). Technical controls, such as anti-virus software, IDSs, and data leakage content
filtering, assist with enforcement of law firm security policies (Whitman & Mattford,
2008).
Audit logs are incorporated within software packages and merely need to be enabled
in order to log the events that have occurred within a computer program (ISO/IEC 27002
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Joint Technical Committee, 2005; Kent & Souppaya, 2006). For example, data leakage
software can identify whether SSNs or credit card numbers are being sent within the
contents of an unencrypted e-mail message (Hook, 2009). This data leakage software
will prohibit and/or stop the e-mail from being successfully sent out. It will also send an
automated e-mail to the sender stating that the inclusion of SSNs, credit card numbers or
other PII is a violation of law firm policies as well as certain laws (Hook). Event logs are
reviewed to determine if a security breach has occurred and to assist with the
investigation of an incident (Kent & Souppaya). Additionally, audit logs may act as a
preventative tool if law firm employees are aware that their actions are being logged.
Summary of What is Known and Unknown about the Topic
Security policies allegedly help with preventing security breach incidents (Baker &
Wallace, 2007; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Hong et al., 2006;
Keller et al., 2005; Metzler, 2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006). Doherty
and Fulford found no statistical relationship between security policies and security breach
incidents. However, they did not examine whether or not the security policies were
initiated by the security breach or were already in place when the security breach incident
occurred.
Wiant (2005) investigated the existence of information security policies in hospitals
and their value in prompting hospital employees to report security incidents. This survey
had a 5.6% completed response rate to their mail surveys. Wiant found that those
hospitals with information security policies did not have fewer incidents or less serious
incidents of computer abuse than those hospitals that had no information security policies
at all. Wiant suggests that the legal industry is behind in security initiatives and

64
recommends further research with regard to the effectiveness of information security
policies in abating security incidents.
Regulatory compliance requires sensitive data be adequately safeguarded from
inadvertent disclosure and supports the availability of audit trails to monitor who has
access to data (Bowen et al., 2006; Greene, 2006). Laws requiring administrative,
physical, and technical safeguards for compliance include 45 state security breach
notification laws as of October 2009 requiring notification of unauthorized access to
computerized PII (Greenberg, 2009). These security breach notification laws are similar
to SB 1386 (2002), GLBA (1999), HIPAA (CMS, 2003), and SOX (2002). Law firms
have clients who must comply with these regulations. When protected data are
transferred to the law firm by the client, the law firm must also comply with the
regulations and provide adequate safeguards (Comerford, 2006). Law firms must abide
by applicable state security breach notification laws with regard to their employee records
in the event employees’ SSNs, bank accounts, or other financial information is breached
(Johnson, 2008; Kugele & Placer, 2007; Schwartz & Janger, 2007).
The Contribution This Study Will Make to the Field
There is little empirical research on information security policies and their effect on
computer security breach incidents (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Hagen et al., 2008; Hong
et al., 2006; Kemp, M., 2005; Romanosky et al., 2008; Thomson, K-L & von Solms, R.,
2006; Wiant, 2005). The contribution of this dissertation investigation is the furtherance
of the research of Doherty and Fulford, as well as Wiant with a different population and
discovery of whether information security policies created proactively aided in
preventing security breach incidents.
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Surveys of different populations have produced varied results concerning security
(Pfleeger & Rue, 2008). Hong et al. (2006) determined in a study of companies in Taiwan
that “Organizational type will have an impact on the time of building an ISP [information
security policy]” (p. 111) and “The larger size of MIS department of an organization, the
earlier will this organization build an ISP” (p. 11). According to Siponen and OinasKukkonen (2007), research has historically concentrated on the technological
perspective; and additional research is needed with regard to practical observations of
security management. In a study of companies in Norway, Hagen et al.(2008)
determined security measures are interdependent. According to Albrechtsen et al., the
implementation and effectiveness of security measures result in an inverse relationship
and “This inverse relationship is interpreted as a metaphorical staircase of four steps:
security policy; procedures and control; tools and methods; and awareness creation” (p.
393). The author’s findings regarding the effectiveness of information security policies
in reducing the number of computer security breach incidents will contribute to the body
of knowledge and provide data concerning the perception of law firms, an under
represented population, in the information assurance field.
The author also added to the body of knowledge with regard to security breach
notification laws. Although information assurance is evolving with regard to computer
security breach incidences (Pfleeger & Rue, 2008; Romanosky et al., 2008; Wiant, 2005),
this research is valuable because it provides insight concerning the effect that information
security policies have on computer security breaches in law firms. The proliferation of
security breach incidents has substantially and rapidly risen over the past five years
(ITRC, 2009; Open Security Foundation, 2008; Romanosky et al.). In the U.S.,
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individual State data breach notification laws protect the PII of individuals and
subsequently require notification to state residents of possible compromises that may lead
to identity theft. Unlike other data privacy laws that are industry-specific, such as GLBA
(for financial services) or HIPAA (for healthcare), these individual state laws are
applicable to any industry, including the legal industry. The one significant finding of
this dissertation investigation in regard to the state security breach notification laws is
that law firms demonstrated a need to become more immersed in security breach
notification law requirements with regard to the requirement that notification of a security
breach of computerized data is based on where the resident resides rather than where the
data reside (Romanosky et al.) in order to respond appropriately to any unauthorized
access to client data or employee PII. The results also demonstrated a significant
difference between the small and medium, small and large, small and very large law
firms with regard to who encrypts e-mail messages with the small law firms reporting
less usage of encryption of e-mail messages and hard drive data. While this is not a
surprising finding given the financial constraints of small law firms, it does provide
insight for legislators to apply when they consider passing laws mandating that all PII
data inserted into e-mail messages or stored on hard drives be encrypted (Worthen,
2008).
In this dissertation investigation, the author contributed to the body of knowledge with
regard to an affirmation of literature regarding self-efficacy (LaRose et al., 2008). This
dissertation confirmed that users are unmotivated to download security software while in
the middle of a project or they feel incapable of making an appropriate decision with
regard to whether or not they should install security software (West, 2008).
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Research Methods Employed
This dissertation investigation utilized a Web-based survey to document and analyze
the responses of law firm IT personnel with regard to their perceptions of how
information security policies affect computer security breach incidents. The author
investigated the exploratory analysis study of Doherty and Fulford (2005), who surveyed
IT directors from large U.K.-based organizations (employing more than 250 people)
regarding the role of information security policies in relation to the number and severity
of security breaches. The author incorporated the Doherty and Fulford original survey
instrument and compared those results to the data collected in this research. The
relationship between information security policies and information security breach
incidents was also examined. Validated questions from the Doherty and Fulford survey
were adapted into this dissertation study. Survey questions regarding security threats,
security policies, and successful implementation of information security policies were
adopted from the original survey instrument received from Doherty and Fulford.
Additional questions posited by the author included self-efficacy issues, applicable
privacy laws, management approval and communication of security policies, and
utilization of risk assessments and other security measures in law firms (Post & Kagan,
2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006). Furthermore, the author investigated
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the role of IT security assessments utilized by law firms in assuring that their networks
are protected from possible information security breaches.
Specific Procedures Employed
Online Survey Development and Distribution
The author developed and distributed a Web-based survey by utilizing Zoomerang
(www.zoomerang.com), a Web survey tool. Global law firm IT members of ILTA were
surveyed. Data were collected from the Web-based questionnaire with multi-choice
questions, demographic questions, and Likert-scale questions. As required whenever
using human subjects, the author completed the institutional review board (IRB) process
(Patton, 2002) with the Nova Southeastern University (NSU) IRB. The author’s survey
received initial NSU IRB approval on April 15, 2008 and on January 7, 2009 an
Amendment of IRB Approved Studies (NSU IRB Protocol, 2008) was approved (see
Appendix C).
The author developed a set of questions based on current information security policies
and security breach notification laws (Gibney & Corham, 2008; Greenberg, 2009; Myler
& Broadbent, 2006; Post & Kagan, 2007; Verdon, 2006; Wiant, 2005). The original
questions from the Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) study were validated in a pre-test and a
post-test conducted by Doherty and Fulford. This set of questions was included in the
author’s Web-based survey on Zoomerang. Five-point Likert-scale questions for the
questionnaire contained five responses including a neutral response available in-between
the strongly agree on one end and strongly disagree on the other end (Sekaran, 2003).
The variables in this dissertation investigation were information security policies,
information security breach incidents, updating information security policies, revising
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information security policies, adoption of best practices, self-efficacy, security measures,
and law firm size. According to Creswell (2009), relating the variables to research
questions and specifically to survey instrument items aids the author in expressing how
the research question answers were calculated. This investigation’s variables, research
questions, including the corresponding survey questions, are outlined in Table 3.

Table 3. Variables, Research Questions, and Items on Author’s Survey
Variable Name
Information
Security Policies
and Security
Breach Incidents

Research Question
1. Do law firms that have written information
security policies have fewer security breach
incidents in terms of frequency and severity than
those that do not have information security
policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?

Item on Survey
See Questions
3, 11, 12

Information
Security Policies
and Security
Breach Incidents

2. Are law firms that have had information security
policies in place for numerous years likely to have
fewer computer security breach incidents in terms
of both frequency and severity than those that do
not have information security policies in place
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?

See Questions
3, 11, 12, 16

Updated
Information
Security Policies
and Security
Breach Incidents

3. Do law firms that have updated their information
security policies on a regular basis have fewer
security breach incidents in terms of frequency
and severity than those that have not updated their
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford,
2005, p. 26)?

See Questions
3, 11, 12, 17

Information
Security Policies
and Security
Breach Incidents

4. Are law firms that have an information security
policy with a broad scope likely to have fewer
security breaches in terms of both frequency and
severity than those organizations that do not
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?

See Questions
3, 11, 12, 21, 22

Adoption of Best
Practices and
Security Breach
Incidents

5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of
best practices likely to have fewer security
breaches in terms of both frequency and severity
than those organizations that have not (Doherty &
Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?

See Questions
3, 11, 12, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27

Self-efficacy

6. When under a time deadline to finish an
assignment, are law firm employees more likely to
by-pass security measures in order to complete the
task (Post & Kagan, 2007)?

See Questions
3, 28
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Variable Name
Information
Security Policies
and Security
Breach Incidents

Research Question
7. Are law firm security policies created in response
to an information security breach incident
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)?

Item on Survey
See Questions
3, 13, 14, 15, 29

Security Measures
and Information
Security Policies

8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans,
and/or penetration tests a part of law firms’
validation of the intended security policies (Myler
& Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006)?

See Questions
3, 18, 19, 20, 30

Information
Security Policies
and Law Firm Size

9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and
smaller law firms (less than 250 users) differ in
whether they have written information security
policies (Gibney & Corham, 2008)?

See Questions
3, 14

Information
Security Policies,
Security Breach
Incidents, and Law
Firm Size

10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees)
and larger law firms (more than 251 users) differ
in whether written information security policies
were due to information security breach incidents
(Gibney & Corham, 2008)?

See Questions
3, 14, 15

The remaining questions posed in the author’s online survey included demographic
questions as to size of the IT department, location(s) of the firm offices, functions of law
firm technology related departments, designation of security responsibility, education,
gender, age, job level, length of experience, position at the law firm, and privacy and/or
security law compliance requirements.
The author’s online survey was distributed through an e-mail message from the
ILTA’s Executive Director, Randi Mayes, to its members via its membership database of
law firm technology professionals that included a link to the author’s Zoomerang survey.
By having the cooperation of ILTA (see Appendix D), the survey was more credible and
well received by its members (Baker & Wallace, 2007), instead of coming directly from a
lesser known sender. In an effort to encourage responses, Ms Mayes provided a link to
the ILTA Website where a PDF of the survey questions was available for ILTA members
to preview prior to participating in this dissertation study. As of April 2009, 1,123 law
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firms globally held ILTA memberships. The author utilized Zoomerang.com to host this
survey since ILTA members are familiar with completing the annual ILTA technology
surveys using the Zoomerang interface. The questionnaire was formatted in hypertext
markup language (HTML) and uploaded to the Zoomerang.com Website. The 35
question survey distributed to ILTA members is attached as Appendix E.
According to Roster et al. (2007), online surveys are more cost efficient and provide
more design features than paper surveys. Evans and Mathur (2005) and Punter,
Ciolkowski, Freimut, and John (2003) point out the advantage of the simplicity with
which the respondents are able to complete the online survey as well as how quickly the
researcher can analyze the results since they are already in an electronic format.

With

the results already provided in electronic format, the reliability of the data collected from
the online survey is improved since the results are not hand coded (Punter et al.). The
simplification of responding to the author’s Zoomerang.com link provided by ILTA,
where the respondents merely click on their answers, improves the response rate as
compared to mailed paper surveys (Punter et al.). Evans and Mathur further found that
online surveys are more convenient than mail surveys or interviews because they can be
completed at the respondent’s leisure and thus are more likely to be completed.
Sampling and Participants
The population for this online survey consisted of law firm IT personnel and others
familiar with legal technology in law firms. Fulford and Doherty (2003) found that
surveys targeting IT personnel “yield a more realistic assessment of the information
security situations in an organization” (p. 107). In this online survey, the author
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continued to use firm size defined in ILTA’s 2008 Technology Survey (Gibney &
Corham, 2008, p.3.) as:
Firm size

Small
Medium
Large
Very Large

Number of users

<151
151-250
251-500
>500

Participants were provided a letter describing the research and an Informed Consent Form
as the first page of the survey.

Subjects were recruited from the global ILTA

membership. By including law firms outside of the U.S., the author was provided an
opportunity to gather and analyze data on an international level. Attorneys, paralegals,
and law firm IT staff who consented to participate in the dissertation investigation
constituted the research subjects. Thus, a site selection purposeful sampling was utilized
by targeting ILTA legal technology members who were knowledgeable and skilled in
using their law firm’s IT (Sekaran, 2003).
ILTA agreed to assist with ensuring that only one e-mail invitation to take this
questionnaire was sent to each law firm, despite multiple offices across the globe (see
Appendix D). The information obtained in this dissertation investigation was treated as
strictly confidential unless disclosure is required by law. The participant’s name was not
linked to his/her responses and was not used in the reporting of information in
publications or conference presentations. The names of subjects or e-mail addresses of
the respondents were not known to the researcher since ILTA sent out the invitation.
However, there was an opportunity for the respondents on the questionnaire to provide
the author with their e-mail addresses for possible follow-up questions. Nevertheless,
their names and any other identifying information provided were not used in the reporting
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of information in this dissertation, in any publications, or conference presentations. Only
cumulative results were analyzed and placed into this dissertation.
Participation in this dissertation investigation by members of this legal technology
group was on a random, volunteer basis, inasmuch as not every member who received the
e-mailed link to the questionnaire completed it (Patton, 2002). The author offered a copy
of the results to participants as an enticement to participate (Baker & Wallace, 2007).
Data Collection
Online survey questions elicited responses to direct questions concerning whether or
not information security policies developed for law firm personnel affect security breach
incidents. Questions dealing with how security is handled, what security measures are in
place, types of security breaches the law firm has encountered, and security policies
utilization in law firms were posed to all participants.
Survey results were placed in the Zoomerang database on www.zoomerang.com, and
were only available online to the author via an ID and a password. The raw data results
were then exported from the Zoomerang database into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.
Confidentiality was maintained by the anonymity of the results provided on this
Zoomerang account and no identifying information of the respondents was transferred to
NSU.
Data Analysis
The survey results were tabulated using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS™)12.0 for the advanced statistics, as well as SPSS™ PASW Statistics 17.0 for
Microsoft Windows, and Microsoft Excel 2007 software’s statistical functions to
create tables representing the respondents’ responses. An interpretation of these results in
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the form of a narrative addresses responses to the research questions and include tables
(Creswell, 2009) created using both SPSS™ and the statistical functions of Microsoft
Excel 2007. Data analyses are provided in a narrative form that included an
interpretation of the findings (Creswell).
Assistance with the analysis of the advanced statistics of this study’s results was
provided by Dr. Phyllis Curtiss, Director of the Grand Valley State University (GVSU)
Statistical Consulting Center (SCC). Dr. Curtiss had access to the raw data Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet containing the individualized responses of the respondents, which
was loaded onto a GVSU secure server that requires userid and password to access the
data. This spreadsheet was utilized to calculate the advanced statistics and was
safeguarded by limiting access to the file at the SCC to only Dr. Curtiss and those
students generating the statistics under the direction of Dr. Curtiss. Upon completion of
the advanced statistical calculations, this file was securely deleted from the GVSU SCC
computers and network.
The Role of the Researcher
According to Creswell (2009), the background of the researcher in qualitative studies
should be included in the study to provide an understanding of how past experiences may
influence the interpretation of the dissertation investigation. The author has firsthand
knowledge of the evolution from paper documents exchanged during litigation to the
current trend of electronic document production with 18 years of experience as a
paralegal in two law firms in Michigan. Most recently achieving her Certified
Information Security Manager (CISM), Certified Information Privacy Professional
(CIPP) certification, as well as experience as a law firm Information Technology (IT)
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Project Manager, and Information Security Consultant, the author has been exposed to
the numerous information security policies, security breach incidents, data privacy laws,
and security breach notification laws. The issue of security and confidentiality of
sensitive client information and PII is of primary concern to a law firm.
Reliability and Validity
According to Sinkovics, Penz, and Ghauri (2008), reliability is more objective than
subjective in qualitative research. Sinkovics et al. suggest building on a previous study as
a way to remove method bias. The author furthered the study of Doherty and Fulford
(2005) in an attempt to remove this validity issue. According to Creswell (2009),
member checking of themes discovered from the investigation should be presented to
someone involved with the group taking the survey. To further enhance the validity of
the Web-based survey, the author used member checking with the 2007-2009 ILTA
President and Sidley Austin LLP’s Enterprise End User Services Director, Joy Heath
Rush, to ensure the accuracy of the findings (Creswell). Additionally, through peer
debriefing and peer review, the author ensured the validity of the findings of the study
with Meg Hackett, J.D., a lawyer in a law firm who did not participate in the online
survey (Creswell). By surveying a diverse population of IT law firm personnel across the
U.S. the author further ensured the corroboration of the Web-based study (Creswell &
Clark, 2007; Patton, 2002).
Importantly by incorporating the Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) original survey
instrument into this dissertation investigation, the author also validated the findings
obtained by Doherty and Fulford within the legal sector (Patton) and also demonstrated
the reliability of this earlier survey (Creswell, 2009). Doherty and Fulford validated their
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survey instrument through two pre-tests and a pilot study exercise distributed to
experienced IS researchers and senior IT professionals with IS duties. A panel of subject
matter experts provided input as to the validity and reliability of the author’s survey
questions as well. The subject matter expert panel included:
1. Anne K. Abatte – Ph.D., Executive Director Greater Cincinnati Library
Consortium, Cincinnati, Ohio
2. Ruth S. Stevens, M.L.S, J.D., Associate Professor, Grand Valley State University,
Grand Rapids, Michigan
3. Mark Thorogood, M.S. – Manager, Application Services at McDermott Will &
Emery LLP, Chicago, Illinois
The subject matter experts’ comments (see Table 4) formed the foundation for the
revision of the original survey. The author’s survey (see Appendix E) primarily
incorporated the questions from the original survey instrument (see Appendix F)
developed by Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) to support their empirical study regarding
security breaches and security policies. Appendix G shows the redline revisions made to
the Doherty and Fulford original survey instrument. These changes enabled the author to
customize the original survey to match the research questions for this dissertation
research.
Table 4. Feedback from the Subject Matter Experts That Served as Panel Members
Question
1
How many lawyers are
employed by your law
firm?

Comment
"Small" should be smaller--you
may insult someone with
numbers that large.

Resolution
ILTA audience uses
these terms on a regular
basis. No action taken.

Why are these law firm size
numbers significant? Why have
break between 150 and 151 vs.
100 and 101, etc. Are these
categories used by another survey
or group?

The target audience is
familiar with these law
firm sizes since ILTA
uses these sizes on all of
their surveys.
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Question

Comment

Resolution

The term “employed” in the
question may be confusing. By
definition, partners are not
employed, they are selfemployed. In a typical law firm,
only counsels, non-attorney
professionals, and associates are
employees of the firm. Partners
are business owners, not
employees.

Revised the question to:
“Please indicate the size
of your law firm.”

Wouldn’t the size of the IT
department be important as well?

Yes, added this question.

Change the sentence “How many
lawyers are employed by your
law firm?” to “Indicate the size
of your law firm?”

Revised the question to:
“Please indicate the size
of your law firm.”

Inside the table, change “Number
of Users” to either “Number of
End-users” or “Number of
Lawyers.” Note that the term
“attorneys” should not be used
because it means different things
depending upon the nationality of
the reader. For example, there are
attorneys, barristers, and
solicitors in the United Kingdom.
Additionally, the term
“employed” should not be used
because technically partners are
business owners, not employees.
Lastly, the term used in the table
should agree with the term used
in the question. The terms
presently do not agree.

ILTA’s Executive
Director indicated via email that she believes
number of users is a
more accurate depiction
of firm size.

Is the size breakdown consistent
with other surveys?

Revised attorneys to law
firm employees/lawyers
or other members of the
firm throughout the
survey.

The target audience is
familiar with these law
firm sizes since ILTA
uses these sizes on all of
their surveys.
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Question
2
Which of the following
most accurately describes
the location(s) of your
firm’s offices?

Comment

Resolution

Why do you switch from "global" Changed all responses to
“international.”
to "international" in the
responses? This could be
confusing.

Does this mean an office outside
of the U.S.? Global typically
means comprehensive. The terms
global and international may be
confusing. The term “global”
appears to mean non-U.S. office;
however, the term could also
mean servicing clients from
multiple nations, which is
sometimes done, especially when
dealing with intellectual property
matters before the Europe court.
The question seems to be tapping
two dimensions (i.e., office count
and office locations). The
question could be severed into
two questions, thereby making it
clearer.

Changed all responses to
“international.”

Revised question to:
Please indicate the size
of your law firm
information technology
department.
Added a new Question
3: Which of the
following most
accurately describes the
location(s) of your
firm’s offices?

Added a new Question
3: Which of the
following most accurately
describes the location(s)
of your firm’s offices?
4
Which of the following
best describes your law
firm?
5
Which of the following
technology-related
department(s) does your
law firm have?

None.

Get rid of "but" in the last choice- Revised question to list
-Seems confusing, and perhaps
functions rather than
says that a different name is
department titles.
wrong.
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Question

Comment
I am concerned about the
wording of this question. Should
this be a list of functions, not
department titles? I see a
situation in which departments at
two different firms have the same
titles, but they do different things.

Resolution

What is the difference between
information technology and
information systems? Moreover,
many firms call their IT
department Information Services.
This raises the concern of
synonyms and the need to clarify
terms and concepts that are
potentially ambiguous.

Changed “information
systems” to
“information services.”

What about a large office that
does not have departments?

Changed to a list of
functions.

The list of departments appears to Revised.
contain synonyms, which may
cause confusion.
Are you only interested in
services that relate to information
security? If so, you should state
that. If you want all services, you
might get a lot of responses in
your "Other" category, like
training, hardware installation,
upgrade, etc.
6
Does your law firm have
a designated person or a
group of people who
handle security issues?

7
If yes, what is their title?

Are you only interested if they
have one person? What if they
had two people or a whole
department? How should they
answer the question?

None.

Added information
security to question:
“Which of the following
information security
functions does your law
firm technology-related
department(s) provide?”

Changed to have two
“yes” answers – one for
a single person and the
other for a group.
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Question
8
Which of the following
privacy and/or security
laws is your law firm
required to comply with?

9
Please record in the table
below the approximate
number of IT security
breaches that your law
firm has experienced in
the past two years.
10
Please indicate the
severity of the worst
breach of each type that
your law firm has
experienced in the past
two years, using the scale
provided.
11
Please indicate your level
of agreement with the
following statements.
12
Does your law firm have
written information
technology (IT) security
policies?
13
Were your law firm
written IT security
policies and procedures
created due to a security
incident/breach?
14
How long has your law
firm been actively using a
documented IT security
policy?

Comment

Resolution

I think there should be a "Don’t
Added a “Do not know”
Know" option next to each
selection.
option. They might know about
one law they have to comply with
but not about another.

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.
None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.

None.

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument
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Question
15
Approximately how often
is the IT security policy
updated?
16
Does your law firm audit
and enforce the
documented IT security
policy?
17
Approximately how often
is the IT security policy
audited by an independent
third party?

18
How is the IT security
policy disseminated to
law firm employees/
attorneys?

19
Using the table below,
please indicate the
security issues covered in
your IT security policy
and/or through separate
procedures or standards.
If you do not explicitly
cover an issue through
your policy or a separate
stand-alone standard,
please leave blank.

Comment

Resolution

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.
None.

I don't like the sequencing of the
responses. They should be in
order of frequency from least to
highest. Every two years should
be before less than every two
years. I also don't like your
intervals. I think there are gaps
and combining "more" and "less"
could create confusion. How
about specific ranges. Every two
years or more. Between one year
and 2 years, etc. Whatever you
want to know.

Revised the sequencing
of frequency from least
to highest.

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.

Revised “organization
employees” to law firm
employees/lawyers or
other members of the
firm.

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.
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Question
20
How important do you
believe the following
factors to be for the
successful
implementation of IT
security in your law firm
on a scale of 1-5 with 1
being the least important
and 5 being most
important?
21
How successful do you
believe your law firm has
been in adopting each of
these factors on a scale of
1-5 with 1 being the least
important and 5 being
most important?

22
Are IT security policy
documents approved by
management, published
and communicated to all
law firm employees and
relevant third party
service providers?

Comment

Resolution

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.

Revised “organization”
to law firm.

None – this question is from
Doherty and Fulford’s original
UK study on Info. Security
Policies survey instrument.

Revised “organization”
to law firm.

I think this combines too many
things in one question. How
separating it into three questions

Split old question 22
into three questions as
recommended.

1 approved
2 published
3 communicated

Added a new Question
22: Are IT security
policy documents
approved by
management?

23
Added a new Question
23: Are IT security
policy documents
published?

Split old question 22
into three questions as
recommended.
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Question
24
Added a new Question
24: Are approved IT
security policy documents
communicated to all law
firm employees and
relevant third party
service providers?
25
Are law firm computers
shut down for inactivity
after a defined period?
26
When under a time
deadline to finish an
assignment, how likely
would it be to:

27
Please indicate your level
of agreement with the
following statements: . . .

28
During the past 12
months, how often did
your law firm . . . ?

Comment

Resolution
Split old question 22
into three questions as
recommended

None.

In this question you don't say
who you are referring to. Is the
person supposed to answer based
on what they would do or what
they think other people in their
firm would do?

Changed to add to: how
likely would it be “for
people in your law
firm.”

Are you asking about both
Deleted procedures.
policies and procedures? Is the
question whether or not firms
need written policies or whether
they need procedures to protect
information security or both?
Could you just leave out the word
“procedures”?

I would highlight "past 12
months" to make it easier to see.
Do you need a “don’t know”
option?
Should this question include
instructions such as select the
answer that best applies because
the potential responses are not
collectively exhaustive?

Highlighted on Word
document and on
Zoomerang.
Added a “Do not know”
column.
Revised to, “During the
past 12 months, how
often did your law firm?
Select the answer that
best applies”.
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Question

29
Which of the following
statements is true for your
law firm?
Section 4 header
Demographic Questions
These last few questions
are to help me get to
know you, the respondent
better. Like all of the
questions in this
questionnaire, your
answers were held in
strict confidence. No
answers were paired with
an individual and only a
cumulative set of results
were presented in the
dissertation.
30
What is the highest level
of education you have
completed?

Comment
“A Few Times a Month” –
Should this be “more than once
per month”?

Resolution
Revised to “more than
once per month”.

I would switch the order on your
last two choices. This leads to
sort of a natural progression.
. . . .get to know you, the
respondent, better. . .

Switched order of last
two choices.

Are these required or optional?
Do you want to state that they are
optional? I might be put off by
this type of question, but I
understand why you are trying to
get this information.

Added comma after
“respondent”.
Added: All of these
responses are optional.

"Highest level" could be difficult Added: “Prefer not to
for someone. What if they have a answer” to level of
bachelors and a JD? Does
education.
"highest level" assume that they
also have a master degree?
Are these categories (Ph.D.)
Removed A.B.D.
necessary, particularly the A.B.D.
category?

31
Please state your gender.

None.

32
Please state your age.

None.

33
Which title best describes
your job level?

Can you add "Law Firm
Administrator" or even CEO as
one of the options?

Yes, added “Law Firm
Administrator” and
“Chief Executive
Officer”.
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Question
Comment
Resolution
34
Would you be willing to
None.
be contacted to answer
follow-up questions via
an e-mail message linking
you to a second follow-up
Zoomerang survey, if
necessary?
* Please note that your email address will only be
used to send you the link
to the additional survey.
Any and all additional
information obtained
would be held in strict
confidence and your
name would not be used
in the reporting of
information.
Final Paragraph
When I started looking at the
Added confidentiality
Thank you for
survey, one of my first thoughts
clause to first question
participating in this study! (as a potential respondent) was
and end of survey.
Is there anything
whether my responses would be
additional that you would confidential. I think there should
like to share with the
be a reminder at the beginning of
researcher? Please
the survey (not just the cover
provide your comments in letter) that responses are
the space provided.
confidential and will not be
linked to any particular firm or
person. If I were in law firm IT, I
would be very hesitant to share
details about my firm’s security
procedures that could be leaked
to others.
Threats to Internal Validity
The primary internal validity threat to this dissertation investigation was maturation.
Sekaran (2003) defines maturation as the tainting of the survey results due to an
uncontrollable variable such as the passage of time. Since technology is evolving at a
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rapid pace, the threat of maturation effects through the passage of time as the dissertation
investigation continues (Sekaran) coupled with technology changes is also a concern.
The survey questions were posed to a panel of subject matter experts in an attempt to
control this threat. The length the survey was open to the respondents was also limited to
three weeks in an effort to combat maturation effects.
Threat to External Validity
A threat to external validity for this dissertation investigation was selection threats of
having more than one person from the same law firm complete the questionnaire. In an
attempt to control this threat, ILTA agreed to send the link to this Web-based study to
only one e-mail address per law firm (see Appendix D). Additionally, an external
validity threat that could not be controlled by the author was whether or not the person
who received the link to the questionnaire was the actual person who completed the
questionnaire.
Formats for Presenting Results
The data collections were represented in graphical format and tables. SPSS™ 12.0 was
utilized for the advanced statistics, as well as SPSS™ PASW® Statistics 17.0 for
Microsoft Windows and the statistical functions of Microsoft Excel 2007 to analyze
and calculate the results of the questionnaires. The survey results were provided to the
researcher from the Zoomerang software in a format that was easily converted into
SPSS™ and Microsoft Excel 2007 for analysis and computation of results using the
various statistical features of these software programs.
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Resource Requirements
Randi Mayes, the ILTA Executive Director, assisted with the distribution of the
surveys to the ILTA members by distributing an e-mail invitation with the link to the
author’s Zoomerang Website (see Appendix D). Reminder e-mails to complete the study
were sent by Ms. Mayes. Zoomerang sent the online results only to the author. Access to
the data collected on Zoomerang was password protected and limited to the author.
Dr. Phyllis Curtiss, Director of the GVSU SCC and those students generating the
advanced statistics under her direction had access to the raw data Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet containing the individualized responses of the respondents. This raw data
spreadsheet was provided by the author and loaded onto a GVSU secure server that
requires userid and password to access the data. This spreadsheet was utilized to calculate
the advanced statistics using SPSS™ 12.0. Participants were not identified in any of the
results. Additionally, SPSS™ PASW® Statistics 17.0 for Microsoft Windows and
Microsoft Excel 2007 were used to analyze and calculate the results of the
questionnaires.
Internet access to the Zoomerang Website account to set up the survey and review the
results of the survey as well as e-mail to send out the Zoomerang link to Randi Mayes
were necessary resources. The NSU electronic library (e-library), the Internet, and
articles in professional journals and magazines supported the author’s research in this
topic area.
Summary
In this chapter the author delineated the specific procedures employed for conducting
the survey and analyzing the survey findings. The author described the methodology
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utilized for this investigation. The approach consisted of the development and
distribution of a Web-based survey that was based on the Doherty and Fulford (2005)
survey and included additional new questions posited by the author. The use of
Zoomerang as the online survey tool and the agreement with ILTA to send out e-mail
invitations to their members was also described.
Furthermore in this chapter, the author discussed the data analysis conducted with
regard to the results received from the Zoomerang survey. The composition of the target
population and sampling for this study was described. The reliability and validity of the
research was reviewed, including the feedback received from the subject matter experts
that served as panel members with regard to customizing the Doherty and Fulford (2005)
questions for this dissertation investigation. Resource requirements and IRB approval
processes were also examined.
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
This chapter reviews the findings of this dissertation investigation which was designed
using the original survey instrument from the Doherty and Fulford (2005) study along
with some additional questions posited by the author. The survey was converted to an
online survey, hosted on Zoomerang. The analysis of these responses includes an
analysis of their relationship to the Doherty and Fulford responses.
On March 12, 2009, ILTA Executive Director, Randi Mayes, sent out an invitation to
1,123 ILTA members to partake in the author’s Web-based study by providing the ILTA
members with an introduction to the author and a link to the Zoomerang online survey.
Ms. Mayes included a link to the ILTA Website where a copy of the survey could be
previewed prior to taking the survey. Ms. Mayes also sent out notices on March 20, 2009
and April 1, 2009 reminding all 1,123 ILTA members to complete the author’s survey on
Zoomerang. This survey was open for three weeks. Those who completed the survey
and agreed to respond to additional follow-up questions were sent an additional
Zoomerang link to these questions on April 2, 2009. Follow-up questions were open for
two weeks. Overall, data were collected over a five week timeframe ending April 15,
2009.
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A total of 111 ILTA members initiated responding to the online Zoomerang survey.
Of these, there were 19 people who completed only a portion of the survey. These
incomplete responses were not included in the response rate or percentage calculation for
valid responses (Sekaran, 2003). There were 92 completed responses to the survey
received, of which four completed the survey by declining to participate after reading the
informed consent resulting in 88 valid responses. The response rate for the survey was
8.19% (92 completed responses) with 7.83% (88) of the respondents providing valid
responses.
It is interesting to note that the Doherty and Fulford study response rate was 7.7%.
Wiant’s (2005) investigation had a 5.6% completed response rate to mail surveys
regarding the existence of information security policies in hospitals and their value in
prompting hospital employees to report security incidents. The Computer Security
Institute (CSI) response rate for their 13th year of its CSI Computer Crime and Security
Survey (2008) was 10%. Similar to the Doherty and Fulford study, as well as the Wiant
studies, when CSI first deployed their survey in 1996, their response rate also was low at
8.6% (Power, 2002).
The author supplemented the dissertation investigation with follow-up questions sent
to 45 of the respondents that had provided e-mail addresses for this purpose. The author
asked the open ended question: “Why do you think so few people respond to
questionnaires dealing with security?” A number of the respondents stated that it was
due to fear of disclosing vulnerabilities, exposure, or liability concerns. The table below
created from data received from follow-up questions shows the actual responses:
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Table 5. Open Ended Follow-Up Question
Why do you think so few people respond to questionnaires dealing with security?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Because we don't know who will have access to identifying information from the survey and
we don't want to advertise our vulnerabilities.
Some people are reluctant to publicize threats because it shows weakness and vulnerability.
Most people think that their security is adequate, but many may not want to admit that they
don't understand security.
Reluctance to make public security arrangements; difficulty of answering the questions with
the options provided.
Most do not pay attention to security until they are impacted by the loss of same.
You never think about it until it happens.
Lack of understanding and denial that there is a problem. Securing computerized data is not
understood by many IT professionals. Law firms in the U.S. are historically conservative in
changing systems that appear to work and fix something only when it has broken.
They either do not want to admit that their own firm has poor security or they have some
silly idea that expressing knowledge of security policies somehow infringes on the security
of their firm.
:-) They either don't know anything about it or they don't care.
Too shy to show that their office might be at risk, we always think that we don’t do enough
to protect our system. Also too afraid to be noticed.
For security reasons. Most people wouldn't want to describe the security system they have at
home for fear it could help people break in.
Because they do not understand the issues
Fear, exposure and liability.
They don't want to show their ignorance of the issue
I don't think it's limited to security issues. But I do think that I hide the most ridiculous
things from vendors (the name of my backup vendor; when the tapes go offsite; stuff that
doesn't matter) in the name of security. Maybe people don't want to share something that,
put together with all the other things, could cause a security breach?
People get asked to fill out surveys every day.
Fear of disclosure
Not enough time to respond to surveys
They are hiding from the fact that they are vulnerable.
So few people know about it! And it's an emotionally difficult area to talk about when your
firm isn't up to standards.
It reminds them how their security is lacking in every area and how they are not following
proper legal procedures
Because they are afraid of the unknown and are embarrassed of their answers.
Fear that the information will be used against them. Embarrassment. Ignorance on the
subject. Many do not understand security and assume someone is taking care of it.
Exposure to media.
Because we are all concerned about our security and would not like others to know any
vulnerabilities
Afraid of public knowledge that will damage the chances for future business and cause loss
of current customers.
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Why do you think so few people respond to questionnaires dealing with security?
27
28

29
30

Probably don't want to take the time to respond.
Besides the fact it's a difficult (as in intellectually challenging) area, it may be an area no
one really believes requires concern -- or expenditures -- until a problem actually surfaces
(when the horse is on the way out of the barn). I know I am often accused of being
"alarmist" and "going overboard on this stuff" and that likely won't change until (and if) an
incident occurs (and if that incident costs money, it will immediately become "why haven't
we?").
Out of sight, out of mind.
Don't want to admit to not having adequate security procedures in place.

Findings
Demographics Analysis
Demographic questions such as level of education, gender, age, and job level were
included in the survey instrument. The basic demographic analysis was performed using
Microsoft Excel. Table 6 presents this demographic analysis. The gender distribution
demonstrated that about two- thirds (66%) of the survey respondents were male and
approximately one-third (34%) were female. Most of the respondents (42%) were
between the ages of 36 and 45. Over one-half of the respondents (55%) held the title of
CIO/Director. More than one-half of the respondents (52%) hold Bachelor degrees,
while an additional number of respondents (19%) possess advanced degrees of Master
degrees and one holds a law degree (1%).

Table 6. Demographic Data of the Study Respondents
Item

High School Graduate
Paralegal Certificate
Bachelor Degree
Master Degree
Juris Doctorate
Ph.D.
Prefer not to answer

Frequency

Percentage

7
0
46
17
1
0
6

8%
0%
52%
19%
1%
0%
7%
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Frequency

Percentage

Other, Please Specify
1 Some college
2 AA
3 Bachelor with 45 hours towards Master
4 Community College
5 Military Technical Academy Graduate
6 Some college
7 Associate Degree, Microsoft Certs.
8 Some college credits, but no degree
9 Technical College
10 Network Admin Certificate, MS & Novel Cert

Item

11

12%

Female
Male

30
57

34%
66%

Age
18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
65+
Prefer not to answer

1
6
37
29
12
0
3

1%
7%
42%
33%
14%
0%
3%

0
1
48
1
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0
11
12

0%
1%
55%
1%
0%
0%
17%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
12%
14%

Associate
Partner
Chief Information Officer/Director
Chief Security Officer/Information Security Officer
Privacy/Compliance Officer
Project Manager
Legal Technology Manager
Paralegal/Legal Assistant
Legal Secretary
Technician
Database Programmer
Database Coder
Network Administrator
Other, Please Specify
1 Director of Information Technology
2 IT Director
3 Systems Administrator
4 Executive Director
5 Director
6 Technology Courseware Developer & Trainer
7 Staff Development & Training Manager
8 Information Systems Director
9 Office Manager/Administrator
10 Director and Network Manager
11 Director, Technology
12 engineer
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Law Firm Demographics
The survey instrument collected law firm demographics such as size of law firm in
number of users, size of information technology department, location of law firm offices,
country where the law firm was based, functions of the law firm technology-related
department, whether the law firm had a designated IT security person or group, and title
of the IT security person. This demographic data are presented in Tables 7 through12.
Table 7 reports on the sizes of the respondents’ law firms and the percentages of their
law firm users. Close to one-half of the respondents (40%) were from small-sized law
firms with fewer than 150 users. One-fourth of the respondents were from large-sized law
firms with 251-500 users. Almost one-fifth of the respondents (19%) were from mediumsized law firms with 150-250 users. The remaining 16% of the respondents were from
very large-sized law firms with less than 150 users.
Table 7. Size of Law Firm in Number of Users of the Study Respondents
Item
Small <150 Users
Medium 151-250 Users
Large 251-500 Users
Very Large >500 Users

Frequency
35
17
22
14

Percentage
40%
19%
25%
16%

Table 8 presents data on the sizes of the respondents’ law firm information technology
departments. The majority of the respondents (52%) had IT departments with 2 to 10
people.

95
Table 8. Size of Law Firm Information Technology Department of the Study
Respondents
Item
1
2-10
11-24
>25

Frequency
16
46
13
13

Percentage
18%
52%
15%
15%

Tables 9 and 10 report on the location of the respondent law firm offices and the
countries where they are based. The majority of the respondents (88%) were based in the
U.S., with 10 percent of the respondents based in Canada, and the balance based in
Australian (1%) and Asia (1%). Approximately one-half of the respondents had multiple
offices in the U.S. (49%) or one office in the U.S. (32%) as their primary office.

Table 9. Location of Law Firm Offices of the Study Respondents
Item
One office in the United States
One office in the United States as well as
international office(s)
Multiple offices in the United States
Multiple offices in the United States as well as
international offices
Multiple offices in the United States and one
international office
One international office in Europe
Other, please specify
One office in Canada
Other, please specify
Multiple offices in Canada
Other, please specify: Multiple of offices in
Canada, one in US,UK & Australia
Other, please specify: Australia

Frequency
28

Percentage
32%

1

1%

43

49%

2

2%

4

5%

0

0%

5

7%

1

1%

1

1%

2

2%
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Table 10. Region Where Law Firm Offices of the Study Respondents Were Based
Item
United States based law firm
European Union based law firm
Canadian based law firm
Asia Pacific based law firm
Latin American based law firm
Prefer not to answer
Other, please specify: Australia

Frequency
77
0
9
1
0
0
1

Percentage
88%
0%
10%
1%
0%
0%
1%

Tables 11 and 12 present data regarding the functions of the law firm technologyrelated departments and report whether the law firm designated a person or group to
handle IT security issues. The majority of the respondents’ technology-related
departments provided information security services (90%), disaster recovery (89%),
information security appliance/software implementation (83%), incident response (80%),
and information security policy development (78%). Less than one-half of the
respondents’ technology-related departments provided Web page design/development
(49%) and privacy policy development (44%). Very few law firms (2%) outsource all of
these functions. Less than three quarters of the law firm respondents (69%) had one
person or a group of people designated to handle security issues.
Table 11. Functions of the Law Firm Technology-related Departments of the Study
Respondents
Item
Information security services
Information security policy development
Privacy policy development
Web page design/development
Incident response
Disaster recovery
Information security appliance/software
implementation
We outsource all of these functions
Do not know
Other, please specify:
Outsource some of these functions

Frequency
80
69
39
43
71
78

Percentage
91%
78%
44%
49%
81%
89%

73

83%

2
2

2%
2%

2

2%
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Table 12. Law Firm Designation of Security Personnel of the Study Respondents
Item
Yes, one person
Yes, a group of people
No
Do not know

Frequency
23
38
27
0

Percentage
26%
43%
31%
0%

Table 13 presents data regarding statements the respondents indicated were true for
their firm. Over one-half (56%) of the respondents indicated that security falls upon
everyone in the IT department in their law firm. Close to one-half (48%) of the
respondents stated that an individual is designated to be responsible for information
security in their law firm. Almost one-quarter (22%) of the respondents did not have any
individual designated as responsible for information security in their law firm. Only
seven percent of the respondents indicated their law firm had a separate department
responsible for information security.
Table 13. Law Firm Respondents’ Designation of Responsibility for Information
Security
Item
There is an individual designated as being responsible for
information security in my law firm.
There is a separate department in my law firm responsible for
information security.
Information security falls upon everyone in the information
technology department in my law firm.
No individual is designated as being responsible for
information security in my law firm.

Frequency

Percentage

42

48%

6

7%

49

56%

19

22%

Table 14 presents data regarding the privacy and security laws applicable to the law
firm respondents, including U.S. laws and international laws. Almost one-half of the
respondents did not know whether their law firms were required to comply with these
laws, or claimed that their law firms did not have to comply with any of these laws.
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Table 14. Privacy and Security Laws Identified by Law Firm Respondents for
Compliance
Item
PIPEDA (The Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Document Act)
State Data Breach Notification Laws
European Union Directive on Data Protection
GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act)
FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act)
FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act)
USA P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act
APEC Privacy Principals (Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation)
Australia's Federal Privacy Act
Japan's Law Concerning the Protection of Personal
Information
Do not know
Other, Please Specify:
1 None
2 Canadian Bar Assoc, Law Societies of BC, AB
& YT
3 None
4 Not sure of the rest
5 PIPA - Personal Information Protection Act
6 None of these apply to us.
7 Massachusetts Regulation 17

Frequency

Percentage

9

11%

12
2
3

15%
2%
4%

31

38%

1

1%

2
12

2%
15%

3

4%

3

4%

0

0%

32

39%

7

9%

Follow-up Questions
This dissertation investigation requested that respondents interested and willing to be
contacted to answer follow-up questions via an e-mail message linking to a second
Zoomerang survey provide their e-mail addresses. Forty-five respondents agreed to
respond to follow-up questions and provided their e-mail addresses. Ten questions were
posed to this group in a separate Zoomerang survey from April 2, 2009 through April 15,
2009.
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According to Romanosky et al. (2008), the critical characteristic of the U.S. data
security breach notification laws are that notice is dependent upon where the consumer
resides rather than where the business is located. Table 14 shows that only 15% of the
respondents indicated that their law firms were required to comply with U.S. data
security breach notification laws. However, because at the time of the survey there were
44 states (excluding Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and South
Dakota) and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands with security
breach notification laws, the author speculated that it was likely that the U.S.-based law
firms had one or more clients who resided in a state requiring data security breach
notifications. In order to test this speculation, the author asked the 45 respondents who
had agreed to a follow-up Zoomerang survey whether they had clients who resided in any
of these or territories with data security breach notifications. Table 15 presents data
regarding the location of where the respondents’ law firm offices were based. Thirtythree of the 34 respondents to the follow-up Zoomerang survey responded that they had
clients that resided in one or more states with data security breach notification laws,
including four of the five Canadian law firms represented in Table 15. Table 16 presents
the mean and standard deviation (Std. D.) for the follow-up questions pertaining to the
respondents’ understanding of U.S. data breach notification laws. These descriptive
statistics were calculated using SPSS™ and included a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly
disagree to 5 =strongly agree).
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Table 15. Region Where Law Firm Offices of the Follow-up Respondents Were
Based
Item
United States based law firm
European Union based law firm
Canadian based law firm
Asia Pacific based law firm
Australian based law firm
Prefer not to answer
Other, please specify

Frequency
29
0
5
0
0
0
0

Percentage
85%
0%
15%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Table 16. U.S. Security Breach Notification Laws
Item
Aware of notification laws in 44 states (excluding Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and South Dakota), the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands that require that in the event
personal information (PI) and/or personally identifiable information (PII) is
exposed to unauthorized parties, the affected clients be notified.

Mean

Std. D.

3.74

1.082

Aware that these U.S. security breach notification laws mandate notification
to its state residents of lost, stolen, or compromised unencrypted PI and/or
PII through unauthorized access to computerized data, including access by
an unauthorized employee.

3.65

1.203

Notification of a security breach of computerized data pursuant to these
U.S. security breach notification laws is based on where the resident resides
rather than where the data resides.

3.29

.906

Survey Data Analysis
The author collected data to measure the incidence (0 occurrences, 1-5 occurrences, 610 occurrences, and >10 occurrences) of breaches (computer virus, hacking incident,
unauthorized access, theft of hardware/ software, computer-based fraud, human error,
natural disaster, and damage by employees) within the two years preceding the survey
along with the severity of the breaches using a five-point Likert scale (1=fairly
insignificant to 5 =highly significant). Data were collected using the same questions that
Doherty and Fulford (2005) used in their study. Table 17 presents the published results
from the Doherty and Fulford study. Table 18 presents the descriptive results of the
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author’s dissertation survey with regard to incidence of breaches and severity of worst
breach. The not applicable (N/A) responses were treated as missing values and not
included in the calculation of the mean.
Table 17. Doherty & Fulford Table 2. The Incidence and Severity of Security
Breaches

Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 29
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford.

Table 18. Law Firms – Incidence and Severity of Security Breaches
Type of Breach

Incidence of Breaches
Approximate Number of
Breaches in Last Two Years

Computer virus
Hacking Incident
Unauthorized
access
Theft of hardware/
software
Computer-based
fraud
Human Error
Natural Disaster

Severity of Worst Breach
Fairly
Insignificant

Highly
Significant

Mean
Value

0

1-5

6-10

>10

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

26
81
55

34
3
24

11
0
2

15
0
2

29
19
23

13
1
8

11
3
5

11
0
6

5
0
0

18
61
43

2.28
1.30
1.86

40

35

7

1

23

9

8

14

1

30

2.29

79

4

0

0

20

3

3

0

0

59

1.35

21
73

46
9

6
0

11
0

34
18

15
3

9
2

11
2

1
2

15
57

2.00
1.78
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Type of Breach

Incidence of Breaches
Approximate Number of
Breaches in Last Two Years

Damage by
Employees

78

4

0

0

Severity of Worst Breach
Fairly
Insignificant

17

2

Highly
Significant

3

1

0

Mean
Value

61

1.48

Research Questions Answered
This Web-based study consisted of 10 primary research questions. The first five
questions were derived from Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) research on the relationship
between written information security policies and security breaches in an exploratory
analysis of U.K. organizations employing more than 250 people. The author converted
their hypotheses into research questions for this dissertation investigation in order to
discover how law firms compare to the subjects in the Doherty and Fulford study. The
additional five research questions in the Web-based survey were designed to investigate
whether information security policies impact law firms. The 10 primary research
questions investigated in this dissertation investigation included:
1. Do law firms that have written information security policies have fewer security
breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those that do not have
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?
Table 19 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study. Doherty
and Fulford found “no statistically significant associations between the existence of an
information security policy and either the incidence or the severity of any of the eight
types of security breach.” (p. 30). While Doherty and Fulford used a chi-square test to
display their results, the author’s survey responses for the incidence of breaches did not
meet the chi-squared test conditions consisting of all expected counts must be >1 and no
more than 20% of expected counts could be <5 (Field, 2009). Additionally, the analysis
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of variance (ANOVA) conditions were not met since the variables were ordinal and not
quantitative. Because neither a chi-squared test nor an ANOVA test was valid to use in
this analysis, a Mann-Whitney U test was determined most appropriate (Dr. P. Curtiss,
personal communication, May 14, 2009). Table 20 presents the author’s dissertation
survey Mann-Whitney U results. Because the p-values are all greater than .05, the results
demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship (Field) between the
adoption of the information security policy and the incidence and severity of security
breaches.

Table 19. Doherty & Fulford – Table 3 The Relationship Between the Adoption of
Information Security Policy and the Incidence and Severity of Security Breaches

Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 30,
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford.
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Table 20. Law Firms – Relationship Between the Adoption of Information Security
Policy and the Incidence and Severity of Security Breaches
Type of Breach

Computer virus
Hacking Incident
Unauthorized access
Theft of resources
Computer-based fraud
Human Error
Natural Disaster
Damage by Employees

Incidence of Breaches
(Mann-Whitney U Test)
U Test Value Two-Sided
Prob.
658.00
0.275
702.50
0.864
594.00
0.211
652.00
0.499
703.50
0.808
664.00
0.502
668.50
0.554
636.00
0.186

Severity of Worst Breach
(Mann-Whitney U Test)
U Test Value
Two-Sided
Prob.
419.00
0.652
33.00
0.175
126.00
0.448
277.00
0.950
61.50
0.428
508.00
0.929
45.00
0.210
26.00
0.207

2. Are law firms that have had information security policies in place for numerous years
likely to have fewer computer security breach incidents in terms of both frequency
and severity than those that do not have information security policies in place
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?
Table 21 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study. Doherty
and Fulford found “that older policies are associated with less severe breaches. However
. . . there is no strong or consistent evidence in support of the hypothesis . . .” (p. 31).
Table 22 presents the Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficient used for the author’s
ordinal data collected with regard to the age of the information security policy and the
incidence/severity of security breaches. Since the p-values are all greater than .05, the
results demonstrated no statistically significant associations (Field, 2009) between the
age of information security policies and the incidence and severity of security breaches.

105
Table 21. Doherty & Fulford – Table 4. Relationship between the Age of
Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches

Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 31,
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford.
Table 22. Law Firms – Relationship Between the Age of Information Security
Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches
Type of Breach

Computer virus
Hacking Incident
Unauthorized access
Theft of resources
Computer-based fraud
Human Error
Natural Disaster
Damage by Employees

Incidence of Breaches
(Spearman's Rho)
Correlation
Two-Sided
Coefficient
Significance
0.14
0.302
0.05
0.735
0.05
0.717
0.11
0.418
0.06
0.670
0.08
0.582
-0.14
0.324
0.07
0.619

Severity of Worst Breach
(Correlation)
Spearman’s
Two-Sided
Rho Value
Significance
-0.01
0.941
0.09
0.735
-0.10
0.592
0.13
0.427
0.11
0.668
0.07
0.669
-0.09
0.710
0.16
0.521

3. Do law firms that have updated their information security policies on a regular basis
have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those
that have not updated their information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005,
p. 26)?
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Table 23 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study. Doherty
and Fulford found “no statistically significant associations between the frequency with
which the InSPy is updated and the incidence and severity of any of the eight types of
security breach.” (p. 32). Similar to Doherty and Fulford, the author of this dissertation
investigation compressed the categorical scales of how often the information technology
security policy was updated (more than every two years, every two years, every year,
every six months, less than every six months) to greater than or equal to once a year and
at least once a year. Table 24 presents the mean rank for this item. Table 25 presents the
author’s dissertation survey Mann-Whitney U results. Since the p-values are all greater
than .05, the results demonstrated no statistically significant associations (Field, 2009).
Table 23. Doherty & Fulford – Table 5. Relationship Between the Frequency of
Updating the Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security
Breaches

Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 32,
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford.
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Table 24. Law Firms – Relationship Between the Frequency of Updating the
Information Security Policy and the Incidence of Security Breaches
Type of Breach

Computer virus
Hacking Incident
Unauthorized access
Theft of resources
Computer-based fraud
Human Error
Natural Disaster
Damage by Employees

How often is the IT security policy updated?
< Once a year
≥ Once a year
Mean Value
Mean Value
27.27
16.50
26.07
25.50
25.30
27.00
23.84
33.33
25.14
24.00
25.19
27.75
24.36
25.50
24.71
27.08

Table 25. Law Firms – Relationship Between the Frequency of Updating the
Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches
Type of Breach

Incidence of Breaches
Severity of Worst Breach
(Mann-Whitney U Test)
(Mann-Whitney U Test)
U Test Value Two-Sided
U Test Value
Two-Sided
Prob.
Prob.
Computer virus
78.00
0.083
65.50
0.586
Hacking Incident
132.00
0.715
6.50
0.789
Unauthorized access
123.00
0.757
26.00
0.094
Theft of resources
79.00
0.096
49.00
0.170
Computer-based fraud
123.00
0.593
6.00
0.695
Human Error
118.50
0.656
54.00
0.110
Natural Disaster
120.00
0.744
13.00
0.593
Damage by Employees
116.50
0.422
10.50
0.498
*Grouping Variable: How often is the IT security policy updated?

4. Are law firms that have an information security policy with a broad scope likely to
have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those
organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
Table 26 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study. Doherty
and Fulford found “with regard to the severity of threats, there are no statistically
significant associations between number of issues covered by the policy and the severity
of security breaches.” (p. 33). Table 27 presents the Spearman’s Rho correlation
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coefficient results of this dissertation investigation for the relationship between the range
of issues covered by the information security policy and the incidence/severity of security
breaches. The results demonstrated a significant but weak relationship. It was found
that a significant association exists when the number of issues covered in the information
security policies increase, the number of thefts of resources also tends to go up.
However, since the p-value is less than .05 the correlation is not very strong because it is
greater than .8 or less than -.8 (Field, 2009).

Table 26. Doherty & Fulford – Table 6. Relationship Between the Range of Issues
Covered by the Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security
Breaches

Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 32,
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford.
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Table 27. Law Firms – Relationship Between the Range of Issues Covered by the
Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches
Type of Breach

Computer virus
Hacking Incident
Unauthorized access
Theft of resources
Computer-based fraud
Human Error
Natural Disaster
Damage by Employees

Incidence of Breaches
(Spearman's Rho)
Correlation
Two-Sided
Coefficient
Significance
-0.13
0.314
0.05
0.699
0.18
0.192
0.38
0.004
0.04
0.783
-0.04
0.775
0.16
0.260
0.13
0.359

Severity of Worst Breach
(Correlation)
Spearman’s
Two-Sided
Rho Value
Significance
0.05
0.722
0.00
1.000
0.01
0.961
-0.18
0.256
-0.09
0.721
-0.25
0.089
0.02
0.950
-0.14
0.559

5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of best practices likely to have fewer
security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those organizations
that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
Table 28 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study. Doherty
and Fulford found that “there is a statistical association between the summated success
factors and security breaches for two out of the 16 tests conducted. . . . given that only
two of the 16 tests were significant, there is insufficient evidence to support hypothesis . .
. it must be rejected.” (p. 34). Table 29 presents the Spearman’s Rho correlation
coefficient results of this dissertation investigation for the relationship between the range
of issues covered by the successful adoption of success factors and the incidence/severity
of security breaches. Since the p-values are all greater than .05, the results demonstrate
no statistically significant associations (Field, 2009).
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Table 28. Doherty & Fulford – One-way ANOVA between the Successful Adoption
of Success Factors and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches

Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 33,
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford.

Table 29. Law Firms – Spearman’s Rho Between the Successful Adoption of
Success Factors and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches
Type of Breach

Computer virus
Hacking Incident
Unauthorized access
Theft of resources
Computer-based fraud
Human Error
Natural Disaster
Damage by Employees

Incidence of Breaches
(Spearman's Rho)
Correlation
Two-Sided
Coefficient
Significance
-0.04
0.796
-0.02
0.883
0.13
0.321
0.19
0.165
-0.15
0.262
0.06
0.638
-0.06
0.680
0.10
0.459

Severity of Worst Breach
(Correlation)
Spearman’s
Two-Sided
Rho Value
Significance
-0.22
0.131
-0.05
0.840
-0.09
0.614
0.06
0.706
-0.39
0.110
-0.13
0.394
-0.19
0.400
-0.04
0.876

Table 30 presents the responses and percentages for each of 10 success factors’
importance of best practices for the effective implementation of IT security in
respondent’s law firm(s).
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Table 30. Law Firm – Success Factors’ Importance of Best Practices
Item
Ensuring security policy
reflects business objectives
Percentage:
An approach to
implementing security that is
consistent with the law firm
culture
Percentage:
Visible commitment from
management
Percentage:
A good understanding of
security risks
Percentage:
A good understanding of
security requirements
Percentage:
Effective marketing of
security to all law firm
employees/ lawyers or other
members of the firm
Percentage:
Distribution of guidance on
IT security policy to all law
firm employees/lawyers or
other members of the firm
Percentage:
Providing appropriate
training and education to all
employees/lawyers or other
members of the firm
Percentage:
Comprehensive
measurement system for
evaluating performance in
security management
Percentage:
Provision of feedback
system for suggesting policy
improvements
Percentage:

Not at All
Important

Not Very
Important

Somewhat
Important

Very
Important

Extremely
Important

N/A

0

0

10

33

18

0

0%

0%

16%

54%

30%

0%

0

2

7

33

19

0

0%

3%

11%

54%

31%

0%

0

0

4

15

42

0

0%

0%

7%

25%

69%

0%

0

0

5

21

34

0

0%

0%

8%

35%

57%

0%

0

0

6

22

33

0

0%

0%

10%

36%

54%

0%

0

1

10

34

16

0

0%

2%

16%

56%

26%

0%

1

1

10

28

20

0

2%

2%

17%

47%

33%

0%

0

3

11

30

17

0

0%

5%

18%

49%

28%

0%

1

4

25

17

13

0

2%

7%

42%

28%

22%

0%

2

9

26

19

4

0

3%

15%

43%

32%

7%

0%

Table 31 presents the responses and percentages for each of these 10 success factors
(best practices) for the effective adoption of IT security in respondent’s law firm(s).
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Table 31. Law Firm – Success Factors’ Adoption of Best Practices
Item
Ensuring security policy
reflects business objectives
Percentage:
An approach to
implementing security that is
consistent with the law firm
culture
Percentage:
Visible commitment from
management
Percentage:
A good understanding of
security risks
Percentage:
A good understanding of
security requirements
Percentage:
Effective marketing of
security to all law firm
employees/ lawyers or other
members of the firm
Percentage:
Distribution of guidance on
IT security policy to all law
firm employees/lawyers or
other members of the firm
Percentage:
Providing appropriate
training and education to all
employees/lawyers or other
members of the firm
Percentage:
Comprehensive
measurement system for
evaluating performance in
security management
Percentage:
Provision of feedback
system for suggesting policy
improvements
Percentage:

Not at All
Successful

Not Very
Successful

Somewhat
Successful

Very
Successful

Extremely
Successful

N/A

1

6

26

19

8

1

2%

10%

43%

31%

13%

2%

1

6

19

25

9

1

2%

10%

31%

41%

15%

2%

3

12

20

16

8

1

5%

20%

33%

27%

13%

2%

3

3

20

26

8

1

5%

5%

33%

43%

13%

2%

2

5

22

23

8

1

3%

8%

36%

38%

13%

2%

2

19

26

9

4

1

3%

31%

43%

15%

7%

2%

1

10

26

15

8

1

2%

16%

43%

25%

13%

2%

3

21

23

10

3

1

5%

34%

38%

16%

5%

2%

8

26

17

5

2

3

13%

43%

28%

8%

3%

5%

8

25

18

8

0

2

13%

41%

30%

13%

0%

3%

Doherty and Fulford (2005) conducted a Cronbach’s alpha measure of the 10 success
factors which was found to be statistically significant with a score of 0.87. Similarly, the
author of this dissertation investigation performed a Cronbach’s alpha internal reliability
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test of the 10 success factors using SPSS™. According to Sekran (2003), a Cronbach’s
alpha of over .60 is considered to be statistically significant with those over .80 to be
good reliabilities. Table 32 presents the results of this test. Findings indicated the
Cronbach’s alpha measure of the 10 success factors of this dissertation investigation to be
statistically significant with a score of 0.89.
Table 32. Law Firms – Cronbach Alpha Internal Reliability Test of 10 Success
Factors
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items
0.896

Cronbach's Alpha
0.895

N of Items
10

Table 33 presents the responses and percentages for whether law firm computers are
shut down for inactivity after a defined period. More than one-half (67%) of the
respondents indicated law firm computers are not shut down for inactivity after a defined
period.
Table 33. Law Firm Computers Shut Down for Inactivity After A Defined Period
Item
Yes
No
Do Not Know

Frequency
27
59
2

Percentage
31%
67%
2%

Table 34 presents the responses and percentages for each security issue covered in IT
security policies and/or separate procedures or standards in the respondent’s law firm(s).
The personal usage of information systems was the highest percentage (63%) in the
policy document only category, with one-half of law firm respondents reporting a policy
document only for Internet access (50%), and just under one-half had a policy document
only in regard to violations and breaches (49%). Almost one-fourth of the responses
under the stand-alone procedures or standard only category were in regard to
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contingency planning (23%), while close to one-half of the respondents indicated policy
document and supplementary procedure or standards were in place for disclosure of
information (45%), Internet access (43%), and mobile computing (42%).
Table 34. Law Firm – Security Issues Covered in IT Security Policies and/or
Separate Procedures or Standards

21
35%
24
40%
30
50%
26
43%
12
20%
18
30%
12
21%
16
27%

Stand-Alone
Procedure or
Standard Only
7
12%
12
20%
3
5%
10
17%
2
3%
14
23%
7
12%
7
12%

Policy Document &
Supplementary Procedure
or Standard
27
45%
21
35%
26
43%
19
32%
7
12%
13
22%
9
16%
25
42%

37

3

19

63%
20
34%
28
49%

5%
8
14%
5
9%

32%
21
36%
21
37%

Policy
Document Only

Item
Disclosure of information
Percentage:
System access control
Percentage:
Internet access
Percentage:
Viruses, worms & Trojans
Percentage:
Software development
Percentage:
Contingency planning
Percentage:
Encryption
Percentage:
Mobile computing
Percentage:
Personal usage of Information
Systems
Percentage:
Physical security
Percentage:
Violations and breaches
Percentage:

Table 35 presents the responses and percentages for whether IT security policies are
approved by respondent’s law firm management. More than 90 percent of respondents
(93%) indicated law firm management does approve IT security policy documents.
Table 35. Law Firms – IT Security Policy Documents Approved By Management
Item
Yes
No
Do Not Know

Frequency
57
3
1

Percentage
93%
5%
2%
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Table 36 presents the responses and percentages for whether law firm IT security
policy is communicated with all law firm employees/lawyers or other members of the
firm and relevant third party service providers. More than one-third of respondents
(33%) only communicated approved IT security policy documents to law firm
employees/ lawyers or other members of the firm. Just over one-fourth of respondents
(28%) communicated all policies with law firm employees/lawyers/other members and
third parties. One-fifth of respondents (20%) indicated only certain policies were
communicated, while less than one-fifth of respondents (16%) do not communicate
policies to relevant third parties.
Table 36. Communication of Law Firm Approved IT Security Policy Documents
Frequency

Percentage

Yes – all of them are communicated to law firm
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm and
relevant third party service providers

Item

17

28%

Yes – but not communicated to relevant third party
service providers

10

16%

Yes – but only communicated to law firm
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm

20

33%

Yes – but only certain ones are communicated

12

20%

No – none of them

0

0%

Do not know

2

3%

Table 37 presents the responses and percentages for whether the law firm IT security
policy is published. More than 90 percent of respondents (92%) indicated that their law
firm published IT security policy documents.
Table 37. Publication of Law Firm IT Security Policy Documents
Item
Yes
No
Do Not Know

Frequency
55
4
1

Percentage
92%
7%
2%
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6. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, are law firm employees more
likely to by-pass security measures in order to complete the task (Post & Kagan,
2007)?
Table 38 presents the mean and standard deviation for the scanning or installation of
security measures using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely
likely).
Table 38. Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an
Assignment – Use of Security Measures
Item
Scan a file for viruses
Install security software updates
Install a digital certificate
Install an ActiveX control from an unknown source

Mean

Std. D.
1.497
1.299
1.207
1.243

2.40
2.03
1.94
3.25

Table 39 presents the frequency and percentages with which an employee/lawyer in
each respondent’s law firm scans a file for viruses if under a time deadline to finish an
assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely likely).
This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large). The
majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is not at all likely or not very
likely that employees/lawyers in their law firms would scan a file for viruses when under
a time deadline to finish an assignment.
Table 39. Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an
Assignment – Scan a File for Viruses
Small
Scan a file for
viruses

Not At All
Likely
Not Very
Likely
Somewhat
Likely

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

14

40%

10

58%

8

36%

3

22%

6

17%

3

18%

9

41%

2

14%

5

14%

3

18%

1

5%

2

14%
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Small
Very Likely
Extremely
Likely

3

9%

0

Medium
0%

2

Large
9%

Very Large
2
14%

7

20%

1

6%

2

9%

5

36%

Table 40 presents the frequency and percentages with which an employee/lawyer in
each respondent’s law firm installs security software updates if under a time deadline to
finish an assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely
likely). This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large).
The majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is not at all likely or not
very likely that employees/lawyers in their law firms would install security software
updates when under a time deadline to finish an assignment.
Table 40. Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an
Assignment – Install Security Software Updates
Small
Install security
software
updates

Not At All
Likely
Not Very
Likely
Somewhat
Likely
Very Likely
Extremely
Likely

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

14

40%

11

65%

10

45%

7

50%

8

23%

3

17%

9

40%

3

22%

7

20%

1

6%

1

5%

0

0%

2

6%

1

6%

1

5%

2

14%

4

11%

1

6%

1

5%

2

14%

Table 41 presents the frequency and percentages at which an employee/lawyer in
each respondent’s law firm installs a digital certificate if under a time deadline to finish
an assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely likely).
This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large). The
majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is not at all likely or not very
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likely that employees/ lawyers in their law firms would install a digital certificate when
under a time deadline to finish an assignment.
Table 41. Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an
Assignment – Install a Digital Certificate
Small
Install a
digital
certificate

Not At All
Likely
Not Very
Likely
Somewhat
Likely
Very Likely
Extremely
Likely

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

19

54%

10

59%

9

41%

6

43%

8

23%

3

17%

7

32%

4

29%

3

9%

1

6%

3

14%

3

21%

3

9%

2

12%

2

9%

0

0%

2

5%

1

6%

1

4%

1

7%

Table 42 presents the frequency and percentages with which an employee/lawyer in
each respondent’s law firm installs an ActiveX control from an unknown source if under
a time deadline to finish an assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely
to 5 =extremely likely). This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large,
and very large). The majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is very
likely or extremely likely that employees/lawyers in their law firms would install an
ActiveX control from an unknown source when under a time deadline to finish an
assignment.
Table 42. Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an
Assignment – Install An ActiveX Control From An Unknown Source
Small
Install an
ActiveX
control from
an unknown
source
Not At All
Likely
Not Very
Likely

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

3

9%

3

18%

4

18%

2

14%

5

14%

0

0%

3

14%

2

14%
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Small
Somewhat
Likely
Very Likely
Extremely
Likely

Medium

Large

Very Large

9

26%

6

35%

3

14%

5

36%

14

40%

6

35%

6

27%

4

29%

4

11%

2

12%

6

27%

1

7%

7. Are law firm security policies created in response to an information security breach
incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)?
Table 43 presents the frequency and percentages of law firms that created written IT
security policies in response to an information security breach incident. Only two law
firms with written IT security policies created their policies in response to a security
breach incident.
Table 43. Law Firm Size in Number of Users and Existence of a Security Policy

Law Firm Size in
Number of Users
Small 1-150
Percentage:
Medium
151-250 Users
Percentage:
Large 251-500 Users
Percentage:
Very Large
>500 Users
Percentage:

Does your law firm have written
information technology (IT)
security policies?
Do Not
Yes
No
Know
21
13
1
61%
38%
1%

Were your law firm written IT security
policies created due to a security
incident/breach?
Yes

No

Do Not Know

0
0.00%

21
100%

0
0.00%

10
59%
19
86%

7
41%
3
14%

0
0.00%
0
0.00%

1
10%
1
5%

8
80%
17
90%

1
10%
1
5%

11
79%

3
21%

0
0.00%

0
0.00%

10
91%

1
9%

Table 44 presents the results from the Spearman’s Rho test on each pair of variables
(past and future Internet effect on security breaches) and the perceived need for
information security policies using a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5
=strongly agree).

Since the p-values are less than .05 (Field, 2009), there are

significant (p-values = .019, .031, and .034) relationships, but because the correlation
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coefficients (p-values = .249, .230, and .227) are all below .500 (Field), the correlations
are weak between the Internet’s projected future effect on information technology
security breaches and the perception that the need for security policies is greater today
than it was one, three, and five years ago. There is also a significant (p-value = .029) but
weak correlation (p-value = .232) between the Internet’s effect on IT security breaches
experienced over the past few years and the perception that the need for security policies
is greater today than it was three years ago.
Table 44. Law Firms – Spearman’s Rho Between the Internet’s Effect on Breaches
and the Need for Policies

Type of Breach

Need for policies – greater
today than one year ago
Need for policies – greater
today than three years ago
Need for policies – greater
today than five years ago

Over the Past Few Years,
Internet Has Greatly
Increased the Number of
Security Breaches Experienced
(Spearman's Rho)
Correlation
Two-Sided
Coefficient
Significance

In the Coming Years, the
Internet Will Greatly Increase
the Risk of IT Security
Breaches
(Spearman's Rho)
Correlation
Two-Sided
Coefficient
Significance

.187

.081

.249

.019

.232

.029

.230

.031

.165

.124

.227

.034

Table 45 presents the responses and percentages for whether the perceived amount of
attorney-client and/or work product communications over electronic networks in a
respondent’s law firm(s) is greater today than it was one, three, and five years ago using a
five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5 =strongly agree). Over one-half of law
firms perceived that attorney-client and/or work product online communications are
greater today than one year ago (59%); over three quarters reported greater attorneyclient and/or work product online communications today than three years ago (85%); and
over 90 percent reported greater attorney-client and/or work product online
communications than five years ago (92%).
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Table 45. Law Firm – Attorney-Client Work Product Communication Over
Electronic Networks
Item

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

The amount of attorney-client work
product communication over
electronic networks is greater today
than it was one year ago.

1

3

7

25

52

1%

3%

8%

28%

59%

0

0

0

13

75

0%

0%

0%

15%

85%

0

0

0

7

81

0%

0%

0%

8%

92%

Percentage:
The amount of attorney-client work
product communication over
electronic networks is greater today
than it was three years ago.
Percentage:
The amount of attorney-client work
product communication over
electronic networks is greater today
than it was five years ago.
Percentage:

8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests a part of
law firms’ validation of the intended security policies (Myler & Broadbent, 2006;
Verdon, 2006)?
Table 46 presents the frequency and percentages of security tasks performed by the
respondent law firms during the preceding 12 months.
Table 46. Law Firm – Performance of Security Tasks During the Past 12 Months

Item

Not at
All

More
Than
Once a
Year

Once a
Year

Once a
Month

Every
Day

Do Not
Know

Perform a vulnerability
assessment that scanned the law
firm networks to identify
potential security risks.

34

15

24

8

3

3

39%

17%

28%

9%

3%

3%

58

6

20

1

0

3

Percentage:
Hire an outside consultant to
perform a risk assessment to
identify the potential threats,
probabilities, and impact of
threats to the law firm's
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Item

Not at
All

More
Than
Once a
Year

Once a
Year

Once a
Month

Every
Day

Do Not
Know

66%

7%

23%

1%

0%

3%

38

12

25

9

0

3

44%

14%

29%

10%

0%

3%

53

14

15

3

0

2

61%

16%

17%

3%

0%

2%

50

5

7

1

22

2

57%

6%

8%

1%

25%

2%

42

11

2

6

25

2

48%

12%

2%

7%

28%

2%

56

6

2

6

14

4

64%

7%

2%

7%

16%

5%

23

20

36

4

1

3

26%

23%

41%

5%

1%

3%

32

15

35

3

0

1

37%

17%

41%

3%

0%

1%

management controls,
operational controls, and
technical controls.
Percentage:
Conduct an in-house risk
assessment of security threats
performed by the members of
the law firm IT department
and/or information security
department.
Percentage:
Provide employee training
sessions on information security
awareness and incident
reporting.
Percentage:
Use managed security services
of a third party.
Percentage:
Encrypt e-mail messages
Percentage:
Encrypt hard drive data
Percentage:
Review the information security
policies of the law firm
Percentage:
Revise the information security
policies of the law firm
Percentage:

Table 47 presents the results from a Spearman’s Rho test on each pair of variables
(security tasks and frequency performed) in relationship to the law firm size. The “Do
Not Know” responses were treated as missing variables and therefore were not included
in the computations (Field, 2009). Since the p-values are less than .05 (Field, 2009),
there are significant relationships between a vulnerability assessment (p-value = .005),
use of an outside consultant (p-value = .003), encryption of e-mail (p-value = .001),
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encryption of hard drive data (p-value < .001), and revision of a law firm’s information
security policies (p-value = .036). However, because the correlation coefficients are all
below .500 (Field), the correlations are weak between a vulnerability assessment (p-value
= .302), use of an outside consultant (p-value = .321), encryption of e-mail (p-values =
.347), encryption of hard drive data (p-values = .441), and revision of a law firm’s
information security policies (p-values = .228).
Table 47. Law Firms – Spearman’s Rho Between the Law Firm Size and Each Pair
of Variables
Security Measures

Law Firm Size
(Spearman's Rho)
Correlation
Two-Sided
Coefficient
Significance

Perform a vulnerability assessment that scanned the law firm
networks to identify potential security risks.

.302

.005

Hire an outside consultant to perform a risk assessment to identify the
potential threats, probabilities, and impact of threats to the law firm's
management controls, operational controls, and technical controls.

.321

.003

Conduct an in-house risk assessment of security threats performed by
the members of the law firm IT department and/or information
security department.

.131

.234

Provide employee training sessions on information security awareness
and incident reporting.

.011

.920

Use managed security services of a third party.

.084

.447

Encrypt e-mail messages

.347

.001

Encrypt hard drive data

.441

.000

Review the information security policies of the law firm

.180

.100

Revise the information security policies of the law firm

.228

.036

Table 48 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to performing a vulnerability assessment
within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated a significant difference between all
four categories of law firms (p-value = .043). Table 48 also presents the Mann-Whitney
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U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in
regard to performing a vulnerability assessment. There was evidence of a significant
difference between the small and large law firms (p-value = .039) and the small and very
large law firms (p-value = .015) with regard to performing a vulnerability assessment
within the past 12 months.
Table 48. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Perform a Vulnerability
Assessment

Security Measures

Perform a vulnerability
assessment that scanned
the law firm networks to
identify potential security
risks.

All Four
Categories
(Small, Medium,
Large, and Very
Large)

Small and
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis PValue

U Test
Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

U Test
Value

TwoSided
Prob.

.043

232.50

.039

126.00

.015

Table 49 presents the frequency and percentages of vulnerability assessments
performed within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size. This data are
grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large). The majority of small
law firms (59%) and over one-third of medium law firms (35%) never perform
vulnerability assessments. By contrast, almost one-half of large law firms (45%) and onethird of very large law firms (31%) perform a vulnerability assessment once a year. A
few large law firms (10%) and very large law firms (8%) performed vulnerability
assessments every day.
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Table 49. Law Firm Size and Perform a Vulnerability Assessment
Small

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

20
7

59%
20%

6
4

35%
24%

5
9

25%
45%

3
4

23%
31%

5

15%

4

24%

4

20%

2

15%

2

6%

3

17%

0

0%

3

23%

0

0%

0

0%

2

10%

1

8%

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Table 50 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a
risk assessment within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated a significant
difference between all four categories of law firms (p-value = .002). Table 50 also
presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which
law firm sizes differed in regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a risk
assessment within the past 12 months. The author identified a significant difference
between the small and very large law firms (p-value = .002) and the medium and very
large law firms (p-value = .001) with regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a
risk assessment.
Table 50. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Hiring of An Outside
Consultant

Security Measures

Hire an outside consultant
to perform a risk

All Four
Categories
(Small, Medium,
Large, and Very
Large)

Small and
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Medium
and Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Medium
and Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis PValue

U Test
Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

U Test
Value

TwoSided
Prob.

.002

124.50

.002

45.00

.001
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Security Measures

All Four
Categories
(Small, Medium,
Large, and Very
Large)

Small and
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Medium
and Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Medium
and Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis PValue

U Test
Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

U Test
Value

TwoSided
Prob.

assessment to identify the
potential threats,
probabilities, and impact of
threats to the law firm's
management controls,
operational controls, and
technical controls.

Table 51 presents the frequency and percentages of hiring an outside consultant to
perform a risk assessment within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size. The
majority of small (79%), medium (88%), large (54%), and very large (29%) law firms
reported not having hired an outside consultant to perform a risk assessment within the
past 12 months. One-half of the very large law firms (50%) reported hiring an outside
consultant to perform a risk assessment once a year, while small (9%), medium (12%)
and large law firms (36%) reported less frequency of hiring an outside consults to
perform risk assessments.
Table 51. Law Firm Size and Hiring of An Outside Consultant
Small

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

27
3

79%
9%

15
2

88%
12%

12
8

60%
40%

4
7

29%
50%

4

12%

0

0%

0

0%

2

14%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

7%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%
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Table 52 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to conducting an in-house risk assessment
within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated no significant difference between the
responses of all four categories of law firms (p-value = .320). Table 52 also presents the
Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes
differed in regard to conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months.
The results demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with
medium law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .225)
with regard to conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months.
Table 52. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and In-House Risk Assessment
Security Measures

Conduct an in-house risk assessment
of security threats performed by the
members of the law firm IT
department and/or information
security department.

All Four Categories
(Small, Medium, Large,
and Very Large)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(Mann-Whitney
U Test)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis P-Value

U Test Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

.320

717.50

.225

Table 53 presents the frequency and percentages of conducting an in-house risk
assessment within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size. The majority of
small (50%), medium (59%), and large law firms (42%) reported not having conducted
an in-house risk assessment. One-half of the very large law firms have conducted an inhouse risk assessment once a year, with over one-quarter of the very large law firms
(29%) performing an in-house risk assessment once a month.
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Table 53. Law Firm Size and In-House Risk Assessment
Small

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

17
8

50%
23%

10
3

59%
17%

8
7

42%
37%

3
7

21%
50%

6

18%

2

12%

4

21%

0

0%

3

9%

2

12%

0

0%

4

29%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Table 54 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to providing employee training sessions on
information security awareness and incident reporting within the past 12 months. The
results demonstrated no significant difference between all four categories of law firms (pvalue = .770). Table 54 also presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in
an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in regard to providing employee
training sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting. The results
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with medium
law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .867) with
regard to providing employee training sessions on information security awareness and
incident reporting within the past 12 months.
Table 54. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Employee Training
Security Measures

Provide employee training sessions on
information security awareness and
incident reporting.

All Four Categories
(Small, Medium, Large,
and Very Large)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(Mann-Whitney
U Test)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis P-Value

U Test Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

.770

842.00

.867
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Table 55 presents the frequency and percentages of providing employee training
sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting in relationship to the
law firm size within the past 12 months. The majority of small (63%), medium (59%),
large law firms (70%), and very large law firms (54%) reported not having provided
employee training sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting
within the past 12 months.
Table 55. Law Firm Size and Employee Training
Small

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

22
5

63%
14%

10
4

59%
23%

14
3

70%
15%

7
3

54%
23%

7

20%

3

18%

3

15%

1

8%

1

3%

0

0%

0

0%

2

15%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Table 56 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to using managed security services of a third
party within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated no significant difference
between all four categories of law firms (p-value = .094). Table 56 also presents the
Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes
differed in regard to using managed security services of a third party. There is no
evidence of a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law
firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .524) with regard
to using managed security services of a third party within the past 12 months.
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Table 56. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Third Party Services
Security Measures

All Four Categories
(Small, Medium, Large,
and Very Large)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(Mann-Whitney
U Test)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis P-Value

U Test Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

.094

812.00

.524

Use managed security services of a
third party.

Table 57 presents the frequency and percentages of using managed security services
of a third party within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size. The majority
of small (59%), medium (75%), and large law firms (68%), reported not having used
managed security services of a third party within the past 12 months. Over one-quarter
of small law firms (29%) and almost one-half of very large law firms (43%) reported
using managed security services of a third party every day.
Table 57. Law Firm Size and Third Party Services
Small

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

20
2

59%
6%

12
4

75%
25%

14
2

68%
9%

4
3

29%
21%

2

6%

0

0%

2

9%

1

7%

0

0%

0

0%

1

5%

0

0%

10

29%

0

0%

2

9%

6

43%

Table 58 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting e-mail messages within the past
12 months. The results demonstrated a significant difference between all four categories
of law firms (p-value = .009). Table 58 also presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that
were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in regard to who
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encrypted e-mail messages. There was evidence of a significant difference between the
small and medium (p-value = .018), small and large (p-value = .029), and small and very
large (p-value = .001) law firms who encrypt e-mail messages.
Table 58. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Encrypt E-mail Messages
Security
Measures

Encrypt e-mail
messages

All Four
Categories
(Small,
Medium,
Large,
and Very
Large)

Small and
Medium

Small and
Medium

Small and
Large

Small and
Large

Small and
Very Large

Small and
Very Large

(MannWhitney
U Test)

(MannWhitney
U Test)

(MannWhitney
U Test)

(MannWhitney
U Test)

(MannWhitney
U Test)

(MannWhitney
U Test)

KruskalWallis PValue

U Test
Value

TwoSided
Prob.

U Test
Value

TwoSided
Prob.

U Test
Value

TwoSided
Prob.

.009

185.50

.018

248.00

.029

111.50

.001

Table 59 presents the frequency and percentages of encrypting e-mail messages within
the past 12 months in relationship to the law firm size. The majority of small law firms
(73%), and over one-third of medium (35%), and large (43 %) law firms, reported never
having encrypted e-mail messages within the past 12 months. Small (18%), medium
(35%), large (38%), and very large (36%) law firms reported encrypting e-mail messages
every day.

Table 59. Law Firm Size and Encrypt E-mail Messages
Small

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

25
0

73%
0%

6
0

35%
0%

9
0

43%
0%

2
2

14%
14%

2

6%

4

24%

3

14%

2

14%

1

3%

1

6%

1

5%

3

22%

6

18%

6

35%

8

38%

5

36%
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Table 60 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting hard drive data within the past
12 months. There is a significant difference between all four categories of law firms (pvalue = .001). Table 60 also presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in
an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in regard to encryption of hard drive
data. There is a significant difference between the small and large (p-value = .005) and
small and very large (p-value < .001) law firms that reportedly encrypt hard drive data.
Table 60. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Encrypt Hard Drive Data
Security Measures

All Four
Categories
(Small, Medium,
Large, and Very
Large)

Small and
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Small and
Very
Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis PValue

U Test
Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

U Test
Value

TwoSided
Prob.

.001

237.50

.005

89.00

.000

Encrypt hard drive data

Table 61 presents the frequency and percentages of encrypting hard drive data within
the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size. The majority of small (88%), medium
(63%), and large law firms (57%), reported never encrypting hard drive data within the
past 12 months. One-third of large law firms (33%) and more than one- third of very
large (39%) law firms repeatedly encrypt hard drive data every day.
Table 61. Law Firm Size and Encrypt Hard Drive Data
Small

Not at All
Once a Year

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

30
1

88%
3%

10
0

63%
0%

12
0

57%
0%

4
1

31%
7%
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Small

More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

0

0%

3

19%

2

10%

1

7%

2

6%

2

12%

0

0%

2

16%

1

3%

1

6%

7

33

5

39%

Table 62 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to reviewing the law firm information security
policies within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated no significant difference
between all four categories of law firms (p-value = .410). Table 62 also presents the
Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes
differed in regard to review of the law firm information security policies. There was no
evidence of a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law
firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .145) with regard
to reviewing the law firm information security policies within the past 12 months.
Table 62. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Review of Information
Security Policies
Security Measures

Review the information security
policies of the law firm

All Four Categories
(Small, Medium, Large,
and Very Large)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(Mann-Whitney
U Test)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis P-Value

U Test Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

.410

691.50

.145

Table 63 presents the frequency and percentages of reviewing the law firm
information security policies within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size.
Over one-third of small (35%) and over one-third of medium (35%) law firms reported
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not having reviewed information security policies within the past 12 months. Small
(38%), medium (30%), large (60%), and very large (47%) law firms review information
security policies once a year. Small (27%), medium (30%), large (20%), and very large
(15%) review information security policies more than once a year.
Table 63. Law Firm Size and Review of Information Security Policies
Small

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

12
13

35%
38%

6
5

35%
30%

3
12

15%
60%

2
6

15%
47%

9

27%

5

30%

4

20%

2

15%

0

0%

1

5%

1

5%

2

15%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

8%

Table 64 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether
there is a difference in the responses from the four categories of law firms (small,
medium, large, and very large) with regard to revising the information security policies
within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated no significant difference between
all four categories of law firms (p-value = .219). Table 64 also presents the MannWhitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes
differed in regard to review of the law firm information security policies. There was no
evidence of a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law
firms and the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .056) with regard
to revising the information security policies within the past 12 months.
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Table 64. Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Revise Information Security
Policies
Security Measures

All Four Categories
(Small, Medium, Large,
and Very Large)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(Mann-Whitney
U Test)

Small/ Medium
and Large/
Very Large
(MannWhitney U
Test)

Kruskal-Wallis P-Value

U Test Value

Two-Sided
Prob.

.219

660.00

.056

Revise the information security
policies of the law firm

Table 65 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to revising the
information security policies in relationship to the law firm size within the past 12
months. The majority of small (51%) and medium (47%) law firms reported not having
revised the information security policies within the past 12 months. The majority of
large (65%) and very large (62%) law firms revise the information security policies once
a year.
Table 65. Law Firm Size and Revise Information Security Policies
Small

Not at All
Once a Year
More Than
Once a Year
Once a
Month
Every Day

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

18
10

51%
29%

8
4

47%
24%

4
13

20%
65%

2
8

15%
62%

7

20%

4

24%

3

15%

1

8%

0

0%

1

5%

0

0%

2

15%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Table 66 presents the frequency and percentages of auditing and enforcing the
documented IT security policy in relationship to law firm size. The majority of small
(67%) and medium (63%) law firms reported their law firms do not audit and enforce the
documented IT security policy. More than one-half of large law firms (59%) and more
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than two-thirds of very large (82%) law firms audit and enforce the documented IT
security policy.
Table 66. Law Firm Size and Audit and Enforce Documented IT Security Policy
Does your law firm audit and enforce the
documented IT security policy?
Yes
No
7
14
33%
67%
3
5
37%
63%
10
7
59%
41%
9
2
82%
18%

Law Firm Size in Number of Users
Small 1-150
Percentage:
Medium 151-250 Users
Percentage:
Large 251-500 Users
Percentage:
Very Large >500 Users
Percentage:

Table 67 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to IT security policy
audited by an independent third party. The majority of small (95%) and medium (78%)
law firms, and over one-third of large (35%) law firms, and over one-fourth of very large
(27%) law firms reported never having the IT security policy audited by an independent
third party. Small (5%), medium (22%), large (24%), and very large (18%) law firms
have the IT security policy audited by an independent third party more than every two
years. Large (29%) and very large (18%) law firms have the IT security policy audited
by an independent third party every year.
Table 67. Law Firm Size and IT Security Policy Audited By Independent Third
Party
Small
Never
More Than
Every 2 Years
Every 2 Years
Every Year
Every 6
Months

Medium

Large

Very Large

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

19

95%

7

78%

6

35%

3

27%

1

5%

2

22%

4

24%

2

18%

0
0

0%
0%

0
0

0%
0%

2
5

12%
29%

4
2

37%
18%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%
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Small
Less Than
Every 6
Months

0

Medium
0%

0

Large

0%

0

Very Large
0%

0

0%

Table 68 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the dissemination of the
security policy. The majority of very large (100%), medium (90%) law, and large (84%),
and less than one-half of small (48%) law firms reported disseminating the IT security
policy to law firm employees/lawyers or other members of the firm on the law firm
intranet. The majority of small (81%), medium (80%), large (84%), and over one-half of
very large (64%) law firms reported disseminating the IT security policy to law firm
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm in the staff handbook.
Table 68. Law Firm Size and Dissemination of the Security Policy
Law Firm Size in
Number of Users
Small 1-150
Percentage:
Medium
151-250 Users
Percentage:
Large 251-500 Users
Percentage:
Very Large
>500 Users
Percentage:

Law Firm Intranet
Checked
Did Not Check
10
11
48%
52%

Staff Handbook
Checked
Did Not Check
17
4
81%
19%

9

1

8

90%
16
84%

10%
3
16%

80%
16
84%

11

0

7

100.0%

0%

64%

2
20%
3
16%
4
36 %

9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and smaller law firms (less than 250
users) differ in whether they have written information security policies (Gibney &
Corham, 2008)?
Table 69 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the results from a ChiSquare test on the existence of a security policy in relationship to the law firm size where
the four categories of law firms are placed into the combination of small with medium
law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms. The “Do Not Know”
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responses were treated as missing variables and therefore were not included in the
computations (Field, 2009). The results demonstrated significant test results (p-value =
.024) indicating that the law firm combination of large with very large law firms tend to
have more written information security policies than the combination of small with
medium law firms.
Table 69. Law Firm Groups – Law Firm Size and Written Information Security
Policy
Law Firm Size in Number of
Users
Small 1-150
or Medium 151-250 Users
Percentage:
Large 251-500 or Very Large
>500 Users
Percentage:

Written Information
Security Policy?
Yes
No
31
20
61%

39%

30

6

83%

17%

Chi-Square

Two-Sided Prob.

.024

Table 70 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the results from a
Fisher’s exact test on the existence of a security policy in relationship to the law firm size
where small law firms is measured against very large law firms. The “Do Not Know”
responses were treated as missing variables and therefore were not included in the
computations (Field, 2009). The results demonstrated no significant difference between
small law firms and very large law firms (p-value = .328) with regard to larger law firms
having more information security policies than smaller law firms.
Table 70. Small vs. Very Large Law Firm and Written Information Security Policy
Law Firm Size in Number of
Users
Small 1-150
Percentage:
Very Large >500 Users
Percentage:

Written Information
Security Policy?
Yes
No
21
13
62%
38%
11
3
79%
21%

Fisher’s Exact Test.

.328
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10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees) and larger law firms (more than 251
users) differ in whether written information security policies were due to information
security breach incidents (Gibney & Corham, 2008)?
Table 71 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the results from a
Fisher’s exact test on information security breach incidents in relationship to the law firm
size where the four categories of law firms are placed into the combination of small with
medium law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms. The results
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of large with very large
law firms and the combination of small with medium law firms (p-value > .999) with
regard to information security breaches. An analysis of small law firms and very large
law firms was not possible because no one in either group indicated that the law firm’s
written IT security policies were created due to a security breach incident.
Table 71. Small vs. Very Large Law Firm and Information Security Breach
Incidents
Law Firm Size in Number of
Users
Small 1-150
or Medium 151-250 Users
Percentage:
Large 251-500 or Very Large
>500 Users
Percentage:

Information Security Breach
Incidents?
Yes
No
1
29
3%

97%

1

27

4%

96%

Fisher’s Exact Test.

>.999

Summary of Results
In this chapter, the author provides the in-depth analyses of the findings of all research
questions posited in this dissertation investigation. Findings from the Zoomerang survey
of law firms are presented in Tables with an explanatory synopsis for each of the
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following: law firm demographics, the relationship between information security policy
adoption, the age of information security policy, frequency of updating the information
security policy, range of issues covered by the information security policy, successful
adoption of success factors, adoption of best practices, and incidence by severity of
security breaches. Communication of law firm approved IT security policy documents,
best practices, and use of security measures were also presented in Tables. Based on the
data collected, the author determined that written information security policies were not
generally created in response to a security breach incident.
The projected future effect of the Internet on breaches and the perception of the need
for policies demonstrated evidence of significant but weak correlations with regard to the
perception that the need for security policies is greater today than it was one, three, and
five years ago. In conjunction with Internet use, the perception of attorney-client work
product communications over electronic networks was that it is greater today than one,
three, and five years ago. The dissemination of security policies was primarily through
the law firm intranet and/or the staff handbook. This type of dissemination is passive
since it requires the law firm employees/lawyers to actively review these without any
ramifications if they do not review them on a regular basis (J. Heath Rush, personal
communication, June 30, 2009).
Law firm size and the use of audits to enforce documented IT security policies results
showed that small and medium law firms typically did not audit and enforce policies
whereas large and very large law firms were more inclined to audit and enforce IT
security policies. The data demonstrated that law firms of all four size categories of law
firms (small, medium, large, and very large) generally did not use an independent third
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party to audit the policies. The hiring of an independent third party for audits of IT
security policies would be a discretionary budget item (J. Heath Rush, personal
communication, June 30, 2009) if not mandated by law. Thus, this finding is not
unexpected.
The results also demonstrated the perceived performance of security measures within
the past 12 months by each law firm. Evidence of significant, but weak correlations
exists between the survey items: vulnerability assessments, use of an outside consultant,
encryption of e-mail, encryption of hard drive data, and revision of a law firm’s
information security policies. Those survey items demonstrating no evidence of
significant differences were in-house risk assessments, employee training, use of
managed security services, and review of a law firm’s information security policies.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
This chapter articulates the conclusions drawn from the author’s analysis of responses
to the dissertation research questions. Next, this chapter discusses the implications of
these conclusions and reviews the contributions of this research to the body of knowledge
relating to information security policies and computer security breach incidents.
Recommendations for future research are included. This chapter concludes with a
summary of this dissertation investigation.
Conclusions
Doherty and Fulford (2005) performed an exploratory analysis of security policies and
security breach incidents that highlighted the need for supplemental research with
different target populations. This dissertation investigation advanced the research of
Doherty and Fulford by targeting information security policies and security breach
incidents in law firms. The goal of this dissertation investigation was to determine
whether there is a correlation between the timing of security policy development
(proactive versus reactive policy development) and the frequency and severity of security
breach incidents in law firms of varying sizes.
The author distributed a survey to ILTA members that was comprised of Doherty and
Fulford’s (2005) original survey questions, augmented by additional questions designed
to elicit information specific to information security policy development and security
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breach incident detection in law firms. This dissertation investigation questioned
whether law firms are proactive in their information security policy development or
reactive to computer security breach incidents. In this dissertation, the author further
investigated whether law firms utilize risk assessments, network vulnerability scans,
and/or penetration tests to validate the intended security policies and ensure the existence
of adequate safeguards from attackers and/or prevention of unauthorized access to law
firm confidential information (Myler & Broadbent, 2006). The population for this online
survey consisted of law firm IT personnel and others familiar with legal technology in
law firms.
The author’s first research question was: Do law firms that have written information
security policies have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity
than those that do not have information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p.
25)? The results demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship
between the existence of a written information security policy and the frequency and
severity of security breach incidents within law firms. Likewise, Doherty and Fulford’s
survey results showed no significant relationship between the existence of a written
information security policy and the frequency and severity of security breach incidents
generally. This led Doherty and Fulford to reject their working hypothesis that the
existence of a written information security policy generally would reduce the frequency
and severity of security breach incidents.
It is worth noting that 37% of the survey respondent law firms with written
information security policies reported experiencing more than six occurrences of
computer viruses within the past two years. While this result may support varying
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hypotheses, it appears unlikely to this author that the existence of a written information
security policy has the unintended consequence of causing computer viruses. Further
research is required to explore whether the increased prevalence of detected security
breach incidents may correlate with the extent to which a law firm has incorporated
information technology into its practice and/or the law firm’s level of sophistication to
detect occurrences of computer viruses.
It is also interesting to note that only 4% of the respondents (two law firms with a
written information security policy and one law firm without a written information
security policy) indicated that they had experienced 1-5 occurrences of external hacking
incidents. The remaining 96% of the respondents indicated that they never experienced
an external hacking incident.
The author’s second research question was: Are law firms that have had information
security policies in place for numerous years likely to have fewer computer security
breach incidents in terms of both frequency and severity than those that do not have
information security policies in place (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)? The results
again demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the
length of time that an information security policy was in place in the responding law
firms and the frequency and severity of the security breach incidents that the law firms
experienced. This finding correlates with Doherty and Fulford’s general finding of no
strong or consistent evidence of significance as well.
Further research is required to determine the impact of policy review practices on the
frequency and severity of security breach incidents in law firms with written policies,
and/or whether the prevalence of security breach incidents turns less upon the mere
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existence of a written policy and more upon the implementation of information security
practices without regard to whether those practices are codified into a policy document.
Additionally, further research is required to determine if having information security
policies in place provides a better response process with appropriate escalation,
mitigation, and remediation of threats which in turn assists in the prevention of further
attacks (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).
The author’s third research question was: Do law firms that have updated their
information security policies on a regular basis have fewer security breach incidents in
terms of frequency and severity than those that have not updated their information
security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? The results again demonstrated no
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between regular policy updates and the
frequency and severity of reported/detected security breach incidents. This finding
reinforces Doherty and Fulford’s findings of no significance.
Among the respondent law firms, the results indicated that when IT security policies
were updated less often, incidence of theft increased. The results demonstrated a
significant but weak relationship in this regard among the respondent law firms. Further
research is required to determine whether this increased incidence of theft is attributable
to a failure by law firms to update their information security policies as necessary to
cover purchases of new equipment (assets), resulting in heightened risk of theft from
unclear parameters regarding the use, storage, and maintenance of such equipment (J.
Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009). Additionally, further research is
required to determine whether the existence of regular information security policy
updates correlates with the sophistication of prophylactic measures employed by law
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firms, resulting in increased detection, not increased incidence, of breaches by firms that
regularly update their information security policies.
The author’s fourth research question was: Are law firms that have an information
security policy with a broad scope likely to have fewer security breaches in terms of both
frequency and severity than those organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p.
26)? The results demonstrated a statistically significant but weak relationship between
the number of issues addressed in an information security policy and the frequency and
severity of reported security breaches. When the number of issues addressed in a
responding law firm’s information security policy increased, the number of reported
thefts of resources also tended to increase. Doherty and Fulford’s study found that “the
range of issues covered is associated significantly with the incidence of both computerbased fraud and natural disaster. However, an inspection of the data . . . is inconclusive.”
(p. 33). This dissertation investigation supports Doherty and Fulford’s finding of a
relationship between the breadth of a law firm’s information security policy and the
frequency and severity of detected/reported security breaches. And, as with Doherty and
Fulford’s study, the author’s inspection of the data is inconclusive.
The author’s fifth research question was: Are law firms that have adopted a wide
variety of best practices likely to have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency
and severity than those organizations that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
The results demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between
the adoption of best practices and the frequency and severity of perceived/reported
security breaches. These results are consistent with Doherty and Fulford’s findings of no
significance as well. However, further research is required to determine whether the
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increased perception and reporting of computer security breaches by law firms that have
incorporated best practices into their respective information security departments may
correlate with the level of sophistication within such law firms’ information security
departments. (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).
More than 90 percent (93%) of respondents indicated law firm management does
approve IT security policy documents. Approximately one-third of respondents (33%)
communicated approved IT security policy documents only to law firm employees/
lawyers or other members of the firm. Just over one-fourth of respondents (28%)
communicated IT security policies to relevant third party service providers in addition to
law firm employees/lawyers/other members. One-fifth of respondents (20%) indicated
that only certain IT security policy documents were communicated to law firm
employees/lawyers, other members of the firm and relevant third party service providers.
Less than one-fifth of respondents (16%) reported that they did not communicate IT
security policies to relevant third party service providers.
Over two-thirds (67%) of the respondents indicated that law firm computers are not
shut down for inactivity after a defined lapse period. Further research is required to
determine whether this finding may be attributable to a reluctance by law firm IT and
Information Security departments to inconvenience lawyers (J. Heath Rush, personal
communication, June 30, 2009) or to inhibit their billable hour capabilities (Bisel, 2007).
When asked to identify the security issues covered in the reporting law firm’s IT
security policy and/or through separate procedures or standards, the highest percentage of
respondent law firms (63%) identified “personal usage of Information Systems” in the
policy document only category. One-half of law firm respondents (50%) reported a
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policy document only for Internet access, and almost one-half (49%) reported a policy
document only in regard to violations and breaches of security policies. Almost onefourth of the respondents (23%) identified contingency planning under the stand-alone
procedures or standard only category, while close to half of the respondents reported that
a policy document and supplementary procedure or standards were in place for
disclosure of information (45%), Internet access (43%), and mobile computing (42%).
The author’s sixth research question was: When under a time deadline to finish an
assignment, are law firm employees more likely to by-pass security measures in order to
complete the task (Post & Kagan, 2007)? The results demonstrated that in the majority
of law firms, regardless of size, it is not at all likely or not very likely that people will
scan a file for a virus, install security software updates, or install a digital certificate when
operating under a time deadline to finish an assignment. Likewise, the majority of law
firms in all four size categories reported that it is very likely or extremely likely that
people in their respective law firms would install an ActiveX control from an unknown
source when under a time deadline to finish an assignment. Further research is required
to determine the prevalence with which people within law firms of various sizes use
security measures when not in a hurry to complete a task.
The author’s seventh research question was: Are law firm security policies created in
response to an information security breach incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant,
2005)? The results demonstrated that, generally, written IT security policies in law firms
were not created in response to a security breach incident. These findings suggest that
information security policies generally are proactively developed by law firms. Further
research is required to determine whether law firms respond to media attention to security
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breach incidents that happen to others (outside of their respective law firms) by creating
information security policies. (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).
Further research also is needed to determine whether law firms create information
security policies in response to media reports of threats (as distinguished from actual
security breach incidents) or in response to knowledge of threats among law firm IT
personnel.
The results demonstrated a statistically significant but weak correlation between the
Internet’s past effect on information technology security breaches and the perception that
the need for security policies is greater today than it was one, three, and five years ago.
The results also demonstrated a statistically significant but weak correlation between the
Internet’s projected future effect on information technology security breaches and the
perception that the need for security policies is greater today than it was three years ago.
Over one-half of law firms (59%) perceived that attorney-client and/or work product
online communications are greater today than one year ago; over three-quarters (85%)
reported that those attorney-client and/or work product online communications are
greater today than three years ago; and over ninety percent (92%) reported that those
attorney-client and/or work product online communications are greater today than five
years ago.
The author’s eighth research question was: Are risk assessments, network vulnerability
scans, and/or penetration tests a part of law firms’ validation of the intended security
policies (Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006)? The author identified significant but
weak correlations between the following survey items: vulnerability assessments, use of
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an outside consultant, encryption of e-mail, encryption of hard drives, and revision of a
law firm’s information security policies.
The results demonstrated a statistically significant difference between all four size
categories of law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to performing
a vulnerability assessment within the past 12 months. There is evidence of a significant
difference between the small and large law firms and the small and very large law firms
with regard to performing a vulnerability assessment within the past 12 months. The
majority of small law firms (59%), and over one-third of medium law firms (35%) never
perform vulnerability assessments, while almost one-half of large law firms (45%) and
approximately one-third of very large law firms (31%) perform a vulnerability
assessment once a year. The results demonstrated that a few large law firms (10%) and
very large law firms (8%) performed vulnerability assessments every day.
The results demonstrated a significant difference between all four size categories of
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to hiring an outside
consultant to perform a risk assessment within the past 12 months. Specifically, the
results demonstrated a significant difference between the small and very large and the
medium and very large law firms with regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a
risk assessment. The majority of small (79%), medium (88%), large (54%), and very
large (29%) law firms reported not having hired an outside consultant to perform a risk
assessment within the past 12 months. One-half of the very large law firms (50%) hired
an outside consultant to perform a risk assessment once a year, while small (9%),
medium (12%) and large law firms (36%) hired an outside consults to perform risk
assessments once a year.
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The results demonstrated no significant difference between the responses of all four
size categories of law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to
conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months. Specifically, the
results demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with
medium law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to
conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months. The majority of small
(50%), medium (59%), and large law firms (42%) reported not having conducted an inhouse risk assessment. One-half of the very large law firms (50%) have conducted an inhouse risk assessment once a year, with over one-fourth of the very large law firms (29%)
performing an in-house risk assessment once a month.
The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to providing employee
training sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting within the past
12 months. Specifically, the results demonstrated no significant difference between the
combination of small with medium law firms or the combination of large with very large
law firms with regard to providing employee training sessions on information security
awareness and incident reporting within the past 12 months. The majority of small
(63%), medium (59%), large law firms (70%), and very large law firms (54%) reported
not having provided employee training sessions on information security awareness and
incident reporting within the past 12 months.
The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to using managed security
services of a third party within the past 12 months. Specifically, the author identified no
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evidence of a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law
firms or the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to using managed
security services of a third party within the past 12 months. The majority of small (59%),
medium (75%), and large law firms (68%), reported not having used managed security
services of a third party within the past 12 months. Over one-quarter of small law firms
(29%) and approximately one-half of very large law firms (43%) reported using the
managed security services of a third party every day.
The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting e-mail
messages within the past 12 months. The results did, however, demonstrate a significant
difference between the small and medium, small and large, and small and very large law
firms that encrypt e-mail messages. Almost three-quarters of small law firms (73%), and
over one-third of medium (35%) and large law firms (43 %), reported never having
encrypted e-mail messages within the past 12 months. The following percentages of law
firms reported encrypting e-mail messages every day - small (18%), medium (35%),
large (38%), and very large (36%).
The results demonstrated a significant difference between all four size categories of
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting hard drive
data within the past 12 months. Specifically, the author identified a significant
difference between the small and large and small and very large law firms that encrypt
hard drive data. The majority of small (88%), medium (63%), and large law firms (57%),
reported never encrypting hard drive data within the past 12 months. One-third of large
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law firms (33%) and more than one-third of very large (39%) law firms repeatedly
encrypt hard drive data every day.
The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to reviewing the law firm
information security policies within the past 12 months. Specifically, the results
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with medium
law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to reviewing
the law firm information security policies within the past 12 months. Over one-third of
small (35%) and over one-third of medium law firms (35%) reported not having reviewed
information security policies within the past 12 months. An annual (once a year) review
of information security policies reportedly occurs in over one-third of small law firms
(38%), in just under one-third of medium law firms (30%), in almost two-thirds of large
law firms (60%), and in just under one-half of very large law firms(47%). Information
security policies reportedly are reviewed more than once per year in over one-quarter of
small law firms (27%), approximately one-third of medium law firms (30%), and onefifth of large law firms (20%).
The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to revising their respective
information security policies within the past 12 months. Specifically, the results
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with medium
law firms and the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to revising
information security policies within the past 12 months. The majority of small law firms
(51%), and just under one-half of medium law firms (47%) reported not having revised
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their information security policies within the past 12 months. Over two-thirds of large
law firms (65%) and just under two-thirds of very large law firms (62%) reported
revising their information security policies once each year.
The results demonstrated that approximately two-thirds of small (67%) and medium
law firms (63%) do not audit and enforce their respective documented IT security
policies. More than one-half of large law firms (59%) and more than three-quarters of
very large law firms (82%) reportedly audit and enforce their respective documented IT
security policies.
The results demonstrated the overwhelming majority of small law firms (95%), over
three-quarters of medium law firms (78%), over one-third of large law firms (35%), and
over one-fourth of very large law firms (27%) never had their IT security policy audited
by an independent third party. Medium (22%), large (24%), and very large law firms
(18%) reported having their respective IT security policies audited by an independent
third party more than once every two years. Large (29%) and very large law firms (18%)
reported having their respective IT security policies audited by an independent third party
every year.
The author’s ninth research question was: Do larger law firms (more than 251 users)
and smaller law firms (less than 250 users) differ in whether they have written
information security policies (Gibney & Corham, 2008)? The results demonstrated that
the combination of large law firms with very large law firms tended to report more
written information security policies than reported by the combination of small law firms
with medium law firms. However, the results demonstrated no significant difference
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between small law firms and very large law firms with regard to the number of
information security policies each has adopted.
The author’s 10th research question was: Do smaller law firms (less than 250
employees) and larger law firms (more than 251 users) differ in whether written
information security policies were due to information security breach incidents (Gibney
& Corham, 2008)? The results demonstrated no significant difference between the
combination of large with very large law firms and the combination of small with
medium law firms with regard to the number of reported information security breaches.
An analysis of small law firms and very large law firms was not possible in this regard
because no law responding law firm within either size group indicated that its law firm’s
written IT security policy was created in response to a security breach incident.
Strengths of Study
The number of reported security breach incidents is growing exponentially every year
(Greenberg, 2008; Open Source Foundation, 2008; ITRC, 2009). With computer security
breaches growing at a rapid pace, this research is of critical significance. Data privacy,
identity theft, and data security breach notification laws are becoming more prevalent
globally (Gunasekara, 2007; Swire & Bermann, 2007). As a result, security breach
incidents must be reported pursuant to these laws (CMS, 2003; Goldberg, 2008;
Greenberg, 2008; Greene, 2006; Hildebrand & Savare, 2008; Li & Shaw, 2008; Rey,
2008; Romanosky et al., 2008). Law firm clients are requesting their lawyers to comply
with these laws on their behalf when they are hosting the client’s sensitive data,
including, but not limited to, PII or ePHI (Gunasekara; Wugmeister et al., 2007). The
state data security breach notification laws are directly applicable to law firms and
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thereby require lawyers to disclose data breach incidents to their clients (J. Heath Rush,
personal communication, June 30, 2009). This research provided a basis for analyzing
the applicable laws, the manner in which information security best practices are utilized
in law firms, and the issues regarding validation of the intended security policies.
There are a number of information security surveys, such as the Computer Security
Institute (CSI), Deloitte-Touche Global Security Survey, Australian Computer and Crime
and Security Survey, and UK Department of Trade and Industry Security Breach Survey
which do not specifically target one population (Pfleeger & Rue, 2008). This survey
compared the results from the Doherty and Fulford (2005) survey of large organizations
in the U.K. and furthered their research by extension to a different population in the form
of law firms. The findings of this dissertation investigation contributed to the body of
knowledge by exploring the effectiveness of security policies in reducing the number of
computer security breach incidents and distinguished the differences in security measures
between small, medium, large, and very large sized law firms.
Limitations
The first limitation of this study was the response rate. ILTA deploys numerous
surveys (usually not security-based questions) to its members throughout the year and
typically has a survey response rate over 40%. ILTA was chosen to deploy this survey
on behalf of the author to its members due to ILTA’s historically successful survey return
rate; however, only 7.3% of ILTA’s members returned valid responses to this survey.
This disappointing response rate presents the significant limitation that the answers of
those who did not respond to the survey may have been drastically different than those
who did respond (Richardson, 2009), inasmuch as, they may have had more computer
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security incidents, a higher significance of severity of computer security incidents, and/or
less written information security policies.
The second limitation of this study was that only ILTA members received an
invitation to participate in this dissertation investigation. As a result, the targeted law
firm population included only active members of ILTA. At the time of the author’s Webbased survey ILTA had 1,123 members. However, there are numerous law firms in the
U.S. that are not ILTA members. Non-ILTA members may have responded quite
differently to this survey. Additionally, this survey was only a snapshot in time.
Therefore, generalizing the results of this study to all law firms should be done
cautiously.
A third limitation of this dissertation investigation was that it can be difficult to obtain
the level of trust required to elicit candid responses from individuals to a security survey.
The respondents who completed this survey may represent law firms that support active
information security initiatives and have diminished fears of responding to a security
survey because they understand security concepts. Those law firms that did not respond
may have chosen not to do so out of fear that their survey response would disclose
unreported security breaches or vulnerabilities in their law firm’s information security
policies or practices.
Implications
The research findings of this dissertation investigation provide valuable insights into
the information security policies, computer security breach incidents, and security
measures that exist in law firms of various sizes throughout the world. The implications
of this dissertation investigation to information security policies and practices are
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significant. The body of knowledge pertaining to information security policies and
practices has been expanded by this dissertation investigation in critical respects beyond
the research of Doherty and Fulford (2005) and Wiant (2005).
The first implication of this dissertation investigation relates to a discovery of whether
security policies created proactively aid in preventing security breach incidents and how
security measures are utilized by law firms. This investigation furthers the research of
Doherty and Fulford (2005), as well as Wiant (2005) in smaller sized organizations with
different populations, policies, and compliance issues. In this dissertation investigation,
the nature of the organizations studied has been expanded beyond hospitals (Wiant) to
include an analysis of information security policies in law firms, which have different
regulatory compliance issues, interdependence on technological connections, and
populations of employees and clients. Also, in the author’s research the size of the
organizations studied was expanded beyond large organizations employing more than
250 people (Doherty & Fulford,) to include smaller sized law firms including anywhere
from 1 up to 250 computer users. Additionally, the geographic boundaries of the
investigation have been extended beyond Europe to include the U.S., Canada, Australia,
and the Asia Pacific.
The second implication of this dissertation investigation is associated with a
confirmation of the findings of the Doherty and Fulford (2005) survey showing that
information security policies are proactively developed. Dissimilar findings of this
dissertation investigation revealed that respondent law firms with written information
security policies reported experiencing more occurrences of computer viruses within the
past two years. These findings may imply either that the existence of a written
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information security policy has the unintended consequence of causing computer viruses
which would seem highly unlikely or, more likely, that the existence of a written
information security policy correlates with a law firm’s sophistication to detect
occurrences of computer viruses, thus explaining the increased prevalence of reported
computer viruses among law firms with written information security policies.
The third implication of this dissertation investigation concerns the reporting of
external hacking. This research verifies the conclusions of Sveen et al. (2007) that
security breach incidents are under reported. Given the prevalence of external hacking
incidents (Richardson, 2009), the author’s finding of virtually non-existent reporting of
external hacking incidents may indicate one or more of the following: (1) that the
responding law firms had not detected, or otherwise were unaware of, attempted hacking
incidents (inadvertent under-reporting); (2) that the responding law firms were reluctant
to disclose their potential vulnerability to information security breaches by
acknowledging incidents of external hacking (intentional under-reporting); and/or (3)
that, even in the absence of a written information security policy, the majority of
respondents had implemented appropriate safeguards to prevent against external
hacking. According to Richardson, based on the propensity of cyber criminals to attack
systems, and the fact that no firewall or anti-virus stops every attack, it is difficult to have
perfect security safeguards in place to prevent all external hacking attempts.
The fourth implication of this dissertation investigation was the finding that when
information security policies were updated less often, theft of resources went up. This
indicates the importance of regular reviews of the information security policies to
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incorporate the purchase of new equipment (assets) and to provide guidance for
employees with regard to how they should protect assets that change within the law firm.
Recommendations
In addition to the further research previously outlined, additional research is
recommended in this evolving area. The first research study that might be developed
from this dissertation investigation would be to conduct research to find how other legalrelated industries, such as corporations and/or application service providers (ASPs) for
litigation support services, compare in both response rate and findings to the Doherty and
Fulford (2005) exploratory analysis and this dissertation investigation. For example, a
survey of corporate legal departments’ responses with regard to security could be
compared and contrasted to law firms and would contribute to the information security
field in revealing whether security is viewed differently in corporate legal departments.
Additionally, this model could be used to survey ASPs specializing in delivery of
electronically stored information (ESI) document collections for law firms and corporate
legal departments to measure whether their views of security policies and computer
security breach incidents are similar to law firms.
A second research study could be developed to discover how to entice respondents to
reveal security issues within their organization without fear. There is a paradox with
reporting security incidents wherein you do not know what you do not know and thus
under report security breach incidents. Those law firms that outsource their network
perimeter activities may not be aware of their third party provider’s efforts in regard to
protecting against hacking incidents and may not be aware of the attempts against their
law firm (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).
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A third research study could include whether information security policies are
developed out of fear based on the media attention given to breaches that happen to other
companies. Further research is necessary to determine whether the incorporation of best
practices in a law firm’s information security department correlates with the
sophistication level of that law firm’s information security department, and might
correspondingly explain the increased perception and reporting of security breaches by
law firms that adopt best practices (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30,
2009).
A fourth research study could address the different law firm practice areas and
whether IT security is more prevalent and/or relevant in one area over another. Due to
the nature of intellectual property law firms wherein trade secrets and patent applications
contain highly sensitive data, there may be a more urgent need for information security
safeguards and best practices than at a law firm that does not host such highly sensitive
data. Additionally, this research study could also examine the differences between a
more recently created law firm (within the last 10 years) and a more established law firm
(in existence more than 10 years) to determine if there is a cultural difference in the
technology utilized and whether as a consequence there are less information security data
breaches.
The emergence and pervasiveness of social networking sites presents additional
security issues with regard to securing the network of any organization. Thus, a fifth
research study could examine the effects of social networking sites on information
security policy development and its frequency and severity of detected/reported security
breaches, and whether security measures/controls assist with the monitoring and
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detection of data leakage of the organization’s confidential data on these social
networking sites.
Summary
In this dissertation investigation, the author examined the problem of whether
information security policies assist with preventing unauthorized parties from accessing
confidential and sensitive information. The author further investigated the exploratory
analysis study of Doherty and Fulford (2005) in this dissertation investigation to
determine whether security policies aid in abating security breach incidents against law
firm data and networks. The author furthered the Doherty and Fulford study by
identifying whether information security policies were developed in response to computer
security breach incidents or whether concern for computer security breaches prompted
the development and implementation of information security policies. Thus, this
dissertation investigation posited questions relative to whether information security
policies, computer security breach incidents, and security measures are utilized to
safeguard law firm data.
The goal of this dissertation investigation was to determine whether law firms are
proactive in their security policy development or reactive to security breach incidents. In
this dissertation investigation, the author investigated whether law firms utilize risk
assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests to validate the intended
security policies and ensure the existence of adequate safeguards from attackers and/or
prevention of unauthorized access to law firm confidential information (Myler &
Broadbent).
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The survey questions regarding security threats, information security policies, and
successful implementation of information security policies were adopted from the
original survey instrument received from Doherty and Fulford (2005). Additional
questions posited by the author included self-efficacy issues, applicable privacy laws,
management approval and communication of security policies, and utilization of risk
assessments and other security measures in law firms (Post & Kagan, 2007; Myler &
Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006). This dissertation investigation posited the following 10
specific research questions with the first five questions derived from Doherty and
Fulford’s research. The additional five research questions in the Web-based survey were
designed to investigate how information security policies impact law firms. The 10
primary questions investigated in this dissertation investigation included:
1. Do law firms that have written information security policies have fewer security
breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those that do not have
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?
2. Are law firms that have had information security policies in place for numerous years
likely to have fewer computer security breach incidents in terms of both frequency
and severity than those that do not have information security policies in place
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?
3. Do law firms that have updated their information security policies on a regular basis
have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those
that have not updated their information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p.
26)?
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4. Are law firms that have an information security policy with a broad scope likely to
have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those
organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of best practices likely to have fewer
security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those organizations
that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?
6. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, are law firm employees more
likely to by-pass security measures in order to complete the task (Post & Kagan,
2007)?
7. Are law firm security policies created in response to an information security breach
incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)?
8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests a part of
law firms’ validation of the intended security policies (Myler & Broadbent, 2006;
Verdon, 2006)?
9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and smaller law firms (less than 250 users)
differ in whether they have written information security policies (Gibney & Corham,
2008)?
10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees) and larger law firms (more than 251
users) differ in whether written information security policies were due to information
security breach incidents (Gibney & Corham, 2008)?
In this dissertation investigation, the author collected data from law firm IT personnel
by utilizing Zoomerang, a Web survey tool. Global law firm IT members of ILTA were
surveyed with 1,123 invitations sent out to the ILTA membership by the ILTA Executive
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Director, Randi Mayes. Information was collected based on a Web-based questionnaire
with multi-choice questions, demographic questions, and Likert-scale questions.
Based on the outcomes from this investigation, the author identified a series of
findings and implications:


The results demonstrated in general that written IT security policies in law firms
were not created in response to a security breach incident. These findings suggest
that information security policies are proactively developed by law firms.



The author identified a significant but weak relationship between the number of
issues addressed in an information security policy and the frequency and severity
of reported security breaches. When the number of issues addressed in an
information security policy increased, the number of reported thefts of resources
also tended to increase.



There was evidence of a significant but weak correlation between the Internet’s
past effect on information technology security breaches and the perception that
the need for security policies is greater today than it was one, three, and five years
ago. The results also demonstrated a significant but weak correlation between the
Internet’s projected future effect on IT security breaches and the perception that
the need for information security policies is greater today than it was three years
ago.



The results demonstrated in general the grouping of large and very large law firms
typically have more written information security policies than the grouping of
small and medium law firms. However, there is not a significant difference
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between small law firms and very large law firms with regard to larger law firms
having more information security policies than smaller law firms.


The author determined that investigation findings did not demonstrate a
significant difference in security breach incursions between the grouping of large
and very large law firms and the grouping of small and medium law firms. The
author was unable to conduct an analysis of small law firms and very large law
firms because no one in either group responded that their law firm’s written IT
security policies were developed in response to a security breach incident.



The results demonstrated a significant difference between the small and large law
firms and the small and very large firms with regard to performing a vulnerability
assessment, since small law firms rarely performed vulnerability assessments
while large and very large law firms performed them on a regular basis.



The majority of small, medium, and large law firms overall rarely hired outside
consultants to perform risk assessments or conducted an in-house risk assessment
within the past 12 months, while respondents from one-half (50%) of the very
large law firms indicated they hired an outside consultant once a year and
conducted in-house risk assessments once a year. In addition, approximately onequarter of very large law firm respondents (29%) conduct in-house risk
assessments once a month.



The majority of all four size categories of law firms (small, medium, large, and
very large) reported not having provided employee IS training sessions on
information security awareness and incident reporting within the past 12 months.
These findings demonstrate the importance of fostering a security awareness
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culture annually to address human errors and insider threats (Chen et al., 2006;
Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Kim, 2005; Rotvold, 2008).


The author identified a significant difference between the small and medium,
small and large, small and very large law firms in terms of encryption of e-mail
messages. Small law firms reported using e-mail encryption technologies for email and hard drive data less frequently than medium, large, and very large law
firms. While this is not a surprising finding given the financial constraints of
small law firms, it does provide insight for legislators to apply when they consider
passing laws mandating that all e-mail messages and hard drives containing PII be
encrypted (Worthen, 2008).



The majority of small and medium law firms reported not having revised the
information security policies within the past 12 months, while large and very
large law firms revise them once a year.
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Appendix B
List of Acronyms
Abbreviation/Acronym
ABA
ACC
ANOVA
APEC
ARRA
ASPs
Biz
Board
CAN
CCN
CDs
CIA
CIO
CMR
CoBIT
COSO
CSI
CSO
CVEs
DOB
Edu
EHRs
e-library
EMA
ePHI
ESI
EU
FACTA
FDIC
FFIEC
FIN
FTC
GLBA
Gov

Definition
American Bar Association
Account Information – Financial
Analysis of Variance
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Application Service Providers
Business
Federal Reserve System
Candidate Numbers
Credit Card Numbers
Compact Discs
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
Chief Information Officer
Code of Massachusetts Regulations
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission
Computer Security Institute
Chief Security Officer
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Date of Birth
Education
Electronic Health Records
Electronic Library
E-mail Address
Electronic Protected Health Information
Electronically Stored Information
European Union
Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
Financial
Federal Trade Commission
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Government
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Abbreviation/Acronym
GVSU
HHS
HIPAA
HITECH
HTML
IDSs
IEC
IIS®
ILTA
IPSs
IRB
IS
ISMS
ISO
ISSO
IT
ITRC
M.G.L.
Med
MISC
NAA
NCUA
NIST
NRS
NSU
OCC
OECD
PCI DSS
PDA
PDF
PHI
PII
PIPEDA
SB 1386
SCC
SOX
SPSS™
SSN
U.K.
U.S.

Definition
Grand Valley State University
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Health Insurance and Portability and Accountability Act
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act
Hypertext Markup Language
Intrusion Detection Systems
International Electrotechnical Commission
Microsoft® Internet Information Server
International Legal Technology Association
Intrusion Protection Systems
Institutional Review Board
Information Security
Information Security Management System
International Organization for Standardization
Information Systems Security Officer
Information Technology
Identity Theft Resource Center
Massachusetts General Law
Medical
Miscellaneous
Names and Addresses
National Credit Union Association
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Nevada Revised Statutes
Nova Southeastern University
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards
Personal Digital Assistant
Portable Document Format
Protected Health Information
Personally Identifiable Information
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
California Senate Bill 1386
Statistical Consulting Center
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
Social Security Number
United Kingdom
United States
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Abbreviation/Acronym
U.S. – CERT
USB
WEP

Definition
United States Computer Emergency Response Team
Universal Serial Bus
Wired Equivalent Privacy
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Appendix C
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Appendix E
Survey Instrument to ILTA Members

Impact of Information Security Policies on
Computer Security Breach Incidents in Law Firms Study
The series of questions in the following four sections are designed to provide information
on the impact of information security policies on computer security breach incidents in
law firms. The four sections included:
Section 1:
Section 2:
Section 3:
Section 4:

Law firm Information
Security Breach Information
Information Security Policies
Demographic Questions

I appreciate your willingness to participate in this study. Participation in this study is
entirely voluntary, with no known risks and no payment provided. Please be advised that
all responses were held in strict confidence. Your name will not be linked to your
responses. Your name will also not be used in the reporting of information in
publications or conference presentations. Only cumulative results were analyzed and
placed into my dissertation report. None of the completed questionnaires were reviewed
by anyone other than me.
Please provide the response that best describes your knowledge for each question.
Results of this survey were published on the International Legal Technology Association
(ILTA) Website.
Section 1: Law Firm Information
1. Please indicate the size of your law firm in number of users. Please check only one
response.
Law Firm Size

Small
Medium
Large
Very Large

Number of Users

Please check only one
response

<151 Users
151-250 Users
251-500 Users
>500 Users

_____
_____
_____
_____

2. Please indicate the size of your law firm information technology department. Please
check only one response.
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Law Firm IT Dept.
Size

1
2-10
11-25
>25

Please check only one
response

_____
_____
_____
_____

3. Which of the following most accurately describes the location(s) of your firm’s
offices? Please check only one response.
Location Description

One office in the United States
One office in the United States as well as international office(s)
Multiple offices in the United States
Multiple offices in the United States as well as international
offices
Multiple offices in the United States and one international office
One international office in Europe

Please check only one
response

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

4. Which of the following best describes your law firm? Please check only one
response.
Law Firm Description

United States based law firm
European Union based law firm
Canadian based law firm
Asia Pacific based law firm
Latin American based law firm
Other. Please specify: ___________________

Prefer not to answer

Please check only one
response

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

5. Which of the following information security functions does your law firm
technology-related department(s) provide? Please check all that apply.
Information Security Functions

Information security services
Information security policy development
Privacy policy development
Web page design/development
Incident response
Disaster recovery
Information security appliance/software implementation
We outsource all of these functions
Other. Please specify: ___________________

Do not know

Please check all that
apply

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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6. Does your law firm have a designated person or a group of people who handle
security issues? Please check only one response.
Designated Security Person

Please check only one response

Yes, one person

_____

Yes, a group of people

_____

No

_____

Do not know

_____

If no or do not know, please skip to question 8.
7. If yes, what is their title? Please check only one response.
Title

Chief Security Officer (CSO)
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)
Information System Security Officer (ISSO)
Chief Information Officer (CIO)
Other. Please specify: ___________________
Do not know

Please check only one
response

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Section 2: Security Breach Information
8. Which of the following privacy and/or security laws is your law firm required to
comply with? Please check all that apply.
Privacy and/or Security Laws

PIPEDA (The Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Document Act)
State Data Breach Notification Laws
European Union Directive on Data Protection
GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)
FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act)
FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act)
USA P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act
APEC Privacy Principals (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation)
Australia’s Federal Privacy Act
Japan’s Law Concerning the Protection of Personal Information
Other. Please specify: ___________________
Do not know

Please check all that
apply

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

181

9. Please record in the table below the approximate number of IT security breaches
that your law firm has experienced in the past two years:
Security Threats –
Approximate Number of Occurrences in Last Two
Years

0

1-5

6-10

> 10

Computer virus

_____

_____

_____

_____

Hacking incident (external)

_____

_____

_____

_____

Unauthorized access to / use of data (internal)

_____

_____

_____

_____

Theft of hardware / software

_____

_____

_____

_____

Computer-based fraud

_____

_____

_____

_____

Human error

_____

_____

_____

_____

Natural disaster

_____

_____

_____

_____

Damage by disgruntled employee

_____

_____

_____

_____

10. Please indicate the severity of the worst breach of each type that your law firm has
experienced in the past two years, using the scale provided.
Fairly
Insignificant

Somewhat
Insignificant

Neither
Significant
nor
Insignificant

Somewhat
Significant

Highly
Significant

Not
Applicable

Computer virus

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Hacking incident (external)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Unauthorized access to /
use of data (internal)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Theft of hardware /
software

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Computer-based fraud

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Human error

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Natural disaster

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Damage by disgruntled
employee

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Security Threats –
Severity of Worst Incident in
Last Two Years
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11. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
Statement

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Over the past few years, the
Internet has greatly
increased the number of
security breaches
experienced.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

In the coming years, the
Internet will greatly increase
the risk of IT security
breaches.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Section 3: Information Security Policies
12. Does your law firm have written information technology (IT) security policies?
Please check only one response.
Information Security Policies and
Procedures

Yes
No
Do not know

Please check only one answer

_____
_____
_____

If no or do not know, please skip to question 25.
13. Were your law firm written IT security policies created due to a security
incident/breach? Please check only one response.
Information Security Policies and
Procedures

Yes
No
Do not know

Please check only one answer

_____
_____
_____

14. How long has your law firm been actively using a documented IT security policy?
Please check only one response.
Actively Using Information Security
Policies

Days
Weeks
Months
Years
Do not know

Please check only one answer

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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15. Approximately how often is the IT security policy updated? Please check only one
answer.
IT Security Policies Updated

Never
More than every 2 years
Every 2 years
Every year
Every 6 months
Less than every 6 months
Do not know

Please check only one answer

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

16. Does your law firm audit and enforce the documented IT security policy? Please
check only one answer.
Audit and Enforce IT Policy

Yes
No
Do not know

Please check only one answer

_____
_____
_____

17. Approximately how often is the IT security policy audited by an independent third
party? Please check only one answer.
IT Security Policies Audited

Never
More than every 2 years
Every 2 years
Every year
Every 6 months
Less than every 6 months
Do not know

Please check only one answer

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

18. How is the IT security policy disseminated to law firm employees/lawyers or other
members of the firm? Please check all that apply.
IT Security Policies Disseminated

Law firm Intranet
Staff handbook
Other. Please specify:
_____________

Please check all that apply

_____
_____
_____

19. Using the table below, please indicate the security issues covered in your IT security
policy and/or through separate procedures or standards. If you do not explicitly
cover an issue through your policy or a separate stand-alone standard, please choose
not applicable (N/A).
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Policy
Document
Only

Stand-Alone
Procedure or
Standard
Only

Policy Document
And
Supplementary
Procedure Or Standard

Disclosure of
information

_____

_____

_____

System access control

_____

_____

_____

Internet access

_____

_____

_____

Viruses, worms &
Trojans

_____

_____

_____

Software development

_____

_____

_____

Contingency planning

_____

_____

_____

Encryption

_____

_____

_____

Mobile computing

_____

_____

_____

Personal usage of
Information Systems

_____

_____

_____

Physical security

_____

_____

_____

Violations and
breaches

_____

_____

_____

IT Security Issue

N/A

20. How important do you believe the following factors to be for the successful
implementation of IT security in your law firm on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the
least important and 5 being most important:
Not At
All
Important

Not Very
Important

Somewhat
Important

Very
Important

Extremely
Important

Not
Applicable

Ensuring security policy reflects
business objectives

____

____

____

____

____

____

An approach to implementing
security that is consistent with the
law firm culture

____

____

____

____

____

____

Visible commitment from
management

____

____

____

____

____

____

A good understanding of security
risks

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

Factors

A good understanding of security
requirements
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Factors

Not At
All
Important

Not Very
Important

Somewhat
Important

Very
Important

Extremely
Important

Not
Applicable

Effective marketing of security to
all law firm employees/lawyers
or other members of the firm

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

Distribution of guidance on IT
security policy to all law firm
employees/lawyers or other
members of the firm
Providing appropriate training
and education to all employees/
lawyers or other members of the
firm
Comprehensive measurement
system for evaluating
performance in security
management
Provision of feedback system for
suggesting policy improvements

21. How successful do you believe your law firm has been in adopting each of these
factors on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least important and 5 being most
important:
Factors

Not At All
Successful

Not Very
Successful

Somewhat
Successful

Very
Successful

Extremely
Successful

Not
Applicable

Ensuring security policy reflects
business objectives

____

____

____

____

____

____

An approach to implementing
security that is consistent with
the law firm culture

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

A good understanding of
security risks

____

____

____

____

____

____

A good understanding of
security requirements

____

____

____

____

____

____

Visible commitment from
management
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Factors

Effective marketing of security
to all law firm
employees/lawyers or other
members of the firm
Distribution of guidance on IT
security policy to all law firm
employees/lawyers or other
members of the firm
Providing appropriate training
and education to all employees/
lawyers or other members of the
firm
Comprehensive measurement
system for evaluating
performance in security
management
Provision of feedback system
for suggesting policy
improvements

Not At All
Successful

Not Very
Successful

Somewhat
Successful

Very
Successful

Extremely
Successful

Not
Applicable

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

22. Are IT security policy documents approved by management? Please check only one
answer.
Information Security Policies and
Procedures

Please check only one answer

Yes

_____

No

_____

Do not know

_____

23. Are IT security policy documents published? Please check only one answer.
Information Security Policies and
Procedures

Please check only one answer

Yes

_____

No

_____

Do not know

_____
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24. Are approved IT security policy documents communicated to all law firm
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm and relevant third party service
providers? Please check only one answer.
Information Security Policies and
Procedures

Please check only one answer

Yes – all of them are communicated
to law firm employees/lawyers or
other members of the firm and
relevant third party service providers

_____

Yes – but not communicated to
relevant third party service providers
Yes – but only communicated to
law firm employees/lawyers or other
members of the firm

_____
_____

Yes – but only certain ones are
communicated

_____

No – none of them
Do not know

_____
_____

25. Are law firm computers shut down for inactivity after a defined period? Please
check only one answer.
Information Security

Please check only one answer

Yes
No
Do not know

_____
_____
_____

26. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, how likely would it be for
people in your law firm to:
Not At All
Likely

Not Very
Likely

Somewhat Likely

Very Likely

Extremely
Likely

Scan a file for viruses

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Install security software
updates

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Install a digital certificate

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Install an ActiveX control
from an unknown source

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Statement
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27. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
Statement

The need for information
security policies in law firms
is greater today than it was
one year ago.
The amount of attorneyclient work product
communication over
electronic networks is
greater today than it was one
year ago.
The need for information
security policies in law firms
is greater today than it was
three years ago.
The amount of attorneyclient work product
communication over
electronic networks is
greater today than it was
three years ago.
The need for information
security policies in law firms
is greater today than it was
five years ago.
The amount of attorneyclient work product
communication over
electronic networks is
greater today than it was five
years ago.

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____
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28. During the past 12 months, how often did your law firm? Select the answer that
best applies for each statement.
Statement

Perform a vulnerability
assessment that scanned the law
firm networks to identify
potential security risks.
Hire an outside consultant to
perform a risk assessment to
identify the potential threats,
probabilities, and impact of
threats to the law firm’s
management controls,
operational controls, and
technical controls.
Conduct an in-house risk
assessment of security threats
performed by the members of
the law firm IT department
and/or information security
department.

Not at
All

More Than
Once a Year

Once a
Year

Once a
Month

Every Day

Do Not
Know

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Provide employee training
sessions on information security _____
awareness and incident
reporting
Use managed security services
of a third party

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Encrypt e-mail messages

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Encrypt hard drive data

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Review the information security
policies of the law firm
_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Revise the information security
policies of the law firm

_____
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29. Which of the following statements is true for your law firm? Please check all that
apply.

Statement

Please check all that apply

There is an individual designated as being responsible for
information security in my law firm.

_____

There is a separate department in my law firm responsible for
information security.

_____

Information security falls upon everyone in the information
technology department in my law firm.

_____

No individual is designated as being responsible for
information security in my law firm.

_____

Section 4: Demographic Questions
These last few questions are to help me get to know you, the respondent, better. All of
these responses are optional. Like all of the questions in this questionnaire, your answers
were held in strict confidence. No answers were paired with an individual and only a
cumulative set of results will be presented in the dissertation.
30. What is the highest level of education you have completed:
Education

High School Graduate
Paralegal Certificate
Bachelor Degree
Master Degree
Juris Doctorate
Ph.D.
Other: ________________
Prefer not to answer

Please check the appropriate answer

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

31. Please state your gender:
Gender

Female
Male

Please check the appropriate answer

_____
_____
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32. Please state your age:
Age

Please check the appropriate answer

18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
65+
Prefer not to answer

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

33. Which title best describes your job level:
Title

Associate
Partner
Chief Information Officer/Director
Chief Security Officer/Information
Security Officer
Privacy/Compliance Officer
Law Firm Administrator
Chief Executive Officer
Project Manager
Legal Technology Manager
Paralegal/Legal Assistant
Legal Secretary
Technician
Database Programmer
Database Coder
Network Administrator
Other: ____________________

Please check only one answer

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

34. Would you be willing to be contacted to answer follow-up questions via an e-mail
message linking you to a second follow-up Zoomerang survey, if necessary?
* Please note that your e-mail address will only be used to send you the link to the
additional survey. Any and all additional information obtained would be held in
strict confidence and your name would not be used in the reporting of information.
Agree to Follow-Up Questions

Yes

Please check only one answer

_____

If yes, please provide your e-mail address:
____________________________________________________
No

_____
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Thank you for participating in this study! Please be advised that all responses were held
in strict confidence. Your name will not be linked to your responses and your name will
not be used in the reporting of information in publications or conference
presentations. Only cumulative results were analyzed and placed into my dissertation.
None of the completed questionnaires were reviewed by anyone other than me.
35. Is there anything additional that you would like to share with the researcher? Please
provide your comments in the space provided.
Comments:

Thank you!
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Appendix F
Doherty & Fulford Original Survey Instrument
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Appendix G
Revised Doherty & Fulford Original Survey Instrument

198

199

200

201

Reference List
Alagna, T., Chen, E., Cirino, M., Elliott, C., Elron, R., Foster, S. W., et al. (2005).
Larstan’s: The Black Book on Corporate Security. North Potomac, MD: Larstan
Publishing, Inc.
Arora, A., Nandkumar, A., & Telang, R. (2006). Does information security attack
frequency increase with vulnerability disclosure? An empirical analysis.
Information Systems Frontiers, 8, 350-362.
Baker, W. H. & Wallace, L. (2007). Is information security under control? Investigating
quality in information security management. IEEE Security & Privacy, 5(1), 3644.
Bartlett, D. & Smith, L. (2008). Managing the data loss crisis. Risk Management, 55(6),
34-37.
Basta, A. & Halton, W. (2008). Computer Security and Penetration Testing, Boston,
MA: Thomson Course Technology.
Batista, C. (2006). Better safe than sorry: Assessing internal security on your firm’s
network. International Legal Technology Association (ILTA) Whitepaper,
ILTAnet.org, Cracking the Code on Security, 3-5.
Belsis, P. & Kokolakis, S. (2005). Information systems security from a knowledge
management perspective. Information Management & Computer Security,
13(2/3), 189-202.
Beaver, K. (2007). Hacking for Dummies, 2nd Edition, Indianapolis, IN: Wiley
Publishing, Inc.
Berg, G. G., Freeman, M. S. & Schneider, K. N. (2008). Analyzing the TJ Maxx data
security fiasco: Lessons for auditors. The CPA Journal, 78(8), 34-37.
Bisel, L. D. (2007). The role of SSL in cybersecurity. IT Professional, 9(2), 22-25.
Bowen, P., Hash, J., & Wilson, M. (2006). Information security handbook: A guide for
managers. NIST Special Publication 800-100. Retrieved November 20, 2009,
from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-100/SP800-100-Mar072007.pdf.
California Senate Bill 1386 – SB 1386. (2002, March 20). California Senate bill no.
1386: Chapter 915. California Senate. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_13511400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.pdf.

202

Cannoy, S., Palvia, P.C., & Schilhavy, R. (2006). A research framework for information
systems security. Journal of Information Privacy & Security, 2(2), 3-29.
Carnegie Mellon University. (2007). Welcome to US-CERT vulnerability notes
database. Cert.org. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://cve.mitre.org/about/faqs.html#b3.
Cassini, J. A., Medlin, B.D., & Romaniello, A. (2008). Law and regulations dealing with
information security and privacy: An investigative study. International Journal
of Information Security and Privacy, 2(2), 70-82.
Chandler, J. A. (2007). Negligence liability for breaches of data security. Banking &
Finance Law Review, 23, 223-272.
Chan, M., Woon, I., & Kankanhalli, A. (2005). Perceptions of information security in the
workplace: Linking information security climate to compliant behavior. Journal
of Information Privacy & Security, 1(3), 18-41.
Chen, C. C., Shaw, R. S., & Yang, S. C. (2006). Mitigating information security risks by
increasing user security awareness: A case study of an information security
awareness system. Information Technology, Learning, and Performance Journal,
24(1), 1-14.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services – CMS. (2003). HIPAA administrative
simplification – security: Final rule. Federal Register, 68(34), 8334-8381.
Cocheo, S. (2006). Read this before you take multi-factor plunge. American Bankers
Association, ABA Banking Journal, 98(5), 54-55.
Comerford, J. D. (2006). Competent computing: A lawyer’s ethical duty to safeguard
confidentiality. The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 19, 629-642.
Conger, S. (2009). Personal information privacy: A multi-party endeavor. Journal of
Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 7(1), 71-82.
Congress of the United States of America. (2009). American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, WhiteHouse.gov. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h1enr.pdf.
Creswell, J. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods
Approaches Third Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Creswell, J. W. & Clark, V. L. P. (2007). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods
Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

203

Curtin, C. M. & Ayres, L. T. (2009). Using science to combat data loss: Analyzing
breaches by type and industry. I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the
Information Society, 4(3), 569-601.
D'arcy, J. & Hovav, A. (2009). Does one size fit all? Examining the differential effects of
IS security countermeasures. Journal of Business Ethics: Supplement, 89, 59-71.
Da Veiga & Eloff, J. H. P. (2007). An information security governance framework.
Information Systems Management, 24(4), 361-371.
Desouza, K. C. (2008). The neglected dimension in strategic sourcing: security. Strategic
Outsourcing: an International Journal, 1(3), 288-292.
Doherty, N. F. & Fulford, H. (2005). Do information security policies reduce the
incidence of security breaches: An exploratory analysis. Information Resources
Management Journal, 18(4), 21-39.
Doherty, N. F. & Fulford, H. (2006). Aligning the information security policy with the
strategic information systems plan. Computers & Security, 25, 55-63.
Evans, J. R. & Mathur, A. (2005). The value of online surveys. Internet Research,
15(2), 195-219.
Farn, K-J., Lin, S-K., & Lo, C-C. (2008). A study on e-Taiwan information system
security classification and implementation. Computer Standards & Interface,
30(1), 1-7.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – FDIC. (2004, December). Putting an end to
account-hijacking identity theft study. FDIC.gov. Retrieved October 26, 2009,
from http://192.147.69.84/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudy/identity_theft.pdf.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – FDIC. (2005, June 17). Putting an end to
account-hijacking. Identity theft study supplement. FDIC.gov. Retrieved
November 26, 2009 from
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudysupp/ idtheftsupp.pdf.
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council – FFIEC. (2005, October 12).
Authentication in an Internet banking environment. Retrieved November 20,
2009, from http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf.
Federal Trade Commission. (2005). FACTA disposal rule goes into effect June 1.
FTC.gov. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/
disposal.shtm.

204

Federal Trade Commission. (2007). Identity theft Red Flags and address discrepancies
under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 final rule. FTC.gov.
Retrieved November 20, 2009, from http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2007_register&docid=07-5453-filed.pdf.
Field. A. (2009). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS (3rd Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications, Inc.
Foley, M. F. (2008). The FTC’s Web site privacy and security rules for every business.
Computer and Internet Lawyer, 25(12), 15-21.
Fordham, D. R. (2008). How strong are your passwords? Strategic Finance, 89(11), 4247.
FTC Business Alert. (2005, June). Disposing of consumer report information? New
rule tells how. FTC.gov. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt152.pdf.
Fulford, H. & Doherty, N. (2003). The application of information security policies in
large UK-based organizations: An exploratory investigation. Information
Management & Computer Security, 11(3), 106-114.
Furnell, S. M., Jusoh, A., & Katsabas, D. (2006). The challenges of understanding and
using security: A survey of end-users. Computers & Security, 25(1), 27-35.
Garrison, C. P. (2008). An evaluation of passwords. The CPA Journal, 78(5), 70-71.
Gibney, C. & Corham, T. (2008). ILTA’s 2008 technology survey. Retrieved
January 1, 2009, from http://www.iltanet.org/communications/
pub_detail.aspx?nvID=000000011205&h4ID=000001315505.
Goldberg, J. (2008). The evolution of the law firm risk. Risk Management, 55(8), 48-53.
Gorga, E. & Halberstam, M. (2007). Knowledge inputs, legal institutions and firm
structure: Towards a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Northwestern
University Law Review, 101(3), 1123-1206.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley – GLBA. (1999). Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: The financial
modernization act. FTC.gov. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/glbact.html.
Greenberg, P. (2008, December). Right to know. State Legislatures, 26-29.

205

Greenberg, P. (2009). State security breach notification laws. NCSL.org. Retrieved
November 20, 2009, from http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/
TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/SecurityBreachNotificationLaws/tab
id/13489/Default.aspx.
Greene, S. S., (2006). Security Policies and Procedures: Principles and Practices, Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.
Gunasekara, G. (2007). The ‘final’ privacy frontier? Regulating trans-border data flows.
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 15(3), 362.393.
Gupta, A. & Hammond, R. (2005). Information systems security issues and decisions for
small business: An empirical examination. Information Management &
Computer Security, 13(4), 297-310.
Hadfield, G. K. (2008). Legal barriers to innovation: The growing economic cost of
professional control over corporate legal matters. Stanford Law Review, 60(6),
1689-1732.
Hagen, J. M., Albrechtsen, E. & Hovden, J. (2008). Implementation and effectiveness of
organizational information security measures. Information Management &
Computer Security, 16(4), 377-397.
Harrison, W. (2006). Passwords and passion. IEEE Software, 23(4), 5-7.
Heikkila, F. M. (2006). Information security assessment of law firm networks.
Journal of Business and Behavioral Sciences, 14(1), 123-134.
Heikkila, F. M. (2007). Encryption: Security considerations for portable media devices.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 5(4), 22-27.
Heitzenrater, J. A. (2008). Data breach notification legislation: Recent developments.
I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 4(3) 661-680.
Hildebrand, M. J., & Savare, M. (2008). Privacy principles for accountants. The CPA
Journal, 78(5), 54-59.
Hiltgen, A., Kramp, T., & Weigold, T. (2006). Secure Internet banking authentication.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 4(1), 21-29.
Holloway, M. & Fensholt, E. (2009). HITECH: HIPAA gets a facelift. Benefits Law
Journal, 22(3), 85-89.
Hook, B. (2009). Reducing risk. SC Magazine, 20(5), 26-28.

206

Hong, K-S., Chi, Y-P, Chao, L. R., & Tang, J-H. (2006). An empirical study of
information security policy on information security elevation in Taiwan.
Information Management & Computer Security, 14(2), 104-115.
Humphreys, E. (2007). Implementing the ISO/IEC 27001:Information Security
Management System Standard, Boston, MA: Artech House.
Im, G. P. & Baskerville, R. L. (2005). A longitudinal study of information system
threat categories: The enduring problem of human error. Database for Advances
in Information Systems, 36(4), 68-79.
International Standards Organization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) 27001 Joint Technical Committee. (2005). Information
security management system requirements. (ISO/IEC 27001:2005). London:
British Standards Institution.
International Standards Organization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) 27002 Joint Technical Committee. (2005). Information
technology - Code of practice for information security management. (ISO/IEC
27002:2005). London: British Standards Institution.
ITRC – Identity Theft Resource Center. (2008a). ITRC 2008 data breach list.
IDTheftCenter.org, Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Report_2008_fina
l_1.pdf.
ITRC – Identity Theft Resource Center. (2008b). 2008 data breach stats.
IDTheftCenter.org, Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Stats_Report_200
8_final_1.pdf.
ITRC – Identity Theft Resource Center. (2009). 2008 data breach total soars.
IDTheftCenter.org, Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/m_press/2008_Data_Breach_Total_
Soar_printer.shtml.
Johnson, V. R. (2008). Data security and tort liability. Journal of Internet Law, 11(7),
22-31.
Johnston, A. C. and Warkentin, M. (2008). Information privacy compliance in the
healthcare industry. Information Management & Computer Security, 16(1), 5-19.
Jones, M. E. (2008). Data breaches: Recent developments in the public and private
sectors. I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 3(3) 555580.

207

Kahn, S. & Sheshadri, V. (2008). Medical record privacy and security in a digital
environment. IT Pro, 10(2), 46-52.
Kamal, M. (2008). The psychology of IT security in business. Journal of American
Academy of Business, Cambridge, 13(1), 145-150.
Keller, S., Powell, A., Horstmann, B., Predmore, C., & Crawford, M. (2005). Information
security threats and practices in small businesses. Information Security
Management, 22(2), 7-19.
Kemp. M. (2005). Beyond trust: Security policies and defence-in-depth. Network
Security, 2005(8), 14-16.
Kent, K. & Souppaya, M. (2006). Guide to computer security log management.
NIST Special Publication 800-92. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-92/SP800-92.pdf.
Kim, E. B. (2005). Information security awareness status of full time employees. The
Business Review, Cambridge, 3(2), 219-226.
Kraemer, S., & Carayon, P. (2007). Human errors and violations in computer and
information security: The viewpoint of network administrators and security
specialists. Applied Ergonomics, 38(2), 143-154.
Kugele, N. & Placer, J. (2007, July). Navigating some uncertain waters in Michigan’s
new security breach notification law. Privacy & Data Security Law Journal, 710737.
LaRose, R., Rifon, N. J., & Enbody, R. (2008). Promoting personal responsibility for
Internet safety. Communications of the ACM, 51(3), 71- 76.
Lefferts, J. (2009). Patrick administration’s final data security regulations filed and take
effect March 1, 2010: State received notice of more than 1 million instances of
exposure in two years, Mass.gov. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=ocapressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eoca&b=
pressrelease&f=20091104_idtheft&csid=Eoca.
Li, J. & Shaw, M. J. (2008). Electronic medical records, HIPAA, and patient privacy.
International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 2(3), 45-54.
Lin, P. P. (2006). System security threats and controls. The CPA Journal, 76(7), 58–66.
Massachusetts General Laws. (2008). Security breaches: Regulations to safeguard
personal information of Commonwealth residents, Mass.gov. Retrieved
November 20, 2009, from http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/93h-2.htm.

208

Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation. (2009). 201 CMR
17.00: Standards for the protection of personal information of residents of the
Commonwealth, Mass.gov. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/idtheft/201CMR1700reg.pdf.
McMillion, R. (2006). Case closed. ABA Journal, 92, 66, 68.
Medlin, B. D., Cazier, J. A., & Foulk, D. P. (2008). Analyzing the vulnerability of U.S.
hospitals to social engineering attacks: How many of your employees would share
their password? International Journal of Information Security & Privacy, 2(3),
71-83.
Metzler, M. (2007). Promoting security policy longevity. Computer Security Journal,
XXIII, (2/3), 82-94.
Miller, M. Z. (2007). Why Europe is safe from ChoicePoint: Preventing commercialized
identity theft through strong data protection and privacy laws. The George
Washington International Law Review, 39(2), 395-421.
Moscaritolo, A. (2009, July 30). Red Flags delay. SC Magazine. Retrieved October 11,
2009, from http://www.scmagazineus.com/Red-Flags-delay/article/140888/.
Myler, E. & Broadbent, G. (2006). ISO 17799: Standard for security. The Information
Management Journal, 40(6), 43-52.
Nahra, K. J. (2008). HIPAA security enforcement is here. IEEE Security & Privacy,
6(6), 70-72.
Nelson, S. D., Isom, D. K., & Simek, J. W. (2006). Information Security for Lawyers
and Law Firms. Chicago, IL: ABA Publishing.
Nickell, C. G. & Denyer, C. (2007). An introduction to SAS 70 audits. Benefits Law
Journal, 20(1), 58-68.
NSU Institutional Review Board. (2008). Institutional Review Board for research with
human subjects (IRB) continuation/renewal/renewal of research protocol. Nova
Southeastern University. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.nova.edu/irb/process.html.
Open Security Foundation. (2008). Data loss database 2008 yearly report.
DataLossDB.org. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://datalossdb.org/yearly_reports/dataloss-2008.pdf.

209
Otto, P. N., Antón, A. I., & Baumer, D. L. (2007). The ChoicePoint dilemma: How data
brokers should handle the privacy of personal information. IEEE Security &
Privacy,5(5), 15-23.
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (3rd Ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
PCI Security Standards Council LLC. (2008). Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (DSS) v 1.2. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml.
Pfleeger, S. L. & Rue, R. (2008). Cybersecurity economic issues: Clearing the path to
good practice. IEEE Software, 25(1), 35-42.
PIPEDA (The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act). (1998).
Privacy Act. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.priv.gc.ca/legislation/02_06_01_e.cfm.
Podgers, J. (2008). A new mission. ABA Journal, 94(12), 60.
Podgers, J. (2009). Wells: FTC delay on 'Red Flag Rule' aids ABA effort. ABA Journal,
95(9), 64-65.
Post, G. V. & Kagan, A. (2007). Evaluating information security tradeoffs: Restricting
access can interfere with user tasks. Computer & Security, 26(3), 229-237.
Power, R. (2002). 2002 CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey. Computer Security
Issues & Trends, VII(1), 1-24. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://diogenesllc.com/2002cybercrimesurvey.pdf.
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2008). A chronology of data breaches.
PrivacyRights.org. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#1.
Punter, T., Ciolkowski, M., Freimut, B. & John, I. (2003). Conduting on-line surveys in
software engineering. International Sysmposium of Empirical Software
Engineering, 80-88.
Radcliff, D. (2008). Slurping the USB port. SC Magazine, 19(9), 30-31.
Raether, R. I. Jr. (2008). Data security and ethical hacking: Points to consider for
eliminating avoidable exposure. Business Law Today, 18(1), 55-58.
Ramim, M. & Levy, Y. (2006). Securing e-learning systems: A case of insider cyber
attacks and novice IT management in a small university. Journal of Cases on
Information Technology, 8(4), 24-34.

210
Reinstein, A. & Seward, J. (2008). Client-CPA-attorney privilege and information
technology risk. The CPA Journal, 78(11), 66-71.
Rey, J. (2008). Are you “red flag” ready? American Bankers Association – ABA
Banking Journal, 100(7), 47-50.
Richardson, R. (2006). Headstrong passwords. Computer Security Journal, XXII(2), 7 –
10.
Richardson, R. (2009). 2008 CSI computer crime and security survey. GOCSI.com.
Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://i.cmpnet.com/v2.gocsi.com/pdf/CSIsurvey2008.pdf.
Ries, D. (2007). Information security for attorneys: An ethical obligation. Pennsylvania
Bar Association Quarterly, 78(1), 1-14.
Robinson, T. (2005). Data security in the age of compliance. netWorker, 9(3), 24-30.
Romanosky, S., Telang, R, & Acquisti, A. (2008). Do data breach disclosure laws reduce
identity theft? Seventh Workshop on the Economics of Information Security,
Hanover, NH, June 25-28, 1-20.
Ross, R. (2007). Managing enterprise security risk with NIST standards. Computer,
40(8), 88-91.
Roster, C. A., Rogers, R. D., Hozier, G. C., Baker, K. G., & Albaum, G. (2007).
Management of marketing research projects: Does delivery method matter
anymore in survey research? Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 15(2),
127-144.
Rotvold, G. (2008). How to create a security culture in your organization. Information
Management Journal, 42(6), 32-34, 36-38.
Salmela, H. (2008). Analysing business losses caused by information systems risk: A
business process analysis approach. Journal of Information Technology, 23(3),
185-202.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. (2002, July 30). H.R. 3763, Public Law 107, 116 Stat. 745810. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from http://www.soxlaw.com/.
Schreft, S. L. (2007). Risks of identity theft: Can the market protect the
payment system?. Economic Review – Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
92(4), 5-40.
Schwartz, P. M. & Janger, E. J. (2007). Notification of data security breaches. Michigan
Law Review, 105(5), 913-984.

211
Sekaran, U. (2003). Research Methods for Business: A Skill Building Approach.
New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Silverman, D. L. (2007). Data security breaches: The state of notification laws.
Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 19(7), 5-12.
Sinkovics, R. R., Penz, E., & Ghauri, P. N. (2008). Enhancing the trustworthiness of
qualitative research in international business. Management International Review,
48(6), 689-713.
Siponen, M. & Iivari, J. (2006). Six design theories for IS security policies and
guidelines. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 7(7), 445-472.
Siponen, M. T. & Oinas-Kukkonen, H. (2007). A review of information security issues
and respective research contributions. The Database for Advances in Information
Systems, 38(1), 60-80.
Stream, G. & Fletcher, J. (2008). Demystifying computer networks for small practices.
Family Practice Management, 15(1), 25-28.
Sveen, F. O., Sarriegi, J. M., Rich. E., & Gonzalez, J. J. (2007). Towards viable
information security reporting systems. Information Management & Computer
Security, 15(5), 408-419.
Swartz, N. (2008). Record data breaches in 2008. Information Management Journal,
42(6), 20.
Swire, P. P. & Bermann, S. (2007). Information Privacy: Official Reference for the
Certified Information Privacy Professional (CIPP), York, ME: International
Association of Privacy Professionals.
Taylor, E., & Murthy, U. (2009). Knowledge sharing among accounting academics in an
electronic network of practice. Accounting Horizons, 23(2), 151-179.
Thomson, K-L. & von Solms, R. (2006). Towards an information security competence
maturity model. Computer Fraud & Security, 2006(5), 11-15.
U. S. Department of Commerce. (2000). Safe Harbor certification. Export.gov.
Retrieved November 20, 2009, from http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/.
Verdon, D. (2006). Security policies and the software developer. IEEE Security &
Privacy, 4(4), 42-49.
Walton, R. B. (2009, October 30). Order granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/ABA_v._FTC_Amended_Order.pdf.

212

Weaver, R. (2007). Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures Second Edition.
Boston, MA: Thomson Course Technology.
Wernick, A. S. (2009, July/August). Red Flags Rule: Will you be compliant or
complacent? Ohio Lawyer, 14-17.
West, R. (2008). The psychology of security. Communications of the ACM, 51(4), 3440.
Whitman, M. E. & Mattord, H. J. (2008). Management of Information Security Second
Edition. Boston, MA: Thomson Course Technology.
Wiant, T. L. (2005). Information security policy’s impact on reporting security incidents.
Computers & Society, 24, 448-459.
Worthen, B. (2008, October 16). New data privacy laws set for firms. The Wall Street
Journal. Retrieved November 20, 2009, from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122411532152538495.html.
Wugmeister, M., Retzer, K. & Rich, C. (2007). Global solution for cross-border data
transfers: Making the case for corporate privacy rules, Georgetown Journal of
International Law, 38(3), 449-498.

